TE/MPE/MI MPE-TM30 th June 2011 FMCM sensitivity to mains perturbations 0v1 M. Zerlauth.

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Presentation transcript:

TE/MPE/MI MPE-TM30 th June 2011 FMCM sensitivity to mains perturbations 0v1 M. Zerlauth

Motivation for FMCM Courtesy of V.Kain

Studies of Fast(est) LHC failures Courtesy of V.Kain

Protection requirements o Today 12 LHC devices and 16 in SPS-LHC transfer lines installed o Required detection level in the order of 5E-4 of nominal current in Very demanding and tight tolerances (worst case, i.e. 7TeV, nominal intensity,…)

● Failures in the magnet powering system are generally SLOW and beams can be (easily) dumped before starting to extract energy ● Exception are failures in some of the nc magnets, which can generate the loss of 10E-5 * Np after some 10 turns only (MSE, MSI, MSD, D1, MBW, MBXWT...) ● Cannot be caught in time by converter controls or WIC (see as well TL incident in fall 2004) ● Introduced Fast Magnet Current change Monitors (FMCM) as reduncany to COLL+BLM ● Interlock on fast changes of current, no absolute measurement! ● Interlock the beam, but do not stop magnet powering ● Intended to protect against ANY failure in magnet powering, leading to changes of the magnetic field, ie ● Power converter failures ● Short circuits in DC part ● Failures of electrical supply chain (network perturbations, AUG, SVC...) -> beware of such common cause failures! Introduction of the FMCM

FMCM schematics HV- Box UHUH Alarm  CIBU  Beam Dump Min/Max- memory Post mortem recorder Digital Signal Processing Magnet voltage Magnet current Threshold DCCT + HP*) A/D Comp. Magnet field estimation filter 1 st order highpass  recognize changes OR Gate = monitor connector D/A Digital Interface Manual control Italic = option d d d = differential input RS-422 *) HP= Highpass Courtesy of M.Werner/DESY

Machine Interlock Systems 7 of 5 Protection of nc circuits Power Converter Status info 60°C + Water Flow 60°C + Water Flow Power Permit WIC Beam Dump to BIS RQ4.LR3/7 RQ5.LR3/7 RD34.LR3/7 RD1.LR1/5 RMSD.LR6B1/2 RBXWTV.R2/L2

CERN 8 FMCM Beam Tests for D1 IR1/5  Low intensity beam test.  Trajectory evolution after OFF send to RD1.LR1, with FMCM masked  Beam dumped by BLMs in IR7 o Trajectory over 1000 turns at a BPM o Position change of ~1.5 mm over last 250 turns

CERN 9 FMCM Beam Tests for D1 IR1/5  Low intensity beam test  Trajectory evolution after OFF send to RD1.LR1, with FMCM active  Beam dumped by FMCM o Trajectory over 1000 turns at a the same BPM o No position change visible within resolution >> The redundant protection is working

CERN 10 Operational Experience in 2010 – 1/2 18-MAY /12FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Glitch on EDF power grid. Few warm magnets lost. 12-MAY /0FMCM_RMSD-b1Power glitch MAY /0FMCM_RMSD-b1Fast current change due to an electrical perturbation over the network 07-MAY /0FMCM_RMSD-b2B2 dumped by switching MSD OFF. Beam dumped OK 07-MAY /0FMCM_RMSD-b1B1 dumped by switching MSD OFF. Beam dumped OK 02-MAY /12FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Clean dump 01-MAY /0FMCM_RMSD-b1FMCM on MSD pulled the dump but analysis OK 19-APR /1FMCM_RD1.LR1 Perturbation of the electrical network caused problems in the channels of most points. 15-APR /0FMCM_RQ5.LR7MPS test on RQ5.LR7 (PC off to test reaction of FMCM) - Test passed. 13-APR /1FMCM_RD1.LR5We switch off RD1.LR5 to study the FMCM 11-APR /1FMCM_RD1.LR1MP test at top energy. RD1.L1 sent to OFF -> correctly caught by FMCM. 07-APR /0FMCM_RMSD-b1Dump septum current glitch 03-APR /2FMCM_RD1.LR5Beam dump due to pertbation of on power network 27-MAR /0FMCM_RMSD-b2MPS test on RMSD-b2. Looks good but must be analysed by XPOC team. 22-MAR /0FMCM_RD1.LR1 MPS test, sending an OFF command to RD1.LR1. beam dumped as expected, no losses. 10-MAR /0FMCM_RQ4.LR3MPS test on FMCM RQ4.LR3 10-MAR /0FMCM_RD34.LR7MPS test for FMCM on RD34.LR7 (PC off) 10-MAR /0FMCM_RD1.LR1MPS test on RD1.LR1 at 450 GeV

CERN 11 Operational Experience in 2010 – 2/2 EVENT_TIMESTAMPENERGYINT B1 / B2Input ChannelOperator Comment 26-NOV /85FMCM_RD1.LR5Perturbation on electrical network. FMCM triggered beam dump. 15-NOV /98FMCM_RD1.LR5FMCM at point 5 dumped the beams due to an electrical perturbation on the net 15-OCT /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2electrical perturbation tripped sector 81 without beam in 28-JUL /0FMCM_RD34.LR3LBDS was armed but no beam in the machine - PM when preparing access 17-JUL /123FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Beams dumped because of a glitch on the network-->FMCM 16-JUL /0FMCM_RQ5.LR3FMCM in P5, no "real" electrical problem reported by TI. 16-JUL /38FMCM_RQ5.LR3FMCM in P3. No "real" electrical issue reported by TI. 14-JUL /95FMCM_RD1.LR5Multiple FMCM triggers on electrical network glitch. 11-JUL /0FMCM_RQ5.LR3Trip of FMCM on RQ5.LR3 due to unstable isolation amplifier. 11-JUL /0FMCM_RQ5.LR3Trip of the FMCM 10-JUL /73FMCM_RD1.LR5ELectrical glitch on the power network seen by FMCM 10-JUL /76FMCM_RMSD-b1Electrical glitch in P6 seen by the FMCM of the RMSD 04-JUL /60FMCM_RD1.LR5Electrical perturbation caught by the FMCM 03-JUL /7FMCM_RMSD-b1electrical perturbation on the 18kV seen by FMCM of MSD in point 6 30-JUN /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2elctrical perturbation due to thunderstorm. several systems affected: collimators 11-JUN /2FMCM_RMSD-b1looks like glitch due to lightning... dump looks OK 26-MAY /8FMCM_RD1.LR5dump due to glitch on 18kV lines... and FMCMs triggered o 24 triggers, 3.5TeV, injection (7 without beam) o 1 OP mistake, 4 due to a failing component, 19 electrical perturbations on the 400V/18kV/400kV networks (at least 3 accompanied by equipment trips) + 11 MPS tests

CERN 12 Operational Experience in 2011 EVENT_TIMESTAMPENERGYINT B1 / B2Input ChannelOperator Comment 09-JUN /11609FMCM_RD1.LR5Site wide electrical glitch (18kV line ) caused FMCMs to trigger dump. 30-MAY /22FMCM_RD1.LR5Another glitch caught by FMCM 30-MAY /0FMCM_RD1.LR5FMCM caught a glitch on the network 28-MAY /11344FMCM_RD1.LR5Beam dumped again because of a disturbance caught by the FMCM of RD1.LR5. 28-MAY /11313FMCM_RD1.LR5Beam dumped. TI operator confirmed noise on the electrical network. 16-MAY /2432FMCM_RBXWTV.L2trip of sector 56 and 81 due to electrical perturbation 14-MAY /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Spurious AUG in TI2 09-MAY /10FMCM_RBXWTV.L2ring wide electrical glitch seen by the FMCMs...only 1 nominal bunch in.dump OK 29-APR /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Power glitch on the 400kV distribution. 29-APR /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2No beam in the machine. Glitch on the 400 kV. 24-APR /5096FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Power glitch on the 400 kV line 16-APR /2678FMCM_RBXWTV.L2electrical perturbation 14-MAR /31FMCM_RD1.LR1Electrical instability tripped warm magnet PCs 11-MAR /0FMCM_RMSD-b2SMP test: switch off of RMSD.LR6B2. 11-MAR /0FMCM_RMSD-b1SMP test: switch off of RMSD.LR6B1 10-MAR /2FMCM_RQ5.LR3MPS test at 1.5 m with RQ5.LR3 (PC OFF) - OK. 09-MAR /1FMCM_RD34.LR7EOF test for FMCM by switching OFF RD34.LR7. 03-MAR /1FMCM_RD1.LR5MPS test on RD1.LR5 at 3.5 TeV and b* 1.5 m. 01-MAR /1FMCM_RD1.LR1MPS test with OC off on RD1.LR1 at 1.5 m beta*. 27-FEB /0FMCM_RBXWTV.L2Beam dumped when LHCb dipole tripped because of a site wide electrical glitch. 24-FEB /1FMCM_RD1.LR5Electrical glitch in Point 6, but the FMCM of RD1.LR5 triggered o 15 triggers, 3.5TeV, injection (6 without beam) o 1 AUG, 14 electrical perturbations on the 400V/18kV/400kV networks (at least 3 accompanied by equipment trips) + 6 MPS tests

CERN 13 Are we too sensitive? o Experience shows that often beams are dumped by network perturbation (and consequent triggers of FMCM), without powering equipment physically tripping OFF -> Are we too sensitive?

CERN APR AM – Fault in 400kV S phase -40kV, 30ms Courtesy of D.Arnoult Typical perturbation originating in 400kV (2 phases, V dip of ~15% for some 60ms)

CERN 15 Comparison to spec of “minimum immunity of equipment” Based on the statistic of past network disturbances, a minimum immunity for equipment has been defined in an LHC ES ‘Main Parameters of LHC 400/230V Distribution System’ U nom= 400 / 230V ± 10 % Typ. Variations = ± 5 % Transients= 1200V for 0.2ms THD = 5% Voltage Swells = +50%, 10ms Voltage Dips = -50%, 100ms 19-APR AM X 07-APR AM 03-APR AM X 01-MAY AM X X

CERN MAY AM – RBXWTV.L2 + others ∆I = 2A ∆I /I = E-3 ∆V = 1.5V ∆V /V = 5 10E-2 FMCM: Measured excursion > 1.5 Threshold : 0.6

CERN APR AM – Trip of RD1s in IR1 an IR5 ∆I = 0.7A ∆I /I = 2 10E-3 ∆V = 20V ∆V /V = 8 10E-2 FMCM: Measured excursion > 8 Threshold : 0.4

CERN APR AM – Perturbation on RB.A12 ∆I = 0.018A ∆I /I = 3 10E-6 ∆V = 4V ∆V /V = 8 10E-1

Device NameElectrical CircuitInitial Warning/Dump Thresholds Modified Warning/Dump Thresholds CIF.UA67.RMSDB1RMSD.LR6B10.2 / / 1.0 CIF.UA67.RMSDB2RMSD.LR6B20.2 / / 1.0 Adjusting Thresholds on Dump Septas o 2010 experience showed injection were unnecessarily tight on dump septas in IR6 -> Increased thresholds by a factor of 2.5 o Validation of modifications with standard commissioning procedures + beam tests

● Tight requirements for detection of current changes result in a certain number of FMCM triggers following network perturbations (often before equipment is affected) ● Choice of thresholds is trade-of between protection & availability ● So far NO unjustified trigger has been observed (apart from 1 component failure on RQ5.LR3), i.e. LHC OP is always cross-checking with TI ● Current thresholds are conservative, but needed to assure equipment protection ● In few cases, tight thresholds have been adjusted (RMDS.LR6B1/B2) Conclusion

FIN