1. Feedback Jackson You can’t say it is conceivable but not possible If it is conceivable it must be possible Or we have to say that it is not conceivable because all knowledge of all physical facts would include knowledge of consciousness But Jackson says this is highly implausible as qualia can’t be understood in terms of function and physical things.

2. Learning objective: To understand the objection that even if zombies are possible, that tells us nothing about how the world actually is, and to evaluate how convincing this objection is.

3. Objection 3 Objection – you cannot make the inference from the claim that zombies are possible, to the conclusion that PD is true. Even if the argument shows that, in another possible world, physical and phenomenal properties are distinct, why does that mean it is true in our actual world? Problems?

4. Problems with this objection Can I be not me in another possible world? Can water be not H2O in another possible world? No. The objection is misunderstanding identity. Phenomenal properties can’t be physical in one world and separate in another, if they are identical, they are identical! So with identity, possibility does tell us about reality.

5. Problem 2 with this objection P says that what exists is physical/depends upon something physical. Remember the painting analogy? If the physical properties of 2 paintings are identical the aesthetic ones can’t be different. How does this relate to P? Once physical properties are established, no more is done to get consciousness, it is already there. Physicalism is therefore a claim about what is possible. So we can’t have 2 worlds where one is P and one is PD. They would have to be the same. If zombies are possible and conceviable then it has to be true in both.

6. Debate As – Object to the zombie argument Bs – defend it 5 minutes to prepare your argument.

7. Does the philosophical zombies argument establish that PD is true? YESNO