Taylor 4 Prototype Categories II

Two main issues: What exactly are prototypes? Do ALL categories have a prototype structure?

4.1 Prototypes can be understood in two ways: 1) As a central member, an actual artifact 2) As a schematic representation of the conceptual core of a category -for this model, a given entity instantiates the prototype -for many categories (e.g. TALLNESS), only 2) is possible

What is Similarity? Membership is assigned by virtue of similarity to the prototype BUT: similarity is a difficult concept because –1. it is a graded concept –2. it is a subjective notion –3. similarity is based on attributes, which themselves show prototype structure (cf. Gentner’s “similarity space”)

Nominal Kinds These are categories with essential conditions for membership. The existence of such categories is not inconsistent with a prototype approach. Facts of this type do not lead to all-or- nothing category membership.

Natural Kinds These are categories with a clear boundary. The existence of a clear boundary does not preclude prototype organization. There can still be better & worse examples, gradience within the category.

4.2 Prototypes according to Langacker Prototype – a typical instance of a category Schema – an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all members of the category it defines Either a schema or prototype + extensions may suffice. Taylor will focus on prototype + extensions, because not all categories yield schemas.

4.3 Folk Categories & Expert Categories Even ODD NUMBER and EVEN NUMBER show prototype effects – small numbers (3 vs. 2, 4) are better examples “Prototype effects…arise from an interaction of core meaning with non- linguistic factors like perception and world knowledge”

Folk vs. Expert Categories Expert categories – defined by the imposition of a set of criteria for membership Folk (natural) categories – structured around prototypical instances and grounded in how people normally perceive and interact with things in their environment

Folk vs. Expert Categories, cont’d. Some words, like gold and water are subject to both expert and folk definitions. The folk definition is prior to the expert one and is often used even when a person knows the expert one.

4.4 Hedges Our everyday folk theory of what a category is contains the belief that categories are definable in terms of what their members have in common. Language requires us to use one word (form) or another, to choose among categories – this reinforces the folk belief in discrete categories.

4.4 Hedges, cont’d. Every language has hedges, which enable a speaker to express degree of category membership. Some hedges: loosely speaking, strictly speaking, par excellence, technically These words manipulate categories and boundaries

4.4 Hedges, cont’d. Hedges provide evidence –That we distinguish between central and peripheral members (par excellence, strictly speaking) –That we distinguish between different degrees of non- membership (strictly speaking) –That category boundaries are flexible (loosely speaking) –That categories can be redefined by ad hoc selection and re-weighting of attributes (in that) –That in some cases categories are defined by classical principles, but these are felt to be exceptions (technically)