June 20091 CNGS Operation Part 1 : CNGS beam operation. Protons on their way to the target. ‘Special’ CNGS issues. Part 2 : Extraction Interlock System.

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Presentation transcript:

June CNGS Operation Part 1 : CNGS beam operation. Protons on their way to the target. ‘Special’ CNGS issues. Part 2 : Extraction Interlock System. Detailed description. Links to documentation covering more details for certain aspects are given at the end of this presentation ! J. Wenninger Acknowledgments : Edda, Verena, Konrad … for figures, photos and numbers.

CNGS ‘Facility’ June  A dedicated primary beam line (TT41), a target chamber (target T40), a decay tube & a muon detection infrastructure.  ‘Attached’ to the LSS4/East extraction channel.

CNGS Tunnels June 20093

4

Key OP Aspects of CNGS June The nominal CNGS beam is a high intensity FT beam : >= 4x10 13 p / cycle  Minimize losses > activation.  Protection of the ring > ‘standard’ ring interlocks.  Loss minimization at extraction > clean kicker gaps. Radiation in ECX4 !  Protection of extraction channel, transfer line and target > interlocks. We must maintain the beam within mm of the T40 target axis to prevent damage to the target (even though this tolerance applies strictly only for 7x10 13 p).

June CNGS Magnetic Cycle  The CNGS beam magnetic cycle is almost identical to the FT beam: the only difference is the much shorter 400 GeV flat top – only 90 ms: 2 fast extractions are programmed 20 ms and 70 ms from the start of the flat top. Time (ms) P (GeV/c) In ‘beam time’ coordinates: Injections at 0 and 1200 ms. Ramp from 1260 to 4200 ms. Flat top from 4200 to 4290 ms. Cycle length 6 s – 5 BPs. Same optics and tunes than FT beam: Q = (~26.62,~26.58)

June CNGS Beam Longitudinal: 2 batches of ~10.5  s (5/11 of SPS). 2 gaps of ~ 1  s (kickers !). Bunch spacing 5 ns. Bunch length at 400 GeV ~ 2 ns. Transverse: Normalized emittance  *  8-10  m. Beam sizes at 400 GeV (10  m): -Wire scanner  H/V  1.4/0.8 mm -Target T40  H/V  0.5/0.4 mm CNGS beam = FT beam with more intensity, up to 4.8x10 13 p. Batch 1Batch 2 Kicker gaps

LSS4 Extraction Channel 19/06/20088

LSS4 Fast Extraction Channel June  5 extraction kicker magnets (MKE) operated at 50 kV.  6 septum magnets (MSE), installed on a movable girder.  4 horizontal and 4 vertical bumper magnets: - Horizontal extraction bump of 31.1 monitor BPCE.418  TPSG protection element for the MSE.

Extraction Kicker MKE June Key constraint for the fast extraction : < 0.1% beam loss during extraction !  Radiation in ECX4 + activation of extraction channel Therefore:  Beam gaps must be VERY clean.  MKE settings (delays, kick length) are critical. - The first kick is most critical. - The second kick is longer since ½ machine is empty Beam Kicker Waveform Beam gaps

MKE4 Kick Alignment 19/06/ OASIS global to observe beam and kick. The best tuning parameter is the loss in LSS4: Minimize on first extraction. Adjust second extraction to have no losses : the first batch is gone – there is space !!! >> see later..

MKE is the heart of the extraction 12 MKE Extraction Interlock System Beam Energy Tracking System Slow Timing Extraction Pre-pulse Beam kicked into septum gap Both SW and HW interlock systems act on the MKE and on the beams with destination CNGS (for SIS), but not on the beam dump and not on the SPS ring HW interlock system.  There is (almost) NO coupling with LHC or FT beams !!! 19/06/2008

 One of the worst failures of the extraction system is to : Kick with too little/high voltage at 400 GeV. Nominal kick at the wrong energy.  To protect the extraction channel and line against such failures, the MKE has a Beam Energy Tracking System (BETS) that ensures that: The measured energy for CNGS is within 1.5 GeV of 400 GeV. The energy measurement is based on the current of the main dipoles. The measured kicker voltage must be kV.  Inhibits the extraction (no kicker fault !) if not OK ! The BETS system does not take into account the energy change due to RF frequency/radial position :  SIS surveys the radial position trims around the flat top (+- 6 mm tolerance). Beam Energy Tracking June

MKE Trigger Logic June Extraction – 13 ms : the PFNs (Pulse Forming Networks) are charged provided the extraction interlock system gives the green light. 2.Extraction ms : the MKEs are triggered when the RF pre-pulse arrives provided that : i.The extraction interlock systems gives the green light. ii.The BETS system gives the green light. Extraction interlock permit CNGS beam BETS LHC beam BETS PFN voltage -13 ms ~+0.6 ms

Extraction Septum June ElementL mag (m) B (T)Kick/mag (mrad) I nom (A)Septum Thickness (mm) Gap Height (mm) MSE2.24~1.52.0~ MSE Extraction channel 15

LSS4 Extraction BLMs 16 TPSG Septum magnets BLM1BLM2BLM3BLM4BLM5BLM6BLM7BLM8 losses due to a large vertical size or tails appear here, at the end of the septum (largest V size). Loss distribution is due to residual beam in the abort gap. ~ 2x10 13 p  The LSS4 BLMs are connected to the ring BIS system because losses can come from the extracted or circulating beam >> dump beam !  The a SW interlock is latched by SIS if losses trigger interlocks on 3 consecutive cycles! June 2009 Tuning of beam gap population (MKP, MKE delays..) is best done by looking at those losses ! Losses due to beam in the gap are largest here at the TPSG

Compare with LSS2… June  Peak losses more than 20 times smaller than in LSS2 !!  Total loss : ~25-50 mGray versus ~3000 mGray ~ 2x10 13 p ~ 2.5x10 13 p

Clean beam gaps : RF voltage 18 To minimize the beam in the gap & improve the capture:  The voltage is ramped up to ~ MV after the first injection !  Back down for second inj.  You can tune the amplitude a bit, but do not remove the voltage step!! On certain days it may seem better (fewer losses) to remove the voltage step, but on average this is more robust against changes of the incoming beam properties (changes in the CPS).

Clean beam gaps : MKP June Second measure to clean the gaps:  The MKP kick of the second injection is advanced to kick out beam in the gap after the first batch.  The second kick must be long enough (11.5 us) to cover the batch + gap.

Injection example June First injection, 0 ms

June 2009 Injection example 21 First injection, 440 ms Uncaptured beam that is moving along the circumference

June 2009 Injection example 22 After second injection, 1560 ms The ‘advanced’ second kick cuts out this edge! Since the un-captured beam + beam in gap is kicked out by the second injection, the injection losses are often ‘apparently’ larger for the second injection. Cut out by the falling edge of the second kick!

Beam losses LSS4 2008/09 June TPSG losses 2008 Interlocks 2009  In 2008 the losses always remained at a very low level (interlock mGray).  Interlock ‘bursts’ tend to occur periodically due to tuning or changes/instability in the CPS.

Radiation 2008 LSS4 June Extraction Channel / TPSG 0.4 mGray/h

Transfer Lines TT40 & TT41 June

TT41 Transfer Line June  ~720 m long, 837 m if TT40 is included (from MSE).  A string of 8 dipoles (MBSG, RBI ) is used to bend the beam towards CNGS. For LHC operation the MBSG is at 0 current.  The lattice is basically the same as for the SPS (betatron & dispersion functions).  Final focus at the end to reduce beam size on target.  Aperture for the beam : > mm in H/V.

Main Bends Powering June Interlock DCCTs MUGEF for ‘standard’ surveillance The TT41 and TI8 main dipoles are powered by a single converter, with switches (mechanical and electronic) to send the current into the correct magnet string. The mechanical switches are interlocked with the access chains. To run CNGS when TI8 is in access, the TI8 (load) switch must be to Earth. If that is not the case, there will be an access interlock on the PC ! To control the switches – use the PC expert (Labview) program ! To verify that the switch positions are correct, there are 2 ‘dummy’ ROCS channels that have only an interlock DCCT but no converter. The names of the ROCS channels are DCCT_TI8 and DCCT_CNGS (acquisition from equipstate). The 2 interlock DCCTs are used to identify which branch is powered, and their current is interlocked like any other converter (see later). Mechanical switches Electronic switch

RBI.816 Settings - nominal 19/06/ At the start (& end) of cycle the current is set MANUALLY to 0: >> required for the electronic switch !  For a SC mixing CNGS & LHC, the PC must switch load according to the cycle.  The switching is implement with LTIMs that are activated either by USER and/or from the DESTINATION information.  For CNGS extraction the LTIMs are by default activated for all CNGSx users and for destination CNGS. >> There is a dedicated help presentation on this PC !

RBI.816/TI8 in CNGS only mode 19/06/  To run CNGS alone with LHC access veto on TI8, the switching is deactivated and the IREF function of RBI.816 must be flattened MANUALLY in the trim editor for the LHCB2transfer (TI8) !!  If the function for LHC is not zeroed, the CNGS dipoles will pulse at the equivalent energy of ~ 520 GeV: o Not a problem for the magnets themselves (D. Smekens dixit). o Could perturb steering and optics due to the change of remanent field ! >> watch out when LHC comes online again !!!! Manual trim (for LHC-free periods)

Beam Position Monitors TT40/41 June  23 H+V position monitors are installed in TT40 & TT41:  18 button monitors (TT41).  5 couplers: 4 in TT40, 1 in front of T40 (on the target table).  Self-triggered electronics:  No gain, but a variable integration window (0.4 or 8  s). Default integration window for regular operation is 8  s.  At low intensity there can be triggering problems…

June 2009 Steering TT40/TT41 31 Steering in TT40/41 is rather easy and reliable (MICADO 1-3 correctors). The line is very stable and requires very little steering. The positions are interlocked, always steer towards the REFERENCE trajectory (beam-target alignment) ! The interlock margin on correctors is  rad (see later) mm +- 2 mm mm Tolerances : (changes are possible) Those offsets are ‘normal’ : TL-target (mis) alignment !!

Target Beam Position Stability  The position stability of the extracted beam in 2008 was excellent, ~ 50 microns rms over the entire run.  No active position feedback is necessary, small corrections of the beam position using the muon profile positions are sufficient! Beam position on the last BPM in front of the target H Extr 1 H Extr 2 V Extr 1 V Extr 2

TT40/TT41 BLMs June  There should be no losses in the transfer lines  very low thresholds.  The TT41 thresholds are 5 mGray (compare to ~50 mGray in ring).  BLMs around the TED have higher thresholds to avoid false interlocks when the beam is dumped on the TED. TT40 TT40 TED TT41 Collimator in front of T40 TI8 – not relevant… After target, not interlocked !! ~ 2.5x10 13 p

Radiation TT June  In TT41 the remnant radiation levels are very low (6 weeks after beam stop).  A few peaks at <= 1  Sv/h.

Timing 19/06/200835

Extraction Timings June CTIMs RF extraction pre-pulses (RF9) Timings must be identical for ALL CNGS users! Please do not change them - consequences on interlocks, logging… Legacy CTIMs

MKE Trigger Prepulses 19/06/  The fast extraction pre-pulses are generated by the SPS RF system (in the Faraday cage in BA3) and distributed over the SPS.  A timing module (CTRV) filters the pre-pulses and distributes them to the kickers – via an LTIM.  For MKE4/MKE6 the pre-pulse distribution is filtered on beam DESTINATION (also valid for the extraction warning event):  CNGS pre-pulses are only distributed to MKE4 when the destination is CNGS.  LHC pre-pulses are only distributed to MKE4 when the DYNAMIC DESTINATION is TI8_DUMP or LHC2_TI8.  LHC pre-pulses are only distributed to MKE6 when the DYNAMIC DESTINATION is TI2_DUMP or LHC1_TI2. >> If the beams go to spare – kickers do not charge and do not kick ! >> For LHC the beams must be declared ‘TO_LHC’ in the sequence.

Prepulse diagnostics : RF 38  The RF prepulse settings can be diagnosed with the extraction interlock surveillance application. 6/23/2009 ! Only enable/disable allowed for set ! For CNGS the prepulse warning is disabled

Prepulse diagnostics : MKE4/6 LTIMs 39  Arrival of prepulse (trigger for the kicker) and warning events (trigger charging) can be diagnosed in the extraction interlock surveillance application. The LTIMs can be enabled/disabled from the application. 6/23/2009 Control of LTIMs with those buttons If bg color is RED:  Destination problem  LTIM not enabled >> MKE will not pulse !

Secondary Beam 19/06/200840

June CNGS Secondary Beam 43.4m 100m 1095m18m5m 67m 2.7m TBID / 2 Ionization Chambers Muon Detectors TBID: Target Beam Instrumentation Downstream p + C  (interactions)   , K   (decay in flight)     

Extraction Interlocking June Target Horn

June carbon target rods  5 & 4 mm total length 2 m

CNGS Muon Monitors June  

June cm 11.25cm Muon Detectors

Muons Profiles June  A fixed display for muon profiles and status of target/horn/reflector/shutter is available.  It includes multiplicities and a status word (color) on the quality ! Good Medium Ugly

Secondary Beam Control June  The target is not under OP control (the rotation is anyhow blocked…).  Horn and reflector are controlled through the working sets (CNGS). Important : The horn/reflector settings shown here can only be controlled when a CNGS user is active. Without CNGS user in the SC, one cannot switch the horn/reflector ON and OFF !!!!!

Secondary Beam ‘Steering’ 19/06/ To steer the beam in the muon chambers, use the muon profile position panel (Steering, Machine Specials menu) : ‘Correct H’ & ‘Correct V’ buttons. Sensitivity : 1 pit 2  0.1 mm parallel steering (angle = 0)

Extraction Interlocking June

Interlock Systems June The LSS4 extraction and the transfer line to the CNGS target are protected by:  The EAST extraction HW interlock system which is based on the same concept (HW) than the SPS and LHC beam interlock systems. o Fast surveillance of essential systems on the scale of milliseconds to microseconds. o Interlock signals are concentrated in BIC (Beam Interlock Conctroller) modules.  The Software Interlock System (SIS) that complements the East extraction HW interlock system: o Acts once per cycle. o Beam stop at the level of the CPS via the timing system. o Consistency of beam mode and equipment state (extraction channel, TED). o Protection of HW interlock system settings (thresholds, PC tolerance, etc). o Complementary (less critical) interlocks.

Extraction HW Interlocking June

HW Interlock System June  The EAST extraction HW interlock system consists of 7 BIC modules. The hardware is identical to the SPS ring beam interlock system: There 6 ‘normal’ BICs for TT40, TT41 and TI8. There is one MASTER BIC (‘EXT2’).  The master BIC has intelligence to handle LHC and CNGS beam in parallel. It takes into account the SPS energy and the TED states in the logic. The output signal (‘permit’) of the master BIC is send to the MKE to enable extraction

(Un-)maskable Interlocks & Safe Beam Flag June  The HW interlocks may be either UNMASKABLE or MASKABLE.  MASKABLE interlocks may be masked when the beam is ‘Safe’. A dedicate signal, the Safe Beam Flag (SBF) is generated by the SMP (Safe Machine Parameter ) system installed in the CCR. It is distributed by a timing telegram to the BICs. If the SBF is TRUE, a mask is applied, when it is FALSE the masks are ignored.  The SBF is: TRUE if the SPS beam intensity is < 1x10 12 protons FALSE if the SPS beam intensity is > 1x10 12 protons  SBF generation: At the start of every cycle, the SBF is reset to FALSE by the SPS MTG. The intensity measured by the SPS hadron BCT in LSS3 (page 1). The measurement is triggered by the 1000 ms fast extraction forewarning and is send to the SMP. When the SMP system receives the intensity from the BCT, it evaluates the SBF and sets it to TRUE is the intensity is < 1x10 12 protons. After 3 seconds the SBF is reset to FALSE automatically.

Extraction Master BIC 19/06/ BIC module with a special logic to cope with TEDs, CNGS & LHC beams. No signal is maskable. TRUE if SPS energy GeV TRUE if SPS energy GeV TRUE if TT40 TED in beam TRUE if TI8 TED in beam TT40-A, TT40-B, TT41-A, TT41-B, TI8 Upstream, TI8 Downstream >> outputs of the ‘standard’ BIC modules ‘Beam flags for and from the LHC, only for LHC injection. Only active when ‘TED-in TI8’ = FALSE

Master Logic (for CNGS) 19/06/ TT40 TED IN BEAM : Only E_400, E_450, TT40A,TT40B are taken into account by the master for the interlock logic. All other inputs to the master are ignored. Either E_400 or E_450 flag must be TRUE. Extraction OK if TT40A and TT40B are TRUE, and either E_400 or E_450 is TRUE. >> Extraction of LHC/CNGS beam to TT40 TED TT40 TED OUT OF BEAM – CNGS case : E_400 is TRUE. TT40A,TT40B, TT41A,TT41B are taken into account for the interlock logic. All other inputs to the master are ignored. Extraction OK if TT40A, TT40B, TT41A and TT41B are TRUE. >> Extraction of CNGS beam to T40 >> There is a similar, but more complicated logic for the LHC beam.

HW Interlock ‘Types’ June For the CNGS fast extractions there are 3 types of interlocks: Continuous surveillance of parameters, like (end-)switches. The associated signals change their state rather ‘rarely’. The signal are quite ‘static’. Vacuum, TEDs, target… Pre-extraction surveillance where signals are evaluated a short time BEFORE extraction. The associated interlock is FALSE by default and switches to TRUE for a short time interval around extraction if all conditions are correct. Surveillance of the beam position at the extraction point and of the PC currents. Post-extraction surveillance where signals are (re-)evaluated AFTER extraction. This type of surveillance concerns beam instrumentation. The signal interlock is switched to TRUE for a short time around extraction. The interlock signal is latched (FALSE) at the level of the FESA class if a measured beam parameter is out of tolerance. Beam losses and beam positions in the transfer lines. Both Pre- and Post-extraction surveillance tasks are triggered by the timing events associated to the fast extraction.

Interlock signals : ‘Obstacles’ June Beam ‘obstacles’ that provide inputs to the HW interlock system: Vacuum valves: must be open. TBSE (personnel protection stopper): must be OUT of beam. TED (dump): must be IN-BEAM or OUT of beam (interlock is moving).. Decay tunnel shutter: must be open. Target: must be at a valid position. BTVs: (maskable) Positions : Al, C, Ti, Out. Should be Out by default. Only the Carbon screen is allowed in beam. Al or Ti  interlock ! Interlock when moving. Last screen in front of T40 is locked in beam (C).

Miscellaneous Interlocks June There are some rather unusual inputs to the Extraction Interlock System: TCC4 Ventilation: interlock is generated if the ventilation system of TCC4 (T40 target chamber) is in ‘Access Mode’. Hadron stop cooling: interlock is generated if the hadron stop is not cooled. Fire alarm: A fire detector for TCC4 is also in the chain… …and there is of course the INHIBIT BUTTON, in the rack next to the MTG inhibit buttons.

Magnets Interlocks June Interlocks related to magnet surveillance: WIC (Warm magnet Interlock Control): magnet temperature surveillance interlock for TT40 and TT41 magnets (one input per TL). MSE girder: this interlock signal combines the following MSE surveillance MSE cooling & temperature. MSE girder : must be in beam, not moving and within +- 2 mm of nominal position. Note that there is NO girder optimization needed for the LSS4 fast extraction. MSE PC must be ON.

Powering Failures 60 Powering ‘failures’ are among the most likely and most critical failures :  Wrong converted setting  surveillance of the current VALUE.  Converter failure  FAST surveillance of the current CHANGE/STATE. TT41 Main Bends Tol. Tolerance Examples of simulated powering failures Tolerance Reaction time ~ 2 ms Reaction time ~ 5 ms June 2009

ROCS Current Surveillance June  The ROCS system provides a pre-extraction surveillance, the FEI (Fast Extraction Interlock). The current of selected converters has to match a reference within a pre- defined tolerance. The surveillance is performed a few milliseconds before extraction.  This system provides in total 6 inputs to the CNGS BICs, all inputs are MASKABLE: LSS4 bumper converters (H+V) TT41 converters TT40 converters MBI main bend converter MSE.418 converter Interlock DCCTs for shared main converter  Operational current tolerances : RBIH , RBIH dipole strings0.2% RBI main dipole string 0.1% Interlock DCCTs1.0% RBI dipole string0.1% Septum MSE0.1% Main quad strings (D/F)0.2% Matching quads0.5% Corrector magnets15  rad Bumpers~2  rad

ROCS Surveillance Timing June  For each extraction, ROCS FEI system provides two 4.5 ms long pulses when interlock = TRUE.  The LEGACY events that trigger the ROCS are: OEX.FINT1-CTMat -16 ms OEX.FINT201-CTMat -4 ms(extraction) 4.5 ms pulse

PC Interlocks Application / 1 19/06/  The FEI settings are protected by the MCS (Management of Critical Settings) system: the data comes with a digital signature, only authorized persons can change the settings.  RBAC protection of the FEI settings prevents trim & drive from outside the CCC island  An application is available to drive, trim and diagnose the FEI settings. No special login is needed to drive the FEI settings.  Three access roles for settings control: MCS-SPSOP : all people on SPS shift + coordinators Can change references for steering magnets. To update settings after steering if out of tolerance. MCS-SPSEXPERT : for the moment only Jorg, Verena & Karel Can change all settings and tolerances, except the settings for the special DCCTs of the main bends. MCS-SPSGURU : for the moment only Jorg & Verena Can do everything. >> 2008 experience showed that EXPERT and GURU access is only needed for setup & commissioning periods because the PCs are stable.

FEI UI 64 Drive all settings (or all settings for a transfer) from LSA DB to ROCS crates (after reboot…). Detailed help available here!

FMCMs June  The FMCM (Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor) is a device developed at DESY for HERA to detect powering failures on PCs, in particular when the current decay is very fast.  The principle of the FMCM is to detect the change in voltage  V when the current decreases rather than to measure directly the change in current  I, because  I/  t is more sensitive when  I and  t are small !  5 circuits are monitored by FMCMs: L is the circuit inductance CircuitI Nominal (A)Measured  I/I (%) Threshold  I/I (%) Specification for CNGS MSE RBIH RBIH RBI RBI

FMCM Signal Timing June Large voltage changes  inhibit Large voltage changes  inhibit FMCM interlock signal  The FMCM removes its interlock when the current is stable on the PC flat top.  During ramp up/down the large voltage changes  interlock.  On the ‘flat bottoms’ the FMCM interlocks because I is too low.  Excellent protection against attempt to extract during the ramp !!!!!!!!!!!

Other PC Interlocks June There are 2 additional PC interlock: Horn and reflector: PC must be ON. MSE Fast internal ‘Sum Fault’: fast internal interlock of the MSE converter. Similar to the SPS MB and MQ interlocks (to BIS in BA3). Very fast signal, delay ~ 1-3 ms.

LSS4 Beam Position Interlock June  The position of the circulating beam is checked before extraction and interlocked if not within tolerance – part of the MOPOS system.  The settings are controlled/monitored from the Steering Application (SPSRing), menu Machine Specials.  Beware - extraction interlocks will be generated if:  the gain is too low/high on bmu40s (MOPOS_4).  bmu40s is rebooted. >> a new system with auto-trigger and no gain will be tested this summer. Interlocked BPM list. Out of tolerance BPMs are highlighted in RED! Interlock settings Measured positions

Beam Position Interlock in TT41 June  The CNGS beam position interlock settings are controlled from the Steering application (CNGS transfer), menu Machine Specials.  Latch status & reset are available from the panel.  The interlock settings are not PPM.  The interlock settings are part of the Management of Critical Settings (MCS). Any trim requires a NICE login… A limited number of people can change settings (MCS-CNGS role). Changes are rare…  The TT40 BPMs are not used for the interlock logic because the LHC beams trigger the BPMs and generate fake interlocks ! Reset of latched interlock

Post-Mortem for Trajectory June The Steering application provides a Post-mortem freeze (active on CNGS): Freezes the display on the last acquisition and changes the DV frame to orange. Stores (internally) the last acquisition with beam. In case the BPM interlock is latched, this provides a display of the last trajectory. To help taking a decision, i.e. reset and continue, or stop and think !

BI Interlock Timings June Transfer line BPMs and BLMs LSS4 BPM Latch

Latched BI Interlock Resets June Reset of latched BLM interlock (TT40/TT41) Reset of latched BLM (TT40/TT41) and BPM interlocks

Extraction SW Interlocking June

SIS for TT40 June Target BICs Timing inhibit that stops beams with destinations passing through TT40 : CNGS, TI8xx  One SIS interlock tree is dedicated to TT40 & LSS4. SIS acts on the TT40 BICs and on the timing system.  The tree contains the usual stuff (PCs, BTVs, …) but also a surveillance of some interlock settings (BLM thresholds (not too high !), PC tolerances and references).

SIS for TT41 June Target BICs Timing inhibit that stops beams with destination CNGS  One SIS interlock tree is dedicated to TT41. SIS acts on the TT41 BICs and on the timing system.  The tree contains the usual stuff (PCs, BTVs, …) but also a surveillance of some interlock settings (BLM thresholds (not too high !), PC tolerances and references).

MTG Inhibits June The SIS signals in the sequence manager (External Conditions)

SIS Interlock ‘Criticality’ June How critical are the SIS interlocks (after all we have a large HW interlock system), and what can be masked in case of ‘communication /controls issues’? Ultra-critical (*) :  Everything with ‘FEI’. Drive settings if it occurs. Critical (*) :  Check that system is in fact OK, then mask until problem fixed.  For ‘BIS-STATE’ interlock may be due to a mask – check if OK !  Please make entry in the eLogbook. Others :  Mask, then try to solve.

Check SIS Subscriptions… June  Open data subscription panel from ‘File’ menu.  Allows to browse all data subscriptions.  Right-click first column for menu (Stop, Start….).  Note that yellow status does not mean that there is a problem. Only RED indicates a real problem!  Click on ‘Refresh’ for details on the device and FEC.

Extraction HW interlock diagnostics June

Standard Supervision 19/06/  The usual BIC supervision application is available for the East Extraction Interlock System.  The application is identical to the SPS ring application, and provides the same functionality (masks, status, history buffer…).  But there are many very short signals for extraction interlocking, and this application is not so easy to use.

Time Evolution Display 19/06/ Under the ‘Show View’ menu of each BIC panel, the option ‘Permit Status Tracker’ opens a graphical display of the interlocks that is refreshed for each cycle. This view does not work (for the moment) for extractions because it has not been adapted to new timing event data structure…

Extraction Interlock Monitor 82  To ease the diagnostics of the Extraction Interlock System, special application analyses the signals and produces a simple status, OK or NOT-OK for each cycle.  Console manager : ‘SPS Control’  ‘Beam Interlocks’  ‘CNGS Extraction Monitor’.  Exists also for TI8 (Beam2 transfer) and TI2 (Beam1 transfer). Main screen Index of first faulty channel Interlock signal to MKE, BIC EXT2

Extraction Interlock Monitor : details 19/06/ BIC detail Time evolution of the signal A tooltip with the channel description should appear is you pass the mouse over the pads.. If the console manager does not interfere ! The green/shadowed regions indicate where the signal must be = 1 (TRUE) to be OK (and to give status = green !

Masks 19/06/ Color coding : Input OK Input not OK Input masked and OK Input masked and not OK Status of the Safe Beam Flag, TRUE  masks are applied

MKE & BETS 19/06/  Settings of the MKE4 on all users and details on the BETS are available from the main menu bar.

MKE Scope 19/06/ A remote scope is available to monitor PFN charging, BTES and BICs ! Extraction interlock permit CNGS beam BETS LHC beam BETS PFN voltage

More Help June

It’s all here … June Detailed system description Test documents & system status Settings references Trouble-shooting Sample screen shots for important information OP programs and diagnostics … For use by the expert and by OP crews !

…and here … June

… and there ! June