Constitutional Law I Market Participant Doctrine March 29, 2006.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Market Structure.
Advertisements

CONGRESS POWER TO ENFORCE 13 TH, 14 TH & 15 TH AMENDMENTS AND LIMITATION IMPOSED BY THE 11th AMENDMENT Goals: Effect of 11 th A on scope of Congress power.
National Supremacy… McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 10 th does not limit fed. Gov. to powers in Con Necessary & Proper Cl. - power to create bank When state/national.
Review of Legal Issues Related to Proposed Stop-leakage Mechanisms Workshop on Imports and Emissions Leakage In Support of the Regional Greenhouse Gas.
Mixed Economies.
The U. S. Economy: Private and Public Sectors
1 Circular Flow. 2 Technical efficiency: maximum value of output from a resource base Economic efficiency: when one person cannot be made better off without.
LAND USE PLANNING Theoretical issues. 8/25/05GEOG THE LAND USE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Participants and roles vary according to the economic system and.
A RISK WORTH RUNNING Dan Galpern Western Environmental Law Center
Chapter 05 Constitutional Principles McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2012 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2007 Prentice Hall, Business Law, sixth edition, Henry R. Cheeseman Chapter 4 Constitutional Law for Business and Online Commerce Chapter 4 Constitutional.
The role of government in the United States economy How does the United States government promote and regulate competition?
The Regulation of International Transactions What are some of the risks of international trade?
THE CONSTITUTION AND BUSINESS. Separation of Powers Power shared by branches of government.  Legislative: enacts legislation appropriates funds.  Executive:
Property II Professor Donald J. Kochan Spring 2009 Class March 2009.
Constitutional Law for Business and Online Commerce.
Federalism The Separation of the Powers between the States and the Federal Government.
Chapter 7. Perfect Competition (theoretical) Large # of buyers and sellers (B/S) exchange identical products under five conditions: 1.There should be.
Chapter 4 Constitutional Law for Business and E-Commerce
What is Divestment? Divesting a plan’s portfolio of certain investments based in part on a consideration of non-economic or social factors. Also referred.
Electronic Commerce and Economic Policy. Policy Issues Antitrust Policies –Promotion of competition –Regulation of uncompetitive markets Information Policies.
Copyright © 2006 by Pearson Prentice-Hall. All rights reserved Slides developed by Les Wiletzky PowerPoint Slides to Accompany ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS AND.
American Constitutional Law LAW-210
Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. 5-1 Chapter 2 Constitutional Law for Business and E-Commerce.
Marbury v. Madison (1803) Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) McCulloch v. Maryland (1824)
CHARACTERISTICS OF A MIXED MARKET ECONOMY. PRIVATE PROPERTY Labor resources, natural resources, capital resources (e.g., equipment and buildings), and.
Business Law and the Regulation of Business Chapter 47: International Business Law By Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts.
Economic Systems.
Constitutional Law Part 2: The Federal Legislative Power Lecture 6: Dormant Commerce Clause.
CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF BUSINESS DAVIDSON, KNOWLES & FORSYTHE Business Law: Cases and Principles in the Legal Environment (8 th Ed.)
Market Failures. Pop Quiz 1.) List three types of monopolies? 2.) List the 4 types of market structures discussed in class. 3.) There are more monopolies.
Constitutional Law Spring 2008 Class 26: Dormant Commerce Clause II.
The Free Enterprise System Ch. 5. Basic Principles – Free Enterprise System Freedom of Choice Invest Their Money All of These Freedoms are a Part of a.
Copyright © 2004 by Prentice-Hall. All rights reserved. PowerPoint Slides to Accompany BUSINESS LAW E-Commerce and Digital Law International Law and Ethics.
Oct 2 – Gov – Intro to Federalism
FEDERALISM. WHY FEDERALISM? THE FRAMERS NEEDED TO CREATE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE PROTECTING CITIZENS’ FREEDOMS AND ALLOWING THE STATES TO RETAIN.
Constitutional Law I Federal Power II Gibbons v. Ogden Feb. 15, 2005.
Constitutional Law I Spring 2004Con Law I Privileges & Immunities April 29, 2004.
Constitutional Law I Privileges & Immunities March 29, 2006.
Constitutional Law I Dormant Commerce Clause II Nov. 17, 2004.
Constitutional Law I Taxing & Spending Powers March 3, 2005.
Constitutional Law I Justiciability – Part II (Standing) Jan. 25, 2006.
Constitutional Law I Market Participant Doctrine Nov. 22, 2004.
Constitutional Law I Dormant Commerce Clause I Nov. 15, 2004.
Constitutional Law I Spring 2004Con Law I Market Participant Doctrine April 27, 2004.
Constitutional Law I Federal Power II (Gibbons v. Ogden) Feb. 10, 2006.
Constitutional Law I Tenth Amendment Redux Feb. 22, 2005.
Constitutional Law I Privileges & Immunities Nov. 22, 2004.
Federalism November 1, U.S. v. Lopez (1995)
1 Market Participant Doctrine Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Chapter IV The Dormant Commerce Clause and Related Doctrines.
Chapter 23 – Comparative Economic Systems Section 1 – Capitalism.
Pure competition is a theoretical market structure that has a very large numbers of sellers, identical products, and freedom to enter into, conduct, and.
Federalism is a system of government in which a written constitution divides the powers of government on a territorial basis between a central, or national,
Chapter 4 Constitutional Law for Business and Online Commerce
The role of government in the United States economy
Federalism.
Federalism The Division of Power between Who has the power?
Chapter 2 Constitutional Law for Business and E-Commerce
Constitutional Law for Business and E-Commerce
Chapter 7.
Chapter 4 Constitutional Law for Business and E-Commerce
Chapter 2 Section 4 Mixed Economies.
Chapter 24 The Regulation of International Transactions.
Political Science 101 Macdonald
Federalism.
Lecture 33 The Commerce Power
Chapter 7.
learn limits imposed by 11th A & exceptions
Dormant Commerce Clause Is there state action (not Federal) action?
Presentation transcript:

Constitutional Law I Market Participant Doctrine March 29, 2006

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim2 Market Participant Doctrine State laws that discriminate against IC are presumptively invalid What about state’s own purchases?  Doesn’t it have to favor 1 supplier over others? Or state’s own sales (e.g., timber sales)  Doesn’t it have to favor 1 buyer over others? When state is acting like private party, does it have same freedom of action? Should there be a distinction between the governmental & proprietary functions of gov’t?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim3 Market Participant Doctrine Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap (1976) Maryland car recycling program pays bounties for re-processing of junk cars Bounty available only to in-state processors  As if the state were buying only from MD firms  Note: no regulatory distinctions for in-state vs out- state reprocessing Can state refuse to buy from out-staters?  Is this like regulating business entry or discriminating against IC?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim4 Reeves v. Stake (1980) SD-owned cement plant favors in-state buyers  What is a nice state like SD doing making cement?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim5 MPD Theories State is not “regulating” anything DCC operates as a “negative” preemption of state laws, but when the state is not regulating, there is nothing to preempt [preclude]  DCC fails on formalism grounds Commerce Cl. designed to limit state taxing & regulatory powers, not market activities  DCC fails on originalism grounds

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim6 MPD Theories Aren’t these contradictory? When regulating, states exercise sovereign power over market; but when participating, states are governed by market forces  Theory: since markets are self-correcting (punish favoritism); there is no need for judicial intervention Sovereign / proprietary distinction When participating in market, states act as fiduciaries over public funds Sovereignty basis for exempting states  See Powell dissent (no sovereignty under DCC)

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim7 Sovereign vs. Proprietary Interests States act in a “sovereign” capacity when they are regulating i.e., as parens patriae of their citizenry States don’t act in a sovereign capacity when they are merely participating in a market When states are market “participants,” they are acting at the height of their sovereignty because they are protecting economic self-interest which implicates their treasury which they hold in trust as parens patriae Isn’t state sovereignty fun?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim8 Federalism Basis for MPD Two different sovereign interests at stake: sovereign power over own citizens sovereign power over its own conduct Note parallels to 10th amendment the 1st sovereign interest gives way to domin- ant federal interest (in DCC and fed regul’n) the 2nd sovereign interest gives rise to a form of immunity (reflected in MPD and 10th amd.) State market activity subject to fed regul’n if valid per 10th amd

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim9 MPD Theories Under MPD, states can be protectionist Despite their effect on interstate markets But, if truly a market participant,  Then subject to federal laws regulating markets  Including antitrust laws Test for MPD Does state action more resemble that of a private trader, or of a market regulator?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim10 White v. Mass. Council (1983) Boston local hire law Are municipal laws ordinarily subject to DCC? What is Boston buying or selling? Is discrimination in labor also exempt from DCC  Is the City exempt from other constitutional limits on state discrimination (e.g., equal protection)? Is Boston a participant re federal funds? If not, why is the City exempt from DCC?  Congress not bound by DCC; may authorize state  Has it here? City action is “harmonious” with federal regulations

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim11 S.Central Timber v. Alaska (1984) Down-stream regulating under guise of MPD Low-price timber sales to firms processing in AK What market is AK a participant in? Timber sales? Lumber processing? Can it use its MPD exemption in the former to impose conditions on the latter? No. AK is engaging in “downstream regulation” outside of the “discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which it is a participant” Designed to protect local lumber industry

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim12 S.Central Timber v. Alaska (1984) Market participant or market regulator? With its in-state processing conditions, AK is acting more like a sovereign than a proprietor Rehnquist dissent: distinction w/o a difference  AK could sell only to companies with in-state mills  Could process the timber itself, then sell products  Could directly subsidize in-state mills Is formalism important here? Does it matter that most of AK’s timber sales were to Japan?

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim13 Exceptions to MPD When state has monopoly power in the market in which it participates Monopolists enjoy “market power,” i.e., the ability to “regulate” the market Sale of natural resources States have special stewardship responsibilities (akin to regulatory power) over natural resources Foreign commerce The “dormant” foreign commerce clause is even stronger than the DCC, and may not admit of an exception for state market activities

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim14 Taxation as Market Activity New Energy of Indiana v. Limbach (1988) Tax credit for ethanol produced in Indiana  Note: state subsidies ordinarily not subject to DCC Otherwise, state could never provide benefits for its residents  But when coupled with taxes, treated as discrim. tax State not buying/selling gas; just taxing it  Why is this subsidy not equivalent to Hughes?  Maybe Hughes was not really a MPD case

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim15 Taxation as Market Activity Camps Newfound-Owatonna v. Harrison (1997) tax exemption for camps serving residents Taxing is a sovereign function, not a function of market participants tax exemption viewed as a subsidy is still not a proprietary function This exception would swallow the rule (against discriminatory taxes) a prime target of the DCC

Spring, 2006Con Law I - Manheim16 Criticism of MPD States never act in non-sovereign capacity even when promoting economic self-interest, it is for benefit of taxpayers as shareholders confusing federalism basis for doctrine Skews marketplace encourages states to buy previously regulated enterprises so as to be exempt from DCC  Landfills; airports Manifestation of judicial balancing discarded in Garcia SCt hasn’t found MPD since Garcia