1. Rethinking Armageddon Planning Scenarios for the Second Nuclear Age Andrew Krepinevich Jacob Cohn 1

2. Click to edit Master title style Presentation Roadmap Project Overview Why Scenarios? Five Scenarios Selected Observations and Insights Next Steps 2

3. Project Overview 3

4. Click to edit Master title style Project Objectives How can scenarios support efforts to craft policies designed to reduce the chances of nuclear use? What would constitute a representative set of scenarios that are characteristic of the Second Nuclear Age, rather than the preceding age? Given these scenarios, what are some of the first-order implications they raise with respect to nuclear policy, strategy, and force posture? 4

5. Why Scenarios? 5

6. Click to edit Master title style Scenarios Scenarios: A tool for helping us plan in an uncertain world; an antidote to “willful ignorance” A need for effective strategic thinking is most obvious in times of accelerated change While the future is fundamentally unpredictable; it is not wholly uncertain 6

7. Click to edit Master title style Why Scenarios? Do not “predict” the future; rather, they help us to think about the future Help identify what factors will most shape the future Understand how the environment might change Recognize when the environment is changing Know how to respond when change is detected 7

8. Click to edit Master title style “Drivers” Geostrategic: Multipolar regional and global competitions Geopolitical: Regime characteristics; external sources of influence Geographic: Proximity and “interspersing” Cultural: The Human Condition; differing perspectives on cost, benefit and risk 8

9. Click to edit Master title style “Drivers” Military-Technical: – Advanced design nuclear weapons – The maturation of the precision-guided weapons regime – Advanced air and missile defenses – Cyber munitions Military Capabilities: Size and composition of strategic forces Proliferation Dynamics: Static, linear or non-linear? Temporal: Mobilization, early warning, command-and-control 9

10. Five Scenarios 10

11. Click to edit Master title style Scenarios Iran, Israel and the Crisis Neither Sought An “N-Player” Middle East Confrontation Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” threat North Korea’s “Rational” Option China and the Long-Term Great Power Competition 11

12. Middle East

13. Click to edit Master title style Iran and Israel to the Brink 13 Scenario (2016 – 2020) Economic: Joint Agreement unfreezes Iranian assets and ends many economic sanctions Proxies: Tehran’s “slow squeeze” of Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and Israel Crisis: Third Lebanon War expands to direct conflict between Israel and Iran; both sides concerned about preemptive nuclear attack Destabilizing Factors Geographic proximity and limits of Early Warning/C2 Predelegation of authority Nuclear doctrine

14. Click to edit Master title style The “N-Player” Problem 14 Scenario (2016 – 2020) Excursion from previous scenario focusing on the “N-Player” problem Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE expect same nuclear freedom as granted to Iran Saudi Arabia jumpstarts nuclear program with Pakistan’s assistance September 2018, Pakistan deploys nuclear IRBMs to Saudi Arabia Destabilizing Factors Attribution problem Will the U.S. protect its allies equally?

15. Eastern Europe

16. Click to edit Master title style Sub-Conventional Aggression in Latvia 16 Destabilizing Factors Alliance management Deterring the “escalate to deescalate” threat Ability of non-nuclear weapons to fill nuclear missions Gaps in the escalation ladder Scenario (2016 – 2018) Economic: Falling oil and gas prices, continued economic sanctions Security: Increasing insecurity as ISIS attributed terror attacks mount Timing: Low domestic approval and weakening internal control near election Crisis: Creeping aggression in Latvia, incorrectly assuming NATO would not intervene, Russia backed into a losing conventional position

17. North Korea

18. Click to edit Master title style North Korea 18 Destabilizing Factors (Mis)perceptions of leaders Alliance management Vulnerability of missile defenses to Haystack tactic Vulnerability of small arsenals to missile defense Scenario (2016 – 2021) Economic: Economic reform backfires, by 2019 the situation is desperate Nuclear: Believed to have nuclear capable Taepodong-3s and Nodongs Arms Control: Concessions viewed as a path to regime change Crisis: Nuclear strike on Japan as last ditch effort to stave off regime collapse

19. Long-Term Competition with China and Russia

20. Click to edit Master title style Long-Term Multipolar Competition 20 Scenario (2017 – 2020) Economic: Economic slowdown leaves regime reliant on nationalism Geopolitical: Setbacks in South China Sea/East China Sea stress last pillar Military-Technical: U.S. CPGS development and Russian violation of INF treaty raises concerns over vertical escalation vulnerability Nuclear: Fissile material is the principal near-term barrier to growing China’s arsenal; decision made to seek balance with U.S. and Russia Destabilizing Factors What force structure is needed for a multipolar competition? Avoiding an arms race & the role of arms control Effect of geographic proximity – nuclear overflight

21. Selected Insights and Observations 21

22. Click to edit Master title style Selected Insights and Observations The “Nuclear Balance” is now the “Strategic Balance” – Wide range of capabilities; many non-nuclear – New vertical and horizontal escalation ladders The Bipolar structure is transitioning to a Multipolar structure – Global and regional competitions – Strategies for deterring one rival may weaken deterrence with another – A nuclear “great game” – Potential for non-nuclear powers to play 22

23. Click to edit Master title style Selected Insights and Observations The Challenge of Extended Deterrence – What is reassuring for one may not be for another – Need to review along with revised escalation ladders The Death of “Rational Strategic Man” – Single, rational unitary actor model long discredited – Crises lead to thinking “fast,” not “slow” – Prospect Theory suggests coercion strategies may be a “dead end” 23

24. Click to edit Master title style Selected Insights and Observations The Erosion of Crisis Stability – Geographic Proximity, Early Warning, Command-and- Control, Pre-delegation Authority and Human Cognitive Limitations – Cyber Munitions and Catalytic War – Problems with Prompt Attribution – Blurring of Strategic and Non-Strategic Strikes – Undeclared Arsenals – Multiple Extended Deterrence Commitments – Haystack Attacks – 1914 Redux: The Mobilization of Missile Defenses 24

25. Click to edit Master title style Selected Insights and Observations Arms Control – From New START to the Washington Naval Treaty – “Multidimensional” Problems – “Multipolar” Problems – Enforcement and Verification Challenges Implications for the U.S. Strategic Posture – Old metrics may no longer apply – More options needed – Position matters in a mobilization race – Potential gap between commitments and capabilities (extended deterrence) – Which scenarios are accorded priority? – A need to think long term 25

26. Next Steps 26

27. Click to edit Master title style Selected Next Steps Undertake Strategic Net Assessments on global, regional and functional aspects of the competition Comparative assessment of strategic doctrines Identify strategic planning issues that emerge across scenarios Develop a set of the “missing” scenarios (e.g.; India-Pakistan; nuclear war termination) 27

28. Click to edit Master title style Selected Next Steps Develop a revised set of metrics to guide efforts to assess the strategic force balance(s) Update horizontal and vertical escalation ladders Assess prospects for regulating the strategic competition (such as a contemporary version of the Washington Naval Treaty) Examine ongoing efforts among the competitors to enhance their strategic forces, identifying major asymmetries in doctrine, forces and their implications 28

29. Questions? 29