Lecture 8 Page 1 CS 236 Online Prolog to Lecture 8 CS 236 On-Line MS Program Networks and Systems Security Peter Reiher.

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Presentation transcript:

Lecture 8 Page 1 CS 236 Online Prolog to Lecture 8 CS 236 On-Line MS Program Networks and Systems Security Peter Reiher

Lecture 8 Page 2 CS 236 Online Smart Cards in Trouble Smart cards are used for authentication But they’re also used for other things –Like electronic cash –Or public transit payments These uses are problematic Why?

Lecture 8 Page 3 CS 236 Online A Problem With Smart Cards Smart cards are in the physical possession of users If it’s in the user’s interest to alter the smart card’s behavior, he might –E.g., free rides on the subway Preventing this is one of the hard problems in security

Lecture 8 Page 4 CS 236 Online What’s the Real Problem? Ultimately, the smart card’s security is based on keeping a secret But the secret is on the card And the card is in the user’s wallet How do you keep the secret from the user? Similar problem to DRM technologies

Lecture 8 Page 5 CS 236 Online An Example of the Problem The Mifare card Used by Netherlands, Britain, Boston for public transport Reverse engineering of the card uncovered the crypto algorithm Weaknesses in that algorithm allow attackers to guess the key –They can then clone the card

Lecture 8 Page 6 CS 236 Online Effect of the Attack Attackers can create cards that were never paid for –So you ride the Tube or the MTA for free Same cards can also be used for building access –Cloning allows you to pretend to be someone else

Lecture 8 Page 7 CS 236 Online What the Attack Does and Doesn’t Mean These cards are too weak for public transit systems But if attacker can’t get hold of your card, he can’t clone it –So maybe OK for authenticating you –Unless other mechanism gives attacker access to your card