1. Critical Facts & Assumptions
MAJ Don Kanase
Seminar 6

2. Purpose
Provide an understanding of “critical facts and assumptions” within the context of MDMP.

3. Agenda Definition and Purpose of Critical Facts
Definition and Purpose of Assumptions
How to Change Assumptions into Facts
Historical Example
References

4. Context within MDMP MDMP Receipt of Mission Mission Analysis
COA Development
COA Analysis
COA Comparison
COA Approval
Orders Production
Mission Analysis
Analyze HHQs
Review CDR’s planning guidance
Identify Critical Facts and Develop Assumptions
Operational Limitations
Specified, Implied, and Essential tasks
Mission Statement
Risk Assessment
Success criteria
CCIR
Staff estimates
Brief
Updated CDR’s planning guidance
In JP 5-0, MA Activities states “Determine known facts.” It never mentions Critical Facts.

5. Definition and Purpose: Critical Fact
- Turning point or a crucial aspect of the mission.
Fact:
Statement of truth or thought to be true at the time.
Purpose: Provide critical knowledge for the CDR to start thinking how to determine priorities.
Critical – Not just relevant. Relevant means something that is closely connected or appropriate to the mission. Often, staff officers provide relevant information, but not compelling or critical information.
Facts- Serve to develop situational understanding, develop planning, and used to assess progress before, during, and after the operation.
Critical Facts vs. Known Facts have different purpose.
In JP 5-0, the verbiage is Known Facts, not Critical Facts, because the emphasis is on developing situational understanding of the Joint Operating Area.
Oten times, a JTF staff may inundate the commander to provide relevant facts concerning the mission variables of METT_TC because it provides a basis for developing situational understanding, continued planning, and assessing progress before, during, and after the operation.
For our purposes, while it is helpful to go through relevant facts within the staff to develop SA, when presenting an MA brief to the commander, the brief should only present critical facts.
Examples within the context of the Korean War:
Relevant fact: The North Koreans have weapons.
Critical fact: Soviets supplied the North Koreans with armored tanks while the US did not supply South Koreans with any armored tanks. This is critical because if the nK conduct an armored assault, the US would have to take the lead because ROK light forces will not be able to defend against an armored assault.

6. Definition and Purpose: Assumption
a supposition on the current situation.
a presupposition on the future course of events, thought to be true in the absence of proof.
Purpose: To continue the planning process.
Assumptions take the place of necessary, but unavailable facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation.
The purpose of making assumptions is to continue the planning process to enable the commander to visualize an estimate of the situation so he/she can eventually make a decision on a COA.
Having assumptions requires CDRs and staffs to continually attempt to replace those assumptions with facts. Rechecking assumptions is valuable at any time during the operations process prior to rendering judgments and making decisions.

7. How to Change Assumptions into Facts
Identify the Information Requirement (IR).
Incorporate the IR into the ISR plan.
ISR platforms provide new information.
Replace assumptions into facts.
Reassess based on new facts.
There is a Process to change Assumptions to Facts.
1. Identify the information required to convert the Assumption to a Fact. This becomes an Information Requirement (IR).
2. Inform the S3 of the IR and its significance. If it is a critical IR, the CDR may categorize it as a CCIR, which Reed will brief next week. The S2 will incorporate the IR into the ISR Plan.
3-4. As various ISR platforms provide new information, replace respective assumptions into facts.

8. Example of a Faulty Assumption in the Korean War
Until Nov 1950, MacArthur and Willoughby assumed:
- The Chinese will not cross the Yalu; they will not intervene.
MacArthur and his G2, MG Charles A. Willoughby, continued to insist, despite the Chinese attacks at Unsan and similar attacks against X Corps in northeastern Korea, that the Chinese would not intervene in force.
On 6 November MacArthur continued to list the total of Chinese troops in theater as only 34,000, whereas in reality over 300,000 Chinese soldiers organized into thirty divisions were in the Korean Theater of Operations.

9. Questions?
Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning Process. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.