Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore March 6, 2016 // Computer-Mediated Communication Trust and Trustworthiness Part II

Projects and Assignment #1  Assignment 1 is a short 2-3 page description of your group project idea and the division of labor within the group.  Due Tuesday October 7 th at beginning of class (one assignment per group, 2 printed copies)  Groups should sign up for a meeting time with us (directions on the assignment page)  courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i216/f08/assignment1.php courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i216/f08/assignment1.php 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore1

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore2 Sources of Uncertainty in Exchange/Interaction Quality of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ Structural uncertainty of an exchange Uncertainty about finding an exchange partner ?

Privacy and Trust (Paine and Schoefield 2008) Dimensions of Privacy  Informational  Accessibility  Expressive “Actual” vs “Perceived” Privacy 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore3

Capturing Online Trust? 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore4

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore5 Trust Networks Under Uncertainty “Trust Networks”  System view  Ego-centric view

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore6 What are the Solutions to Uncertainty in CMC Environments? Proxies and ‘inferred trustworthiness’ Institutional backing Closed Systems versus Open Systems  Experiential, often negative- only reputations (not explicit) 3 rd party (explicit) reputation

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore7 Using ‘Games’ to Understand Trust- Building

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore8 Rules for the CMC trust game…  Two players  Each player gets 10 items (X’s) from the experimenter on each round.  Players simultaneously decide whether to ‘entrust’ 0 to 10 of their items to the other player.  Players decide whether to return the items to the partner or not.  If player returns the items, the experimenter DOUBLES the amount returned to the partner.  The player can just keep the entrusted items; then nothing is returned to the partner.

For Example… 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore9 Player A entrusts 1 X’s Player B entrusts 3 X’s Player APlayer B Player A returns the 3 X; Player B gets 6X! Player B returns the 1 X; Player A gets 2X! At the end of the round, you keep whatever you did not entrust, plus whatever you earned or kept from your partner!!

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore10 Debriefing… What were the risks? What were the sources of uncertainty? What are the opportunity cost(s) in this game? Does the game play any differently when there are repeated interactions with the same partner, compared to when there are new, random partners?

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore11 Trust-Building Processes in US and Japan

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore12 Trust-Building Processes in US and Japan

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore13 Freq. Random PartnerFixed Partner One-shot interaction  solicitations  attachments from unknown sources Iterated interaction  Peer-to-peer digital goods exchange  Online “pick-up” games (e.g., cards)  Online communities  Online auctions  Chat programs  Massively multiplayer games Continuity Internet situations by frequency & continuity

3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore14 Freq. Random PartnerFixed Partner One-shot interaction ? Iterated interaction ?? Continuity CMC and Trust-Building

Meta Reviewers for this Week:  Gopal Vaswani  (gvaswani [at] ischool.berkeley.edu)  Carol Chen  (carolc [at] ischool.berkeley.edu)  Heather Dolan  (HDOLAN [at] GMAIL.COM)  Emrehan Kirimli  (emrehan [at] berkeley.edu) 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore15

The CMC Trust Paradox: Certainty Defeats Trust? 3/6/2016Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore16