The EU Response Developments in EU Cartel Enforcement Howard T. Rosenblatt Howrey LLP Brussels International Cartels Law Seminars International Conference.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment
Advertisements

2012 ICN Cartel Workshop Panama City, Panama, Thursday, October 4 th, 2012 Lisa M. Phelan Chief of the National Criminal Enforcement Section (NCES) United.
The civilian consequences of competition law violations Copenhagen 28 September European Commission, DG Competition How can we construe a European.
RESTRICITVE PRACTICES AND LENIENCY Zuzana Šimeková European Union – Opportunities and Challenges June 2009, Dubrovnik.
John W. McReynolds Assistant Chief, New York Field Office Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice Judicial Training Program Moscow, Russia July.
Enforcement pluralism Regulation of market conduct –EU Commission General surveillance of compliance with the Treaty “Trustbuster”: DG Comp –National Competition.
Cracking Cartels With Leniency Programs Scott D. Hammond Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement Antitrust Division, U.S. Department.
Onscreen cover – Alternative 5 Joint and several liability for cartel fines: lessons from Gigaset and Siemens Austria 73 TH LUNCH TALK OF THE GCLC Winfred.
POWELL, GOLDSTEIN, FRAZER & MURPHY LLP ORIGINAL IDEAS. UNCOMMON SOLUTIONS. U.S. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT Presented by Neil R. Ellis Vienna, Austria.
CITD Seminar - Doing Business in Europe IRONBRIDGE, LLP CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS September 21, 2004 San Francisco, CA.
1 Recent Developments in Competition Law in Australia ABA Spring Meeting, Global Antitrust Panel (The East) Washington DC, April 2009 Elizabeth M. Avery.
Form NYIMG0039 (Rev. 11/11/10). Regulation 194: Producer Compensation Transparency New rule imposes mandatory compensation disclosure requirements on.
Criminal Antitrust Practice Donald C. Klawiter J. Clayton Everett, Jr. Jennifer M. Driscoll.
Entrepreneurship: A business of your own
THE VITAMINS‘ CARTEL global dimension 1997 Case filed in Alabama: Robertson v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd Donaldson & Hosenbein, Inc. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche.
LUMSA – International Commercial Law 24 October 2014 Prof. Avv. Roberto Pirozzi
Obtaining Evidence through Discovery & Witnesses John W. McReynolds Assistant Chief New York Field Office Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice.
58th UIA Congress31 October 2014 Personal liability for infringements of competition law in Denmark Martin André Dittmer | 31 October 2014.
Criminalization of Cartels UHOS Conference 11 th November 2008 – Brno, Czech Republic Carolyn Galbreath Member and Director Cartels Division The Competition.
NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION REGULATORY PRACTICES WORKSHOP MODULE: 4 INVESTIGATION.
Philip Kienapfel, European Commission, DG Competition
Mini Plenary 3: Cartel Enforcement and Leniency in Developing Agencies Leniency Programme in Turkey Gülçin DERE Competition Expert Turkish Competition.
Case COMP/ – ENI (Abuse of Dominant Position) International Competition Law Dushanka Dovichinska 24 Nov 2010.
Cartel investigations in the EU: Procedural fairness for defendants and claimants Dave Anderson – Partner, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels UOHS St.
Recent antitrust enforcement activity in the payment card industry – Visa/Morgan Stanley and Cartes Bancaires Peter Willis, Dundas & Wilson LLP ABA Antitrust.
Entrepreneurship: A business of your own. Vocabulary Entrepreneur: a person who organizes and manages a business Entrepreneurship: the organization and.
Interface between Leniency, Direct Settlement and Criminal Sanctions – A UK perspective European Competition Day, Brno Philip Collins Chairman Office of.
Post-Grant & Inter Partes Review Procedures Presented to AIPPI, Italy February 10, 2012 By Joerg-Uwe Szipl Griffin & Szipl, P.C.
European Commission, DG Competition, Directorate G, Cartels Interface Between Leniency and Settlements in European Commission proceedings Sari Suurnäkki,
Akinori Uesugi 13 December 2007 Recent Antitrust Developments in Japan.
Dr Ulrich Classen Private Antitrust Enforcement – Experience and Perspectives – Vereniging voor Mededingingsrecht (The Hague, 25 th April 2007)
Individual liability for competition law infringements Koen Platteau UIA - Firenze 31 October 2014.
European Cartel Enforcement and Investigations ABA Antitrust 51st Annual Spring Meeting Alec Burnside April 2003.
Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Relevant changes to the amount of fine. Defining and applying mitigating and aggravating.
FEDERAL ANTIMONOPOLY SERVICE International Competition Network 6 th Annual Conference Moscow 2007 Application Experience of International Competition Network.
Settlements Wouter Wils * BIICL, 15 May 2008 * All views expressed are strictly personal.
Navigating the Roadblocks on the Leniency Highway Multijurisdictional Implications Julian Joshua Howrey Simon Arnold & White LLP College of Europe Global.
Alfredo M. O´Farrell American Bar Association - Fall Meeting Latin American Antitrust: New Rules and Issues for American and European Investors.
Recent Trends and Developments in Competition Law - Private Enforcement Panel Dave Anderson Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Brussels Czech Office for the.
Developments in Australian Competition Law ABA International Asia/Pacific Antitrust Round-Up Fiona Crosbie, Partner Allens Arthur Robinson.
EU MERGER LAW: fundamentals Eleanor M. Fox Professor, New York University School of Law ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting 2005.
© Hogan & Hartson LLP. All rights reserved. Cartels Fines, Leniency, Settlement John Pheasant November 28, 2007 Brussels.
xx session2_opening_notes.ppt Submission May 2004 Ajay Rajkumar, Chair, Slide 1 IEEE Session #2 Opening Session Ajay Rajkumar.
Changes to Contested Case Hearing Requirements and Procedures Janis Hudson Environmental Law Division Texas Commission on Environmental Quality Advanced.
 To teach our students  To model for our students  To avoid unwittingly breaking the law  To avoid possible infringement entanglements  Why do you.
Proposed and Recent Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Some thoughts on enforcing EEA competition law in Iceland 17 February Gjermund Mathisen Director for Competition and State aid.
European Commission, DG Competition Consumer Detergents « The Washing Powder Cartel »
Boston New York San Francisco Washington, DC Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute Understanding Intellectual Property June 4, 2008.
Keep Secure Your Creative Work with Copyright Registration.
SMEs and private enforcement of competition law Rachel Burgess Ph:
Dr. Anastasios Xeniadis Dr. Luca Schicho
Competition Law and its Application: European Union
ANTITRUST DAMAGES CLAIMS UNDER EU AND NATIONAL LAW A TRANSPORTATION SECTOR FOCUS Pedro Callol.
Competition Law Enforcement in the E.U. - Dawn Raids -
Antitrust Section of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB-SP)
Caron Beaton-Wells and Julie Clarke
The EU Competition Law Fining System European Parliament Committee on economic and monetary affairs Working group on competition policy Antoine Winckler.
Discovery / disclosure issues in EU cartel enforcement
European Commission's fining policy 10 February 2015
ICN | The interplay between private enforcement and leniency policy
ICN Cartel Working Group SG-1
Commissioner’s Legal Advisor - Italian Competition Authority
Non-Discretionary Administrative Sanctions under the AMA in Japan
ICN Cartel Working Group SG 1 Call Series Linda Plumpton
Public antitrust enforcement- Procedure and Standards of Judicial Review in EU Competition Law EU Antitrust Law September 2018, Zadar Croatia.
The interaction between public and private enforcement of EU competition rules Helena Penovski European Competition Network and Private Enforcement Unit.
The Hungarian informant reward programme
ICN webinar on parental liability 20 September 2017 Tímea Pálos
The interplay between private enforcement and leniency policy
Presentation transcript:

The EU Response Developments in EU Cartel Enforcement Howard T. Rosenblatt Howrey LLP Brussels International Cartels Law Seminars International Conference Washington, DC, 7-8 September 2006

The EU Backdrop Between 2002 and 2005: 165 applications (80 cartels). But few decisions. Dedicated cartel directorate established, three units with 40 case handlers. Plea bargaining? Wait and see approach.

Massive Fines Hoffman-La Roche€462 million Lafarge SABASF AG€249 million BASF AG€237 million Total €219 million Arjo Wiggins Appleton€184 million Solvay€167 million BPB PLC€138 million Hoechst€ 99 million

New Fining Guidelines Published in the O.J. on 1 September 2006 Likely effect: Substantial increase in most cases, especially for large companies in long cartels. Neely Kroes: “Don’t break the antitrust rules; if you do, stop it as quickly as possible, and once you’ve stopped, don’t do it again....If companies do not pay attention to these signals they will pay a very high price.”

New Fining Guidelines 1998 Guidelines Silent on methodology for calculating start point. Start point is increased by 10% for each year of infringement. No “entry fee”. Recidivism typically increases basic amount by a total of 50% Guidelines Percentage sales of relevant product (<30%). Start point is multiplied by number of years of infringement. New “entry fee”. Recidivism increases basic amount by 100% for each prior act.

Hypothetical: Le Prix, SA Five-year cartel EEA Sales of €100 million Second offense

Le Prix, SA 1998 Guidelines 1.Start Point:30% x €100 million = €30 million. 2.Duration:€30 million x 1.5 = €45 million. 3.Recidivism:€45 million x 1.5 €67.5 million 2006 Guidelines 1.Start Point:30% x €100 million = €30 million. 2.Duration:€30 million x 5 = €150 million. 3.“Entry fee”:€150 million + €25 million = €175 million. 4.Recidivism: €175 million x 2 €350.0 million

New Fining Guidelines Premium on keeping a clean record. Premium on discovering and ending ongoing cartels. Leniency calculus even more critical. Prelude to plea bargaining?

Hot Topics Sufficient evidence to prove a cartel –Relying on (increasingly oral) “corporate statements” in leniency applications as proof against all. –This issue is currently on appeal to the CFI in at least two cases. –Commission already imposing tougher standards to obtain immunity or leniency.

Hot Topics Parental liability –Extreme willingness to disregard corporate structures –Even more relevant after the new fine guidelines: disregarding the corporate structure raises the 10%-of-turnover ceiling.

Hot Topics Discoverability of leniency materials –Amended 2002 Leniency Notice formalizes use of oral applications: –No need to sign transcript –Other parties can read, but not copy –Implications

The EU Response Developments in EU Cartel Enforcement Howard T. Rosenblatt Howrey LLP Brussels International Cartels Law Seminars International Conference Washington, DC, 7-8 September 2006