Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

Who is this person? Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science  Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now  Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996 What I do  International Relations  Political Economy  Empirical Political Science  Comparative Politics Where I publish  The World Economy  Comparative Political Studies  Journal of Conflict Resolution  International Interactions  Economics Letters  Social Science Quarterly  International Politics  Current Politics and Economics of Europe

My research Intersection of domestic politics and international relations International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues Connections: The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter? The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik) International regimes & organizations Political markets vs. political contests

Privatizing commercial diplomacy Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors: petition for the initiation of trade disputes consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues attend WTO talks with government officials negotiate privately (industry-to- industry) on regulatory reform EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301 US: Private Sector Advisory Committees EU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations

Institutional innovation Nihil nove sub sole? Industry influence on government Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.) Government organizing industry (corporatism) But... Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure International industry groups are being organized by states Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access

Why is this interesting? The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally? Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions Normative issues

Research questions Positive:  What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy?  Which industries & groups are most active, influential?  What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups?  What are the differences across institutions and polities? Normative:  Is “the cart leading the horse”?  Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ?  Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade regime?  Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they lend ammunition to its critics?

Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Research strategy

Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU

Research strategy Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US Political-economy analysis: --use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping) Institutional analysis --compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes Cross-polity analysis --compare patterns in US with those in EU Interviews and analysis of documents Information / opinion from industry, government, and civil-society groups Emphases: --implementation and politics / process --extent of business-government cooperation --connection to global trade regime --normative questions

Conclusions The petition processes are relatively successful  still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry “International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases  It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins:  institutional causes  political/electoral causes  hegemony/state-power causes Normative issues:  “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy  petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized retaliatory measures  Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction