The El Farol Bar Problem on Complex Networks Maziar Nekovee BT Research Mathematics of Networks, Oxford, 7/4/2006.

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The El Farol Bar Problem on Complex Networks Maziar Nekovee BT Research Mathematics of Networks, Oxford, 7/4/2006

Content Motivation. The El Farol Bar problem. Solutions extensions and critique. El Farol on social networks. Conclusions.

Motivation Many real-life situations involve a set of independent agents/entities competing for the same resource, in an uncoordinated fashion. drivers choosing similar travel routes. visitors to a popular website. ………………………….. …………………………… wireless devices (wifi, Bluetooth etc) sharing RF spectrum.

a cognitive radio a network of cognitive radios: independent learners and decision makers competing the same resource (RF Spectrum) Scientific American, March 2006

The El Farol Bar Problem

Mathematical formulation

Decision making model Each customer has a finite set of predictors which s/he uses to predictor next week’s attendance, based on past attendance history. Each predictor has a score associated to it, which is updated according to: Customers use the predictor with the highest score to predict next week’s attendance. Then: reinforced learning

Predictors The same as last week A (rounded) average of the last m attendances. The same as 3 weeks ago. The trend in the last 8 weeks (bounded by 0 and 100) …

Simplified El Farol (Minority Game) Challet and Zhang, 1997.

Key questions Would bar attendance settles to some stationary state: Can decentralised decision making result in efficient utilization of the bar:

Nash Equilibrium W. B. Arthur, 1984.

Critique of El Farol Predictor’s choice. Global information available to agents regardless attendance. Other learning mechanisms. The impacts of inter-agent communication (via a social network).

Statistical mechanic’s approach Marsili, Challet, et al Johnson et al

A strategy soup

Marsili, Challet, Otino, 2003

Stochastic solution with simple adaptive behaviour Agents adapt their attendance probability through a simple process of “habit forming”: Full information on attendance: Partial information on attendance: Bell, Sethares, Buklew, 2003 (bounded by 0 and 1)

(simplified) El Farol on networks

El Farol on social networks N agents connected via a social network. Instead of interacting via a global signal of attendance history, agents interact with K other (randomly chosen) agents. Galstyan, Kolar, Lerman, 2003

Emergence of scale-free influence networks A social network of N agents through which agents communicate (ER random graph). Agents play the minority game on the graph, using reinforced learning to select a leader among their nearest neighbours: Toroczkai, Anghel, Basselr, Korniss, 2004

Emergence of scale-free influence network Toroczkai, Anghel, Basselr, Korniss, 2004

Conclusions The El Farol bar problem (EFBP) is highly relevant to understanding distributed resource sharing in interacting multi-agent systems. Many unexplored questions remain. Information flow via inter-agent networks can greatly impact the dynamics of EFP. EFP on cognitive radio networks. Thanks to Matteo Marsili for pointing me to the EFBP work in progress