Free Will and Fixed Futures Jim Fahey Philosophy Group-Department of Cognitive Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Fatalism “Cartoon” Fatalism: Appointment in Samara The Problem and How to Fix it: If the events “in between” fated events are “metaphysically open,” then it is possible that an event occurs that gets in the way of a “fated” event. To Fix This we must in some way constrain the events that are “in between” fated events.

Fatalism (cont.) A “non-crazy” form of fatalism (one traditional way of fixing “cartoon fatalism”): Aristotelian Fatalism: The Problem of “Tomorrow’s Sea Fight” in light of the Law of the Excluded Middle -- P v ~P (p 1 v ~p 1 ) Instances of the (p 2 v ~p 2 )Law of Excluded Middle (p 3 v ~p 3 ).

Aristotelian Fatalism (cont.) If we consider the collection of all of the TRUE PROPOSITIONS, Aristotle worries that they will amount to a comprehensive map of the World – past, present and future. And if this is the case, then it seems that no one can ever do otherwise than what it is already true that they will do! Aristotle worries that from this it follows that such things as deliberation, rational action and moral responsibility DO NOT EXIST.

Aristotelian Fatalism (cont.)

Responses to Aristotle’s Worry: “Head in the Sand” response: since we don’t (can’t) know the future, there is nothing to worry about. – But Aristotle’s worry is a metaphysical one; our epistemic shortcomings are not a factor. “We Make the Future” response: More defensible is the view that the future is FIXED in the way that it is because I make it happen in just that way.

God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will On another level, the God of the Western religious tradition is OMNISCIENT. But if God knows what I will do in the future, it seems that I cannot do otherwise than what God knows I will do. And if I CANNOT DO OTHERWISE than what God knows I will do, how can God hold me legitimately morally responsible for what I cannot help but do?

God’s Foreknowledge and Human Free Will (cont.) Augustine’s Two classic responses: 1.Willings by their nature must be free. (since unfree willings would be “willings against one’s will,” which is absurd) 2.From the mere fact that God knows what I will choose, it does not follow that God makes me choose in just that way.

Minority Report However it does follow from the traditional Western View of God and also, I think, Minority Report that the knowledge claimed on the part of both God and the precognizers is NOT mere inductive/abductive knowledge. That is, in neither case is the knowledge mere fallible prediction. As I see it, if either God or Agatha know that I will do future event F, then it is inevitable that I do F. and this entails that I will do F, regardless of what other events logically compatible with F might occur.

Minority Report (cont.) More particularly, for Agatha, If person S experiences precognition P of future event F, then F inevitably occurs and either (i) F backwardly causes P, or (ii) whatever causes F inevitably to occur, also causes P to occur. But if this is the correct view about precognition, then the view that a precognized event can be prevented is FALSE.

God and Minority Report Does an analogous claim hold for God’s Foreknowledge? The standard claim is that IT DOES NOT since God is an eternal Being who exists outside of space & time. Hence, in truth, God has no foreknowledge since, for God, everything is a kind of timeless, tenseless, present moment. However, many argue that if God has certainty (certain knowledge) about what for me are future events, then these events are inevitable and hence unfree.

Determinism: A Prelude The “Covering Law” model of explanation. All A’s are B’sA: instances of water at A 1 sea level pressure under degrees Celsius B 1 B: instances of water freezing

Causation, Determinism and Free Will UNIVERSAL CAUSAL DETERMINISM (Covering Law Model on steroids) ALL LAWS OF NATURE. INITIAL CONDITIONS (at some point in time) EVERY EVENT

Causal Determinism

Determinism and Moral Responsibility TWO STATEMENTS: (1)Determinism is true. (2) Persons perform free, rational actions for which they can be correctly held morally responsible.

Determinism and Moral Responsibility HARD DETERMINISM (1),~(2) FREE WILLISM ~(1),(2) SOFT DETERMINISM (1),(2)

Determinism and Moral Responsibility (cont.) COMPATIBILISM It is LOG. POS. that ( (1) & (2) ) (Soft Determinists are Compatibilists but Compatibilists need not be Soft Determinists) INCOMPATIBILISM ~ LOG. POS. ( (1) & (2) ) (Typically, Free Willists and Hard Determinists are Incompatibilists.)

Determinism and Moral Responsibility (cont.) The Free Action Principle, a principle about which every one seems to agree: If (person) S performs free action A, then S could have done otherwise. Soft Determinist interpretation: “S could have done otherwise if S had chosen to do otherwise.” Free Willist (and Hard Determinist) interpretation: “S could have done otherwise under exactly similar circumstances.”

Mechanism & the Big Bang But suppose Determinism is FALSE since Laws of Nature are NOT universal generalizations but merely statistical generalizations. Nevertheless, if every event unfolds in accord with statistical laws stating the world’s statistical ways of working, we might say that mechanism is the case.

Mechanism & the Big Bang CAUSAL MECHANISM ALL (STATISTICAL) LAWS OF NATURE. INITIAL CONDITIONS (at some point in time) LIKLIHOOD OF EVERY EVENT

Mechanism & the Big Bang TWO STATEMENTS: (1)Mechanism is true. (2) Persons perform free, rational actions for which they can be correctly held morally responsible.

Mechanism & the Big Bang QUESTION: Are (1) and (2) “COMPATIBLE?”

Mechanism & the Big Bang Suppose the “Big Bang” happened in the “standard manner.” That is, suppose that all of space & time (spacetime) came into existence “all at once” as a universe of 4 (or more) dimensions. QUESTION: Since every event is FIXED throughout the history of the universe, ARE FREE ACTIONS POSSIBLE IN SUCH A UNIVERSE?

Aristotle’s Worry Revisited