Extended QoS Authorization for the QoS NSLP Hannes Tschofenig, Joachim Kross.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Authentication.
Advertisements

Internet Protocol Security (IP Sec)
External User Security Model (EUSM) for SNMPv3 draft-kaushik-snmp-external-usm-00.txt November, 2004.
1Nokia Siemens Networks Presentation / Author / Date University of Twente On the Security of the Mobile IP Protocol Family Ulrike Meyer and Hannes Tschofenig.
Progress Report: Metering NSLP (M-NSLP) 66th IETF meeting, NSIS WG.
Mobile IPv6 - NSIS Interaction for Firewall traversal draft-thiruvengadam-nsis-mip6-fw-04 S. Thiruvengadam Hannes Tschofenig Franck Le Niklas Steinleitner.
1 © NOKIA MitM.PPT/ 6/2/2015 / Kaisa Nyberg (NRC/MNW), N.Asokan (NRC/COM) The Insecurity of Tunnelled Authentication Protocols N. ASOKAN, VALTTERI NIEMI,
1 Role of Authorization in Wireless Network Security Pasi Eronen Jari Arkko November 3, 2004 This document has been produced partially in the context of.
SIP roaming solution amongst different WLAN-based service providers Julián F. Gutiérrez 1, Alessandro Ordine 1, Luca Veltri 2 1 DIE, University of Rome.
1 © NOKIA MitM.PPT/ 6/2/2015 / Kaisa Nyberg (NRC/MNW), N.Asokan (NRC/COM) The Insecurity of Tunnelled Authentication Protocols N. ASOKAN, VALTTERI NIEMI,
Telematics group University of Göttingen, Germany Overhead and Performance Study of the General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) Protocol Xiaoming.
802.1x EAP Authentication Protocols
An Initial Security Analysis of the IEEE 802.1x Standard Tsai Hsien Pang 2004/11/4.
Trade-offs and open issues with path discovery and transport or not all requirements are orthogonal… Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS Hannes Tschofenig, Farid Adrangi, Avi Lior, Mark Jones.
Omniran IEEE 802 Scope of OmniRAN Date: Authors: NameAffiliationPhone Max RiegelNSN
Session Policy Framework using EAP draft-mccann-session-policy-framework-using-eap-00.doc IETF 76 – Hiroshima Stephen McCann, Mike Montemurro.
SIP Authorization Framework Use Cases Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Jon Peterson IETF 91, SIPCore WG Honolulu, Hawaii, USA November 13,
Light Weight Access Point Protocol (LWAPP) IETF 57 Pat Calhoun, Airespace.
Comparative studies on authentication and key exchange methods for wireless LAN Authors: Jun Lei, Xiaoming Fu, Dieter Hogrefe and Jianrong Tan Src:
NSIS Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Issues (draft-tschofenig-nsis-aaa-issues-00.txt) Authors: Hannes Tschofenig Henning Schulzrinne Maarten.
Architectural Considerations for GEOPRIV/ECRIT Presentation given by Hannes Tschofenig.
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, NETWORKS AND DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING Fifth International Symposium July, 2006, Patras, Greece Security in Wireless Networks:
XMPP – Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol Vidya Satyanarayanan.
NSIS Path-coupled Signaling for NAT/Firewall Traversal Martin Stiemerling, Miquel Martin (NEC) Hannes Tschofenig (Siemens AG) Cedric Aoun (Nortel)
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). What is SIP? An application-layer protocol A control (signaling) protocol.
KAIS T Security architecture in a multi-hop mesh network Conference in France, Presented by JooBeom Yun.
(Preliminary) Gap Analysis Hannes Tschofenig. Goal of this Presentation The IETF has developed a number of security technologies that are applicable to.
3Com Confidential Proprietary 3G CDMA AAA Function Yingchun Xu 3COM.
1 Course Number Presentation_ID © 2001, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. External User Security Model (EUSM) for SNMPv3 draft-kaushik-snmp-external-usm-00.txt.
2003/12/291 Security Aspects of 3G-WLAN Interworking 組別: 2 組員: 陳俊文 , 李奇勇 , 黃弘光 , 林柏均
KAIS T Wireless Network Security and Interworking Minho Shin, et al. Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 94, No. 2, Feb Hyeongseop Shim NS Lab, Div. of.
EAP Key Framework Draft-ietf-eap-keying-01.txt IETF 58 Minneapolis, MN Bernard Aboba Microsoft.
QoS NSLP draft-ietf-nsis-qos-nslp-06.txt Slides: Sven van den Bosch, Georgios Karagiannis, Andrew McDonald.
Secure Active Network Prototypes Sandra Murphy TIS Labs at Network Associates March 16,1999.
0 NAT/Firewall NSLP Activities IETF 60th - August 2nd 2004 Cedric Aoun, Martin Stiemerling, Hannes Tschofenig.
EAP Authentication for SIP & HTTP V. Torvinen (Ericsson), J. Arkko (Ericsson), A. Niemi (Nokia),
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS Hannes Tschofenig, Farid Adrangi, Avi Lior, Mark Jones.
ACHIEVING MULTIMEDIA QOS OVER HYBRID IP/PSTN INFRASTRUCTURES QOS Signalling and Media Gateway Control ITU-T SG13/SG16 Workshop on IP Networking and Mediacom.
IETF67 DIME WG Towards the specification of a Diameter Resource Control Application Dong Sun IETF 67, San Diego, Nov 2006 draft-sun-dime-diameter-resource-control-requirements-00.txt.
EAP Keying Framework Draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem-06.txt EAP WG IETF 56 San Francisco, CA Bernard Aboba.
URP Usage Scenarios for Mobility James Kempf Sun Microsystems, Inc.
ICOS BOF EAP Applicability Bernard Aboba IETF 62, Minneapolis, MN.
Security Mechanisms for Delivering Ubiquitous Services in Next Generation Mobile Networks Haitham Cruickshank University of Surrey workshop on Ubiquitous.
Authorization GGF-6 Grid Authorization Concepts Proposed work item of Authorization WG Chicago, IL - Oct 15 th 2002 Leon Gommans Advanced Internet.
Santhosh Rajathayalan ( ) Senthil Kumar Sevugan ( )
SAML for SIP Hannes Tschofenig, Jon Peterson, James Polk, Douglas Sicker, Marcus Tegnander.
Implications of Trust Relationships for NSIS Signaling (draft-tschofenig-nsis-casp-midcom.txt) Authors: Hannes Tschofenig Henning Schulzrinne.
Muhammad Mahmudul Islam Ronald Pose Carlo Kopp School of Computer Science & Software Engineering Monash University Australia.
© 2010 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 1 © 2010 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential.
Connect. Communicate. Collaborate Deploying Authorization Mechanisms for Federated Services in the eduroam architecture (DAMe)* Antonio F. Gómez-Skarmeta.
IP Multicast Receiver Access Control draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-req draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-arch.
Washinton D.C., November 2004 IETF 61 st – mip6 WG MIPv6 authorization and configuration based on EAP (draft-giaretta-mip6-authorization-eap-02) Gerardo.
Quality of Service Authorization Diameter QoS Application F. Alfano, P. McCann, H. Tschofenig, T. Tsenov RADIUS QoS Support H. Tschofenig, A. Mankin,T.
Key Management in AAA Russ Housley Incoming Security Area Director.
N. Asokan, Kaisa Nyberg, Valtteri Niemi Nokia Research Center
NSIS QoS NSLP Authorzation Issues Hannes Tschofenig.
NSIS NAT/Firewall Signaling NSIS Interim Meeting Romsey/UK, June 2004 Martin Stiemerling, Hannes Tschofenig, Cedric Aoun.
Paris, August 2005 IETF 63 rd – mip6 WG Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping in split scenario (draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-00) mip6-boot-sol DT Gerardo Giaretta,
NSLP for Quality of Service Sven van den Bosch (ed) Georgios Karagiannis Andrew McDonald (et al.) draft-ietf-nsis-qos-nslp-02.txt Slides:
1 NSIS: A New Extensible IP Signaling Protocol Suite Myungchul Kim Tel:
Phil Hunt, Hannes Tschofenig
Katrin Hoeper Channel Bindings Katrin Hoeper
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
Discussions on FILS Authentication
– Chapter 5 (B) – Using IEEE 802.1x
Securing the CASP Protocol
Authors: Hannes Tschofenig Henning Schulzrinne Maarten Buechli
AAA: A Survey and a Policy- Based Architecture and Framework
Security Activities in IETF in support of Mobile IP
Presentation transcript:

Extended QoS Authorization for the QoS NSLP Hannes Tschofenig, Joachim Kross

Overview Current status of the QoS NSLP: — Two party approach (reuses properties of GIMPS) — Token-based three party (based on token concept defined for SIP/RSVP) — Generic three party approach discussed but no solution provided Draft addresses two approaches for the generic three party model — Challenge/Response based Scheme — Extensible Authentication Protocol Approach

Two-Party Approach Properties: — Strong trust relationship between "Entity authorizing resource request" and "Entity performing QoS reservation" — Typically: Data-origin authentication sufficient — Financial establishment pre-established based on previous protocol execution Examples: — Network access authentication reused for QoS authorization QoS Request Entity requesting resource Entity authorizing resource request granted/rejected End Node Node within the attached network

Three-Party Approach Token based Mechanism Financial establishment created between "Entity authorizing resource request" and "Entity performing QoS reservation" Example: — Session Authorization Policy Element [RFC3520] — Framework for Session Set-up with Media Authorization [RFC3521] QoS Request + Token Entity requesting resource Entity performing QoS reservations granted/rejected Entity authorizing resource request (TTP) Authz Token Request Authz Token

Three-Party Approach Entity Authentication Financial establishment created between "Entity authorizing resource request" and "Entity performing QoS reservation" Properties: — AAA-type authorization - splitting functional components — Dynamic re-authorization based on new incoming requests. — Typically: entity authentication between "Entity requesting resource" and "Entity authorizing resource requests" QoS Request Entity requesting resource Entity performing QoS reservations granted/rejected Entity authorizing resource request QoS Authz Request QoS Authz Response

Generic Three Party Approach Comparison with Token-based Approach Features: — End host must actively participate in the protocol exchange — True authentication between the end host (user) and the AAA server. — Session key establishment is provided — Provides better security properties Difference between EAP and C/R based approach is mainly flexibility: — With C/R based scheme a specific family of authentication and key exchange protocol is chosen — If this does not fit into an architecture then there is a problem. — With EAP this type of flexibility is provided since EAP acts as a container for many EAP methods — EAP is heavily used in other areas (e.g., network access)

Challenge/Response-based Authentication Challenge/Response based authentication protocol extensions to the QoS NSLP Could be reused by some architectures (3GPP, 3GPP2) with their C/R based authentication and key exchange protocol variant QoS Request (Identity) Entity requesting resource Entity performing QoS reservations Unauthorized (challenge) Entity authorizing resource request QoS Request+Response Success/Failure AAA-QoS (Identity) AAA-QoS (challenge) AAA-QoS (response) AAA-QoS (success/failure)

EAP-based Approach Advantage: More flexible due to the concept of EAP methods Disadvantage: Overhead by EAP QoS Request (EAP-Request/Identity) Entity requesting resource Entity performing QoS reservations Unauthorized (EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge) Entity authorizing resource request QoS Request (EAP-Response/AKA-Response) NSIS (EAP-Success/Failure) AAA-QoS (EAP-Request/Identity) AAA-QoS (EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge) AAA-QoS (EAP-Response/AKA-Response) AAA-QoS (EAP-Success/Failure) Legend: AKA-Challenge: (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC) AKA-Response: (AT_RES, AT_MAC)

Technical Issues C/R and EAP Channel binding might be necessary to prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Binding NSLP and NTLP security mechanisms together. Session keys need to be established and used in subsequent messages in order to bind signaling messages to the authentication/authorization step Interworking with NTLP security needs to be studied: — Unilateral authentication at the NTLP layer — Client authentication at the upper layer 'Lying NAS' problem needs to be addressed. A lot of security specific issues need to be addressed

Next Steps For the QoS NSLP to make progress it is necessary to decide which approach to use: — Challenge/Response based approach — EAP-based approach

Questions?

Backup

Trust Model: New Jersey Turnpike Model Network ANetwork C Node A Node B Network B Peering relationship is used to provide charging between neighboring networks - similar to edge pricing proposed by Schenker et. al. David Clark: "We know how to route packets, what we don't know how to do is route dollars." Data Sender Data Receiver

Authentication, Authorization and Accounting Infrastructure Authorization might not always happen at an NSIS element itself (see roaming scenarios) Information which is exchanged between the end host (e.g., NI) needs to be forwarded to a backend server (e.g., PDP or AAA server) NSIS and AAA protocols need to aligned See also related activities in AAA working group. AAA Client NSIS Initiatior Network Entity NSIS AAA Server COPS / Diameter Authentication and Authorization Credentials Back - end AAA Server