1. Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, Robert D. Tollison Received: 17 November 2009 / Accepted: 25 February 2011 Presentation by: Summer Dickey Regulators and Redskins

2. Existing Data (Ekelund et al. 1994) Rent seeking Barro 1973; Becker and Stigler 1974; McCormick & Tollison 1978; Besley 2006 Higher pay is deterrent to corruption Carlino and Coulson (2004) Housing rents about 8% higher in cities with NFL teams Wages about 2% lower in areas with teams Coates and Gearhart (2008) No evidence that either a NASCAR track or NASCAR event affects housing rents positively or negatively Coates and Humphreys (2002) Residents of cities whose teams won Super Bowls experience a small but statistically significant increase in real per capita personal income in the same year *None that directly tests impact of amenities on bureaucratic behavior

3. Regulators and Redskins

5. Pages of Federal Register each quarter and the Redskins end of season WP

6. Quarterly RGDP and quarterly Federal Register pages

7. Ratio of quarterly Federal Register pages to RGDP (FR pages/RGDP)

8. Econometric Model u  well-behaved disturbance term R  page count of the Federal Register W  history of Redskins W-L record Q()  maps history into a current measure of team’s quality GDP  control variable that captures general trend of R increasing over time with the size of the economy *Winning Percentage (WP) at that point in the current season

9. Results Quarterly Federal Register pages positively correlated to WP and significant at 1% level RGDP significantly positive For an increase in the WP in 2007 from.50 to 1.0, predicts a 9% increase in the quarterly pages of the Federal Register Annual Significant positive correlation with previous season’s WP or playoff berths Congressional Behavior No Redskin effects Washington area sports teams

10. Conclusions At least one local amenity – a winning professional football team – is associated with more regulatory output from the federal government Existence of winning football team may simply provide an environment conducive to logrolling Could explain use of public funds to subsidize teams Thoughts on the paper…