CMSC 477/677 VOTING AND AUCTION GAME DAY March 17, 2005.

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Presentation transcript:

CMSC 477/677 VOTING AND AUCTION GAME DAY March 17, 2005

VOTING GAME Round 1: Plurality voting (ABCD) CANDIDATEVOTES A8 B4 C7 D1

VOTING GAME Round 2: Plurality voting (ABCD) CANDIDATEVOTES A8 B2 C10 D0

VOTING GAME Round 3: Plurality voting (ABCD) CANDIDATEVOTES A3 B8 C8 D1

VOTING GAME Round 4: Borda voting (ABCD) CANDIDATE#4#3#2#1TOTAL A B C D

VOTING GAME Round 5: Borda voting (top 3 from round 4) CANDIDATE#3 pts2 pts1 ptTOTAL A96544 B49737 C75839 D

VOTING GAME Round 6: Borda voting (top 2 from round 5) CANDIDATE2 pts1 ptTOTAL A91129 Bd C11931 D

AUCTION GAME Round 1: English auction – one A – Final price: 5.9 Round 2: English auction – one B – Final price: 5.2 Round 3: English auction – one C and one D – Final price: 8.0

AUCTION GAME Round 4: First-price sealed-bid (one A and one C) – Final price: 8 Round 5: First-price sealed-bid (two Bs and one C) – Final price: 11 – Final price: 42 Round 6: Dutch (one A and one D) – Final price: 5.1

AUCTION GAME Round 7: Vickrey (one C) – Highest bid: – Second bid (final price): 10 9 Round 8: Vickrey (one A, one B) – Highest bid: 1000 – Second bid (final price): 14 Round 9: Vickrey (two As, one C, two Ds) – Highest bid: – Second bid (final price): 500

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION GAME ROUND 1 COALITIONGOODSPRICE 210A 10B 10C 10D x10 21

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION GAME ROUND 2 COALITIONGOODSPRICE

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION GAME ROUND 3 COALITIONGOODSPRICE

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION GAME ROUND 4 COALITIONGOODSPRICE

THE END Have a fantastic spring break!