Verifiable Mixing Protocol How can a mixer prove its integrity?

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Presentation transcript:

Verifiable Mixing Protocol How can a mixer prove its integrity?

Basics VMP allows the mixer to prove that it paid the address specified by the user. It provides a way for mixing services to: Build trust quickly Resist fraudulent claims of failure to pay VMP does NOT improve anonymity.

Setup The mixer has to give up some info: Input addresses the mixer uses Output addresses (T) paid by the mixer Signatures of T: Φ Keys g, h 1. User sends coins to mixer, specifies address m 2. Mixer picks random r (prevents exploitation) 3. Transaction includes commitment C = g m h r

Caveats User's choice of m should be unique Protocol gets more complicated otherwise If user fails to follow protocol, return money Protects mixer from intentionally unverifiable payments

Verify Verifier wants to check that the address specified in input transaction i was paid. Public knowledge: g, h, C, T, Φ Mixer knows: m, r Prove: m T and C commits to m Don't need to reveal m

Verify Zero-knowledge set membership proof By Camenisch, Chaabouni, and Abhi Shelat

Confirming Value How do we know that the mixer payed enough? Have T only include transactions in correct range. This would require outrageous volume to be safe. Traditional mixing solutions still apply.