1 SHARCS: Secure Hardware-Software Architectures for Robust Computing Systems Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH.

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1 SHARCS: Secure Hardware-Software Architectures for Robust Computing Systems Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH

Project Details  Start date:  Duration: 36 months  Budget: 3,105,762  Coordinator: FORTH  Academia  FORTH  Vrije Universiteit  Chalmers  TU Braunschweig  Industry  Neurasmus BV  OnApp Limited  IBM Ltd  Elektrobit GMBH 2

Overview  Design, build and demonstrate secure-by-design system architectures that achieve end-to-end security  Analyze and extend each H/W and S/W layer  Technologies developed directly utilizable by applications and services that require end-to-end security 3

Motivation  Systems are as secure as their weakest link  Must think in terms of end-to-end security  Security is typically applied in layers  Tighten up one layer and attackers move to another  Ultimately security mechanisms must be pushed down to the H/W  Immutability; Clean and simple API; Secure foundation; Efficiency  H/W on-chip resources are no longer a problem  Billions of transistors on-chip; Exploit parallelism and H/W  Pushing security to the H/W  Benefit: performance, energy/power-efficiency; Challenge: flexibility  Global adoption of embedded systems  No widely deployed security software 4

Objectives 1. Extend existing H/W and S/W platforms towards developing secure- by-design enabling technologies 2. Leverage H/W technology features present in today’s processors and embedded devices to facilitate S/W-layer security 3. Build methods and tools for providing maximum possible security- by-design guarantees for legacy systems 4. Evaluate acceptance, effectiveness and platform independence of SHARCS technologies and processes 5. Create high impact in the security and trustworthiness of ICT systems 5

SHARCS Framework 6

Hardware Architecture  Instruction Set Randomization  Defense against code injection  Minimal performance/area overhead (~1%)  Additional hardware inside MMU  Control Flow Integrity  Defense against code reuse attacks  Minimal performance/area overhead (~1%)  ISA extension & additional registers/memory  Main memory encryption  Defense against main memory disclosure attacks  Effective even against cold boot attacks  Affordable runtime overhead if customized hardware is deployed 7

Runtime and Software Tools 8  GPU encryption keys protection  Keys are stored in GPU registers/memory  Secure against whole main memory disclosure  Accelerated cryptographic operations  GPU Network Intrusion Detection  Based on signature matching  Computational intensive  High throughput, highly parallel  Inexpensive, commodity, programmable

Applications - Pilots 9  Medical  Automotive  Cloud

Implantable Medical Device (attacks) 10  Operation modification  Data-log manipulation  Data theft

Implantable Medical Device (defenses) 11  Control Flow Integrity  Instruction Set Randomization  Memory Encryption

Automotive Application (attacks)  Data/code modification  Program flow modification  Large-scale exploit  DoS 12

Automotive Application (defenses)  Control Flow Integrity  Instruction Set Randomization  Memory Encryption 13

Cloud Application (attacks)  Unauthorized access  Date modification  Breach or loss of data  … 14

Cloud Application (defenses)  GPU keys protection  GPU NIDS 15

SHARCS Applications 16

More Information  Visit us on the web: sharcs-project.eu  Follow us on  Like us on Facebook: facebook.com/sharcsproject  us at: 17

18 SHARCS: Secure Hardware-Software Architectures for Robust Computing Systems Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH

Defense against ROP 19

Defense against JOP 20

Instruction Set Randomization 21

Memory Encryption with software 22

Memory Encryption with hardware 23

Candidate Hardware Extensions  Instruction Set Randomization  Control Flow Integrity  Information Flow Tracking  Secure H/W Memory  Fine-grained Memory Protection  Dynamic Type Safety 24

SHARCS Methodology 25