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1 HBS: A Single-Key Mode of Operation for Deterministic Authenticated Encryption Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, Japan) Kan Yasuda (NTT Corporation, Japan) FSE 2009 2009 Feb. 25, Leuven, Belgium
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2 Table of contents Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE) Deterministic AE (DAE) Previous work: SIV HBS (Hash Block Stealing) How it works Its efficiency and security
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3 Background (AE) Blockcipher modes of operation Two goals: To establish authenticity (data integrity) To preserve privacy (data confidentiality) Authenticated Encryption (AE) Concurrently achieves the two goals
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4 Background (AE, nonce-based) AE CCM, GCM, OCB, … Usually uses a randomized salt or state-dependent value Formalized as nonce-based AE [Rogaway 2001, 2002, 2004] Nonce Never repeat the same value, or lose all security
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5 Table of contents Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE) Deterministic AE (DAE) Previous work: SIV HBS (Hash Block Stealing) How it works Its efficiency and security
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6 Background (DAE) Nonce misuse Settled by Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE) [Rogaway – Shrimpton 2006] DAE “Secure” even if the same value is used (all an adversary can do is to detect the repetition)
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7 Background (How DAE works) Deterministic algorithms Encryption Input: (Header H, Message M) Output: (Tag T, Encrypted Msg C) Decryption Verifies (H, T, C) Outputs either or M
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8 Security definition of DAE Enc H, M T, C Adversaries Cannot distinguish ? Dec H, T, C / M Random H, M $$$ H, T, C Real Ideal
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9 Table of contents Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE) Deterministic AE (DAE) Previous work: SIV HBS (Hash Block Stealing) How it works Its efficiency and security
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10 SIV mode of operation A concrete DAE mode [Rogaway – Shrimpton Eurocrypt 2006] “MAC-then-Encrypt” Entirely blockcipher-based Uses CMAC* (vectorized CMAC) for authentication Uses CTR mode for encryption Requires two keys
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11 Motivation: Can we construct a single-key DAE mode?
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12 Table of contents Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE) Deterministic AE (DAE) Previous work: SIV HBS (Hash Block Stealing) How it works Its efficiency and security
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13 HBS (Hash Block Stealing) The HBS mode Single-key Also “MAC-then-Encrypt” style New polynomial-hashing for MAC “Odd” CTR (counter) mode for Enc
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14 Vector-input (VI) polynomial hashing Motivation: Two different inputs (H,M) (H’,M’) We may have H || M = H’ || M’ Cannot use string-input polynomial hash New notion: VI- –AXU hash function For any (H,M) (H’,M’) and Y Pr[ Hash L (H,M) Hash L (H’,M’)=Y] ≤ Pr is over random hash keys L
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15 How to construct VI- -AXU hash Finite-field polynomial L = E K (0 n ) is the hashing key For header H = H 0 H 1 H 2 and message M = M 0 M 1 M 2 hash value S = L 7 L 5 H 0 L 3 H 1 LH 2 L 8 L 6 M 0 L 4 M 1 L 2 M 2 Use odd for header and even for message Note the additional leading terms
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16 Produce tag and “Steal” hash Polynomial Hash HeaderMessage Tag EKEK S Steal the hash “block” and use it as IV for the CTR mode
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17 “Odd” CTR mode M0M0 EKEK S C0C0 M1M1 EKEK C1C1 M2M2 EKEK C2C2 XOR Integer x rep. as bit string Necessary for the security of HBS
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18 Table of contents Background and motivation Authenticated encryption (AE) Deterministic AE (DAE) Previous work: SIV HBS (Hash Block Stealing) How it works Its efficiency and security
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19 Efficiency comparison SIVHBS # of blockcipher keys 21 # of calls to blockcipher h + 2m + 2m + 2 # of multiplications 0h + m + 2 Header h blocks, message m blocks
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20 Security of HBS mode Secure under the assumption that the blockcipher E is a SPRP Security theorem: Adv DAE (HBS) ≤ Adv SPRP (E) + 33q 2 (1+h+2m) 2 /2 n q max # of queries h max length of each header m max length of each message
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21 Thank you very much.
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