1 Radiation Monitoring at CTF3 CTF3 Buildings – weak spots Radiation Monitoring system Monitoring results – First Lessons Idelette Floret, Thomas Otto,

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Stefan Roesler SC-RP/CERN on behalf of the CERN-SLAC RP Collaboration
Advertisements

EDMS November th LHC Radiation Day RAMSES Induced Activity Monitors 5 th LHC Radiation Day CERN - 29 November 2005 RAMSES Induced Activity.
Radiation Protection aspects of the Switch-Yard operation V. Donate, G. Dumont, Joachim Vollaire on behalf of DGS-RP.
TLEP3 How radiation issues could be studied through FLUKA simulations. Possible approaches/mitigation schemes Alberto Fassò.
K. Potter RADWG & RADMON Workshop 1 Dec WELCOME TO THE 4th RADWG & RADMON WORKSHOP 1 December 2004.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Presentation to ASAC R. Casey Radiation Shielding: Assumption and Design April 24, 2007.
Radiation at accelerator laboratories Prompt radiation from the particle beam Beam induced radiation –Neutrons –Gammas –Synchrotron radiation Radiation.
13 Oct 2005 ICALEPCS RAMSES: The LHC RAdiation Monitoring System for the Environment and Safety G. Segura CERN on behalf of the RAMSES team.
C. Theis, D. Forkel-Wirth, S. Roesler, H. Vincke.
Radiation Environment at AWAKE Silvia Cipiccia, Eduard Feldbaumer, Helmut Vincke.
ARCON/RAMSES: Current Status and Operational Risk D. Forkel-Wirth, G. Segura Milan, D. Perrin, S. Roesler; H. and Hz. Vincke, P. Vojtyla, M. Widorski (DGS,
ATC/ABOC Days 21-23/1/2008 Heinz Vincke for SC-RP 1.
Studies of radiation hardness of ECAL modules 1Yu. Guz 2013/05/28.
1 Induced radioactivity in the target station and in the decay tunnel from a 4 MW proton beam S.Agosteo (1), M.Magistris (1,2), Th.Otto (2), M.Silari (2)
Radiation Protection LS1 - Collaboration with CERN Technical Groups - Lessons learnt Stephane Bally (CERN), Sandro Di Vincenzo (CERN) Indico
Handling Electronics from Radiation Areas N. Conan, D. Forkel-Wirth, T. Otto, S. Roesler, C. Theis, C. Tromel, V. Tromel, Heinz Vincke, L. Ulrici R2E,
Vacuum Interventions in Radioactive Environments J.M. Jimenez AT Department / Vacuum Group.
1 Safety Issues for HIE-ISOLDE and nTOF-Ph2 Thomas OTTO, Radiation Protection Group, SC-RP, CERN.
Radiation Protection for the Beam Line 4 Schools project Robert Froeschl (DGS/RP)
RAMSES PROGRAMME F. SZONCSO CERN – DGS/DI 31 st March 2014 CERN – GREECE INDUSTRY day1.
Radiation Protection considerations concerning a future SPS dump design Helmut Vincke DGS-RP.
First AWAKE dump calculations Helmut Vincke. Beam on dump Muon axis inside and outside CERN Distances: Beam impact point to end of West hall: ~300 m Beam.
MG - IEFC meeting 22/01/20101 Linac 3 shielding S. Gilardoni, M. Giovannozzi, S. Baird, R. Brown, S. Damjanovic, T. Otto, M. Widorski, Acknowledgements:
Highlights of RP activities in support of ISOLDE operation and projects Joachim Vollaire, Alexandre Dorsival and Christelle Saury with material from others.
The Status of ESS Accelerator Shielding and Accident Scenarios Lali Tchelidze May 26, 2014.
Thickness of the Kamaboko Tunnel Shield Wall under Different Assumptions Ewan Paterson Technical Board June 23,
RSSO refresher meeting J. Pedersen M. Tavlet, T. Otto.
Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas Thomas Otto based on material from RP group.
Radiation safety evaluation for “KAMABOKO” Main Linac Tunnel KEK-APL : T.Sanami, S.Ban KEK-ACC : A.Enomoto, M.Miyahara ILC Mechanical & Electrical Review.
Beam loads & dump concepts T. Kramer, B. Goddard, M. Benedikt, Hel. Vincke.
First radiological estimates for the HIRADMAT project H. Vincke and N. Conan 1.
Radiation Protection aspects for SHIP Doris Forkel-Wirth, Stefan Roesler, Helmut Vincke, Heinz Vincke CERN Radiation Protection Group 1 st SHIP workshop,
Estimates of Radiation Levels in the Main Linac Tunnel and Beam Dump Caverns for the CLIC Design Study Sophie Mallows, Thomas Otto SATIF 10, S.
ADO-PO Section Meeting Safety Group LS1 Shutdown Safety Organization.
Considerations for an SPL-Beamdump Thomas Otto CERN in collaboration with Elias Lebbos, Vasilis Vlachoudis (CERN) and Ekaterina Kozlova (GSI) Partly supported.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Summary of Shielding Calculations for NSLS2 Accelerators P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March
Radiation Protection in J-PARC neutrino beam line Sep Yuichi Oyama (KEK) for T2K neutrino beam line construction group Happy birthday.
New SPS scraping system: preliminary RP remarks Helmut Vincke DGS-RP.
EDMS Session 2 - Operation at high intensity of the CERN machines ATC/ABOC 21 January ARCON – RAMSES Bridge ATC/ABOC Days CERN – 21 to 23.
Horst Breuker Review Oct ELENA Safety and Radio Protection ELENA TDR : Chapter 6; Safety Files in preparation; Descriptive, Demonstrative (Risk.
Horst Breuker ADUC Jan Safety and Radio Protection, Consequences for the Experiments ELENA TDR : Chapter 6; Safety Files in preparation; Descriptive,
Radiation Protection studies for the Linac4 / Linac2 interface Joachim Vollaire, DGS-RP 28/09/2015 Linac4 Coordination Meeting.
Radiation Protection and Radiation Safety for Particle Accelerator Facilities J. Vollaire, Radiation Protection Group CERN Compact Accelerators for Isotope.
CERN LEP3 MINI-WORKSHOP A brief recall of the LEP (radiation) history (out of my memory and published papers) Marco SILARI, DGS/RP.
Radiation Protection Considerations for the CDR Helmut Vincke DGS-RP.
R ADIATION P ROTECTION ASPECTS LSS1 LHC f RE - INSTALLATION Cristina Adorisio (CERN - DGS/RP) LTEX Meeting – May 10 th, 2012.
TE-MPE-CP, RD, LHC risk review 06-Mar R. Denz TE-MPE-CP Radiation Hardness of Cold By-pass Diodes Acknowledgements: D. Hagedorn (former project.
Status of GIF++ Adrian Fabich, Dorothea Pfeiffer, EN-MEF-LE EATM, 27th August 2013.
How to access CNGS Heinz Vincke for DG-SCR-SL RADWG3/4/
EURISOL DS Task meeting Orsay, 07 Janvier Preliminary shielding assessment of EURISOL Post Accelerator D. Ene, D. Ridikas. B. Rapp.
High Energy Neutron and Proton Irradiation Facilities at TSL Alexander Prokofiev, , 6th LHC Radiation Workshop 1.
GIF++ implementation Adrian Fabich, Sylvain Girod, EN-MEF-LE Technical meeting with Supplier of Irradiator, 3 rd October 2013.
EURISOL, TASK#5, Bucuresti, November 1 Preliminary shielding assessment of EURISOL Post Accelerator D. Ene, D. Ridikas. B. Rapp.
Procedure for Removal of Material and Waste from LHC P. Bonnal, N. Conan, I. Brunner, D. Forkel-Wirth, H. Menzel, S. Roesler, C. Tromel, L. Ulrici, with.
1 How Many Protons can we afford to loose in the PS ? Thomas Otto SC-RP.
KEK Radiation Related Topics neutrino beam construction subgroup Yuichi Oyama (KEK) and target monitor subgroup for.
J. Bauer, V. Bharadwaj, H. Brogonia, A. Fasso, M. Kerimbaev, J. Liu, S
Heating and radiological
Industrial Radiography
S. Roesler (on behalf of DGS-RP)
Radiation Protection Issues After 20 Years of LHC Operation
Safety in Construction and Upgrade Phases
Radiation protection of Linac4 M. Silari Radiation Protection Group
Radiation Protection for the Beam Line 4 Schools project
Radiation Protection for the Beam Line 4 Schools project
Use of Beam Loss Monitor type detectors in CNGS muon station
Sensitivity tests of BLM_S chamber in PSB dump
Andreas Jansson, Lali Tchelidze
Fassò, N. Nakao, H. Vincke Aug. 2, 2005
Radiation Protection Handbook
Presentation transcript:

1 Radiation Monitoring at CTF3 CTF3 Buildings – weak spots Radiation Monitoring system Monitoring results – First Lessons Idelette Floret, Thomas Otto, Daniel Perrin, Markus Widorski DG-SC Radiation Protection Group

2 Strategy for Radiation Protection CTF3 built in existing surface structures, built for another electron accelerator (LEP pre-injector) Wall thickness can hardly be modified “weak spots” where bulk shielding is broken or thin Monitor ambient dose rate levels and raise radiation alarm if limits exceeded Installation of the state-of-the-art RAMSES monitoring system (1 st facility after CNGS & LHC)

3 CTF3- surface buildings Lateral shielding 270 cm concrete Roof shielding 240 cm concrete, accessible Roof shielding 200 cm concrete, accessible Roof shielding 80 cm concrete, inaccessible “weak spot” in bulk shielding

4 Ambient dose rate limits Area accessible to public: 0.5  Sv/h 2.5  Sv/h for infrequently occupied areas (e.g. Parking) For example Public spaces around CTF3 surface building Supervised Radiation Area: 3  Sv/h at workplaces 15  Sv/h in passageways Obligation to wear a personal dosimeter For example Klystron galleries

5 What is monitored ? During operation: Monitor ambient dose rate H*(10) from stray radiation at “weak spots” (representative for the whole of the facility) During Tech. Stop / Shutdown: Monitor ambient dose rate H*(10) from activated material to determine suitable working conditions for interventions

6 High-sensitivity radiation monitor For stray radiation Centronics pressurised ionisation chamber (2 MPa) Part of RAMSES system

7 Stray Radiation Monitoring (1)

8 Stray Radiation Monitoring (2)

9 Observation of stray radiation

10 Stray Radiation The assumptions that the access mazes represent weak spots is confirmed Ambient dose rate limit for public area at emergency exits exceeded: Observation of values Consequences: Temporary fencing of emergency access, intensity limitation Improvement of the mazes

11 Extension of the access labyrinth (originally for tail clipper) L 1L 2D 1D 2 Alternative cm 240 cm 80 cm 40 cm Alternative cm 160 cm

12 Improvement of operational margin Beam loss at 2 m from exit for which ambient dose rate in public space will exceed 2.5  Sv h -1 : 1 % 55 % (CTF-3 nominal electron beam with 3.5 A, 1.4  s, 5 Hz ≈ MeV)

13 Induced Radiation Monitoring

14 Observation of induced radiation

15 Residual dose rates Residual dose rates varies from spot to spot over orders of magnitude, depending on previous accelerator operation While Induced Activity Monitors give a first indication, radiation survey before access remains mandatory During maintenance periods, authorised personnel can work in CTF3 without permanent supervision by RP personnel All material dismantled from the accelerator must be stored as radioactive material/waste

16 Summary CTF3 operates an electron accelerator with relatively high power (P < 7.7 kW) in surface buildings, designed for a different purpose In order to protect persons in accessible areas, beam loss monitoring is essential Compared to CERN’s proton accelerators, residual dose rates low, but not negligible. Activation must be further studied for waste storage/elimination purposes