Coye Cheshire March 2, 2016 // Computer-Mediated Communication Information Pools and Incentives for Collective Action

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication1 Producing ‘Impossible Goods’: Thinking About Classifying Information Pools Order  The process of production and exchange is well- defined and the outcome product is clearly specified Coordination  The roles of the various actors are clearly specified.

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore2

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication3 Selective Incentives as Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem?

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication4  “Nearly anonymous people from around the world with no prior introduction independently request or contribute time and expertise and freely give the result away to anyone interested without payment or coercion”  Marc Smith (1999), referring to the Usenet Their info Your info My info

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication5 Group Size and Collective Goods Remember: Olson’s group size effect should be reversed if the value of the good does not decrease as individuals consume it (Marwell and Oliver 1993)

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication6 Information as a Public Good 1)Information can be consumed by many without losing value (Jointness of Supply or Non-Rival Goods) 2)When information is transferred or exchanged, this can often be done in replication. “…is information like love—you don’t lose it when you give it away?” (former unnamed student)

Jointness of Supply  Ranges from ‘pure’ (non-rival) to zero (rival) 3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication7 Vs. book_of_knowledge.pdf

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication8 Replication  ‘Replication’ is a specific capability of some goods. It is related to, but not the same as, jointness of supply. Vs.

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication9 Producing Digital Goods as “Collective Action”  Peer-to-peer file swapping  Open-source software  Collective editing information systems

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication10 Information Pool Information Pools as “Group-Generalized Exchange”

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication11 + = Productive Exchange

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication12 Information Pool Information Pools as Types of Exchange Information Pool Generalized Exchange Productive Exchange

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication13 What about Motivations?

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication14 If only 2% of the users of a given Internet system contribute, why do they do so? Other incentives besides the content value of the digital goods?

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication15 Altruism? Rational Zealotry?

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication16 Intrinsic Motivations for Contributing to Wikipedia (Zhang and Zhu 2006)

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication17 Zhang and Zhu 2006

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication18 Selective Incentives and Public Goods Public Good “Second-order social dilemma If incentives are intrinsic, we can avoid the 2 nd order social dilemma

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication19 Social Psychological Selective Incentives Social psychological processes could give small, positive feelings to contributors Social psychological processes may be small, but they can have a relatively powerful effect if the costs of contribution are very small as well

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3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication21 Two Other Selective Incentives…  Social Approval  Observational Cooperation

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication22 Results of Information Sharing Experiment

3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore23 But there’s more! (see: Ling et al. 2005)  Uniqueness of contribution  Similarity/Homogeneity of the Group  Personal and community benefits (salience)  ‘Reminders’ for intrinsic motivation

Synchronous Feedback (Internet Field Experiment with Mycroft System 3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication24

Feedback as Incentives 3/2/2016Computer-Mediated Communication25

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