MICS Authentication Profile Maintenance & Update Presented for review and discussion to the TAGPMA On 1May09 by Marg Murray.

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Presentation transcript:

MICS Authentication Profile Maintenance & Update Presented for review and discussion to the TAGPMA On 1May09 by Marg Murray

Changelog Summary Change RFC3280 to RFC5280 Add req to include MICS AP OID w/o version New language to describe –Private key protection –Communication between CA and RA –Binding of CSR to act of ID vetting –Maintaining EE persistence and traceability –Timing of CRL publication –Due diligence for subscribers

Private Key Protection (2 - last ¶) Old: –Private keys must not be shared between entities. NEW: –The private key associated with any certificate must not be disclosed to or shared with end- entities other than the one to which the certificate was issued.

Communication between CA and RA ( 3. 1 ) Old: (missing)NEW: –All communications between the CA and the RA regarding certificate issuance or changes in the status of a certificate must be by secure and auditable methods. The CP/CPS should describe how the RA or CA is informed of changes that may affect the status of the certificate.

Binding of CSR to act of ID vetting ( 3. 1 ) Old: –The primary identity management system may contain other entities that do not qualify based on the above mentioned conditions, but it must not be possible for such entities to obtain valid credentials from the MICS. NEW: (replace) –In all cases, the certificate request submitted for certification must be bound to the act of identity vetting.

EE persistence and traceability ( 3. 3 ) Old: –(missing) NEW: –The CP/CPS must address how the IdM maintains persistence and traceability for entities that are eligible for a MICS certificate, and how name uniqueness is guaranteed. Certificates may be left to expire implicitly if the status of the entity in the IdM changes, if and only if traceability information to the individual is retained. Upon loss of traceability, the CA Manager must suspend or revoke the ability for that individual to get a MICS certificate and should revoke any already issued certificates unless they expire in less than 1 million seconds.

(4.4) Timing of CRL publication If the authority publishes a CRL, it should be in compliance with RFC5280. The CA must react as soon as possible, but within one working day, to any revocation request received. After determining its validity, a CRL must be issued immediately. For CAs issuing certificates to end-entities, the maximum CRL lifetime must be at most 30 days. The CA must issue a new CRL at least 7 days before the time stated in the nextUpdate field for off-line CAs, at least 3 days before the time stated in the nextUpdate field for automatically issued CRLs by on-line CAs, and immediately after a revocation. The CRLs must be published in a repository at least accessible via the World Wide Web, as soon as issued. The CRL life time is defined as the difference between the times stated in nextUpdate and thisUpdate.

(10)Due diligence for subscribers Keep: The MICS CA should make a reasonable effort to make sure that subscribers realize the importance of properly protecting their private data. Replace the rest with: –When using software tokens, the private key must be protected with a strong pass phrase, i.e., at least 12 characters long and following current best practice in choosing high- quality passwords. Private keys pertaining to host and service certificates may be stored without a passphrase, but must be adequately protected by system methods. –Subscribers must request revocation as soon as possible, but within one working day after detection of loss or compromise of the private key pertaining to the certificate, or if the data in the certificate is no longer valid.

Other Suggestions Anything else?