CPS 196.2 Proper scoring rules Vincent Conitzer

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Presentation transcript:

CPS Proper scoring rules Vincent Conitzer

How to incentivize a weather forecaster P( ) =.7 P( ) =.3 P( ) =.8 P( ) =.2 Forecaster’s bonus can depend on –Prediction –Actual weather on predicted day Reporting true beliefs should maximize expected bonus

A first attempt Suppose we reward the forecaster as follows: –Suppose outcome i happened –Pay the forecaster the probability he assigned to i Notation (in binary setting): –x = whether the event (say, rain) happens 1 if rain, 0 if sun –q = probability (of rain) reported by forecaster –p = forecaster’s private (true) probability (of rain) So, forecaster receives xq + (1-x)(1-q) Forecaster’s expected payoff for reporting q: pq + (1-p)(1-q) How does forecaster choose q to maximize expected payoff?

A different reward function How about: xq - q 2 /2 Forecaster’s expected payoff: pq - q 2 /2 Derivative w.r.t. q: p - q –Setting to 0 gives q=p –Note second derivative is negative Forecaster is (strictly) incentivized to tell the truth! We say that xq - q 2 /2 is a proper scoring rule Little funny: asymmetric between x=0 and x=1

Brier (aka. quadratic) scoring rule How about: 1 - (x - q) 2 Forecaster’s expected payoff: 1 - p(1 - q) 2 - (1 - p)q 2 Derivative w.r.t. q: -2pq + 2p - 2(1-p)q = 2p-2q –Setting to 0 gives q=p –Note second derivative is negative So Brier is also proper

Logarithmic scoring rule How about x log q + (1-x) log (1-q) Forecaster’s expected payoff: p log q + (1-p) log (1-q) Derivative w.r.t. q: p/q - (1-p)/(1-q) –Setting to 0 gives q=p –Note second derivative is negative So logarithmic is also proper

A securities-based interpretation Let’s say we allow the forecaster to buy “rain securities” Each rain security pays off 1 if it rains, 0 otherwise Price starts at 0; After the forecaster buys s(0) securities, we increase the price to.1; After the forecaster buys s(.1) securities, we increase the price to.2; Etc. Forecaster should keep buying until price = p –(regardless of function s)

A securities-based interpretation p=.34 s(0) s(.1) s(.2) s(.3) s(.4) s(.5) Forecaster pays s(0)*0 + s(.1)*.1 + s(.2)*.2 + s(.3)*.3, expects.34*(s(0)+s(.1)+s(.2)+s(.3))

Formulas If the forecaster buys up to price q, he will end up buying y=0 ∑ q s(y) securities (y is the price) He will pay y=0 ∑ q s(y)y He expects a payoff of p* y=0 ∑ q s(y)

Making things continuous If the forecaster buys up to price q, he will end up buying y=0 ∫ q s(y)dy securities He will pay y=0 ∫ q s(y)ydy He expects a payoff of p* y=0 ∫ q s(y)dy

Example s(y) = 1 If the forecaster buys up to price q, he will pay y=0 ∫ q s(y)ydy = y=0 ∫ q ydy = q 2 /2 He will receive x* y=0 ∫ q s(y)dy = x* y=0 ∫ q dy = xq Total payoff = xq - q 2 /2 This was the proper scoring rule we started with!

Another example s(y) = y If the forecaster buys up to price q, he will pay y=0 ∫ q s(y)ydy = y=0 ∫ q y 2 dy = q 3 /3 He will receive x* y=0 ∫ q s(y)dy = x* y=0 ∫ q ydy = xq 2 /2 Total payoff = xq 2 /2 - q 3 /3 Expected payoff = pq 2 /2 - q 3 /3 Derivative w.r.t. q = pq - q 2 –Expected payoff maximized at q=p I.e. xq 2 /2 - q 3 /3 is also a proper scoring rule –Not surprising, since of course you want to keep buying up to where the price hits p

Yet another example s(y) = e y If the forecaster buys up to price q, he will pay y=0 ∫ q s(y)ydy = y=0 ∫ q e y ydy = (q-1)e q He will receive x* y=0 ∫ q s(y)dy = x* y=0 ∫ q e y dy = xe q Total payoff = xe q - (q-1)e q Expected payoff = pe q - (q-1)e q Derivative w.r.t. q = pe q - (q-1)e q - e q –Expected payoff maximized at q=p I.e. xe q - (q-1)e q is also a proper scoring rule –Not surprising, since of course you want to keep buying up to where the price hits p

More than two outcomes P( ) =.5 P( ) =.3 P( ) =.2 P( ) =.8 P( ) =.1 Can extend all the above by simply asking for separate predictions for whether there will be sun, whether there will be rain, whether there will be lightning

Market scoring rules Extend proper scoring rules to multiple forecasters Each forecaster is allowed to move current distribution Gets rewarded according to new distribution, minus reward for previous distribution Say we use proper scoring rule xq - q 2 /2 P( ) =.3P( ) =.5P( ) =.4 x(.3) - (.3) 2 /2x(.5) - (.5) 2 /2 - x(.3) + (.3) 2 /2 x(.4) - (.4) 2 /2 - x(.5) + (.5) 2 /2 time