1. The Minister and the Mandarin Keep the Minister Fire the Minister Keep the DM Fire the DM

2. The Minister and the Mandarin Keep the Minister Fire the Minister Keep the DM Team 6, Team 7 Fire the DM

3. The Minister and the Mandarin Keep the Minister Fire the Minister Keep the DM Team 6, Team 7Team 1, Team 8 Fire the DM

4. The Minister and the Mandarin Keep the Minister Fire the Minister Keep the DM Team 6, Team 7Team 1, Team 8 Fire the DM Team 2, Team 4, Team 5, Team 9

6. The Not-So-Civil Service (cont’d): Recent Changes in the Power Resources and Relationship Between Ministers and their Senior Civil Servants January 31st, 2006

7. Resources -- Ministers political legitimacy political legitimacy expertise expertise – political vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis public vis-a-vis cabinet vis-a-vis cabinet ability to manage relationship ability to manage relationship outside expertise outside expertise competing lines of advice competing lines of advice relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with cabinet, PM relationship with public/media relationship with public/media

8. Ministerial Resources and Public Opinion Polling revolution in computer technology revolution in computer technology – costs of public opinion polling have dropped exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments exponential rise in the growth of public opinion polling by government departments the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete the role of the minister as the political antenna of the department may be becoming obsolete – senior bureaucrats probably have a better read of public opinion on a given policy issue

9. The Tenure of Ministers (the Constant) “ministerial musical chairs” “ministerial musical chairs” – move often and frequency has increased effects on ministerial power effects on ministerial power – the traditional view ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister ministerial musical chairs weakens the power of minister – the counter-traditional view avoids ministerial capture avoids ministerial capture

10. The Tenure of Senior Public Servants (the change!) the revolving deputy ministerial door the revolving deputy ministerial door – move often and frequency has increased effects on deputy ministerial power effects on deputy ministerial power – the traditional view equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents equalizes the relationship between DMs and ministers – both are short-term departmental residents why? why? – an alternative view strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) strengthens the Centre (e.g PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO) DM becomes representative of the Centre (e.g. PCO)

11. The Tenure of Ministers and their Senior Public Servants changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... changing patterns in the tenure of ministers and deputy ministers... effects are ambiguous/contradictory effects are ambiguous/contradictory complex interaction between both patterns complex interaction between both patterns power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question power of ministers/DM in new environment is an open empirical question HOWEVER... HOWEVER... relationships are changing relationships are changing both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre both changes are important in terms of relationships between departments and The Centre

12. The Political-Bureaucratic Interface Across the System Centralized and Diffuse Accountability Across Government January 31st, 2006

13. Dilemmas of Organizational Structure – Centripetal and Centrifugal Tendencies political control/accountability vs. impartiality political control/accountability vs. impartiality democratic paradox democratic paradox top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up responsiveness (effectiveness, efficiency) top-down responsiveness vs. bottom- up responsiveness (effectiveness, efficiency) bureaucratic paradox bureaucratic paradox central political accountability vs. diffused political accountability central political accountability vs. diffused political accountability parliamentary paradox parliamentary paradox –collective ministerial responsibility – accountability directly to the electorate –individual ministerial responsibility – accountability to parliament

14. The Centrifugal Tendencies responsiveness (bottom-up) to clientele/public/changing circumstances responsiveness (bottom-up) to clientele/public/changing circumstances – effectiveness, efficiency diffused political accountability diffused political accountability impartiality vs. political control impartiality vs. political control

15. Centrifugal Organizational Responses line/program/vertical/functional departments line/program/vertical/functional departments bottom-up responsiveness bottom-up responsiveness diffused political accountability diffused political accountability

16. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level

17. Centrifugal Organizational Responses line/program/vertical/functional departments line/program/vertical/functional departments departmental sub-units (structural heretics) departmental sub-units (structural heretics) regulatory agencies regulatory agencies Crown Corporations Crown Corporations non-departmental agencies non-departmental agencies – impartiality, effectiveness or efficiency (vs. political control) mechanisms of political control... mechanisms of political control...

18. The Centripetal Tendencies top-down responsiveness top-down responsiveness coherence coherence centralized political accountability centralized political accountability collective cabinet responsibility collective cabinet responsibility political control (vs. impartiality) political control (vs. impartiality)

19. Centripetal Organizational Responses agents of central political control agents of central political control PM and Prime Minister’s Office PM and Prime Minister’s Office Cabinet Cabinet –Treasury Board Minister of Finance Minister of Finance

20. The Centre – The Political/Bureaucratic Interfaces PM/Cabinet and PCO PM/Cabinet and PCO Clerk of the Privy Council Clerk of the Privy Council political bureaucratic interface in other central agencies political bureaucratic interface in other central agencies Minister of Finance and Department of Finance Minister of Finance and Department of Finance President of the Treasury Board (cabinet committee) and the Treasury Board Secretariat President of the Treasury Board (cabinet committee) and the Treasury Board Secretariat

21. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level Prime Minister, PMO, Min. Fin., TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

22. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level

23. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level)

24. Channels of Central Political Control Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

25. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level)

26. Channels of Central Political Control Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

27. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level) downward and outward from political level to bureaucratic level downward and outward from political level to bureaucratic level

28. Channels of Central Political Control Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP

29. Channels of Central Political Control outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) outward at political level (then downward to bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level) downward from political to bureaucratic level (then outward at bureaucratic level) downward and outward from political level to bureaucratic level downward and outward from political level to bureaucratic level

30. Channels of Central Political Control Ministers Deputy Ministers Prime Minister, PMO, Min.Finance, TBP Clerk of the Privy Council, PCO, TBS

31. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister through Cabinet to PM

32. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers

33. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board

34. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers

35. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers

36. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s

37. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s -DM influence over ministers

38. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers

39. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence DM influence over Ministers DM influence over Ministers – from Minister to Cabinet PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board PCO influence over PM/Min. Finance/Treasury Board – from PM/Min. Fin./Treasury Board to Ministers PCO influence over DM’s PCO influence over DM’s -DM influence over ministers

40. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers

41. Implications of the Organizational Structure various agencies (departments, agencies) which have radically different organizational purposes various agencies (departments, agencies) which have radically different organizational purposes line departments -- provide services/programs line departments -- provide services/programs central agencies – coordinate line departments central agencies – coordinate line departments – potential for conflict inherent in structure central agency mandate for horizontal coordination reinforces centripetal tendencies central agency mandate for horizontal coordination reinforces centripetal tendencies line department resistance reinforces centrifugal tendencies line department resistance reinforces centrifugal tendencies these tendencies become institutionalized these tendencies become institutionalized –even if the circumstances/concerns which give rise to these tendencies fade, the tendencies may persist

42. Implications of the Organizational Structure centrifugal forces and centripetal forces exist at both bureaucratic and political levels centrifugal forces and centripetal forces exist at both bureaucratic and political levels creates complex mix of incentives for various actors creates complex mix of incentives for various actors creates potential for cross-level coalitions/alliances creates potential for cross-level coalitions/alliances contrasts with bureaucratic vs. political dichotomy contrasts with bureaucratic vs. political dichotomy

43. Implications of the Organizational Structure political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites PM/PMO and PCO PM/PMO and PCO central agency ministers and central agencies central agency ministers and central agencies PM and DMs PM and DMs line departments ministers and DMs line departments ministers and DMs

44. Implications of the Organizational Structure political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence

45. Implications of the Organizational Structure political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites political-bureaucratic interfaces exist at numerous sites creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence creates potential for complex strategies of political control or bureaucratic influence blockage of one line (political control or bureaucratic influence) does not mean that control/influence not exercised blockage of one line (political control or bureaucratic influence) does not mean that control/influence not exercised more simplistic model highlighted democratic questions; reality is more complex more simplistic model highlighted democratic questions; reality is more complex

46. Channels of Bureaucratic Influence Ministers Deputy Ministers

47. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level

48. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level

49. The Political-Bureaucratic System Political Level Bureaucratic Level