Discussion QuestionDiscussion Question  Some pundits argue that spread of nuclear weapons will bring more stability to the interstate relations, while.

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Presentation transcript:

Discussion QuestionDiscussion Question  Some pundits argue that spread of nuclear weapons will bring more stability to the interstate relations, while others claim that unfettered spread of nuclear weapons will be inimical to the security of nation states. What are the bases of each argument? In what ways do you think spread of nukes will affect interstate relations?

Rational Deterrence TheoryRational Deterrence Theory  Kenneth Waltz  The destructive potential of nuclear weapons makes war less likely as the cost of war rise in relation to possible gains.  The systemic pressures disable any two nuclear weapons state from deviating from the point of logical decision making; that nuclear weapons are primarily a tool of deterrence and their existence is a stabilising factor in international politics.  Nuclear weapons does not only deter attacks on the homeland, they deter attacks on any vital strategic interests, lowers the stakes of war + intensity of war  Nukes affect both the deterrer and the deterred  Gradual horizontal proliferation would actually lead to greater stability on a systemic level.

Unit of Analysis and Assumptions  Unit of Analysis: The State (3rd level)  Assumptions:  The state is basically rational, self-preserving, and risk averse in the sense that it won’t risk large-scale destruction of itself, even if the chances are small.  Enough people in the decision-making processes will conform to the rationality assumptions to allow us to infer unitary preferences.

How to awoid war and secure peace? Deterrence Rational deterrence theory (Achen and Snidal, 1989) 1.Commitment clearly defined 2.Clearly communicated 3.Defender has means to punish initiator (increase costs to unacceptable) 4.Commitment credible in eyes of initiator

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)  … the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack (Dr. Strangelove)   The threat of large scale nuclear destruction deters war  Thus, mankind's most destructive creation might be its peacemaker.  Assumption of no splendid first strike and secure second strike capabilities  The large scale effects of nuclear proliferation thus might be peace.  Theorised nuclear peace

Bureaucratic politics (organisational) theory  Scott Sagan  Such an optimistic view of nuclear weapons is dangerous for the world.  Argues that military organisations, unless managed by strong civilian-control institutions, will display organisational behaviours that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war, because of common biases (offensive culture), inflexible routines, and parochial interests.  Future nuclear-armed states will likely lack the requisite civilian control mechanisms, and military interests, not objective interests, will dominate  More new proliferators  more chance of accidents/miscalculations

Unit of Analysis and Assumptions  Unit of analysis: The state, bureaucratic organizations - especially the military and its relationship to the civilian population (2 nd level)  Assumptions:  State is not unitary, not necessarily rational, and subject to miscalculations and accidents.  Cost benefit calculation not really applicable.

Personal viewPersonal view  Because something hasn’t happened, does not necessarily mean that it will never happen - argumentation fallacy  The lull before the storm  Waltz’s proliferation-peace theory only has legs because it is based on a knowable past.  Change from a bi-polar world order to a more multi-polar world order  I think it is more useful to apply Sagan’s understanding of how nuclear weapons have been managed (or mismanaged) and the implications this has for proliferation.  With more unstable and autocratic states getting nuclear weapons it can lead to ’irrational decisions’  They lack institutional mechanisms for civilian control over nuclear decision making.  Military organisations are ‘inward looking’, heavily influenced by domestic politics  Therefore, nuclear decisions would be taken based on issues of domestic stability, rather than systemic threats.  Diversionary wars