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RAND EDUCATION Test-Based Accountability Systems: Asking the Right Questions Laura Hamilton RAND February 1, 2003 Presented at the Annenberg School for.

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Presentation on theme: "RAND EDUCATION Test-Based Accountability Systems: Asking the Right Questions Laura Hamilton RAND February 1, 2003 Presented at the Annenberg School for."— Presentation transcript:

1 RAND EDUCATION Test-Based Accountability Systems: Asking the Right Questions Laura Hamilton RAND February 1, 2003 Presented at the Annenberg School for Communication University of Southern California

2 RAND EDUCATION Page 2 Testing and information are cornerstones of state and federal education policy  “Information is power; testing and gathering independent data are the ways to get information into the hands of parents, educators and taxpayers.”  “Until teachers and parents recognize what their students know and can do, they can't help them improve. Testing will raise expectations for all students and ensure that no child slips through the cracks.”  “Accountability begins with informed parents, communities and elected leaders so we can work together to improve schools.” (Source: U.S. Department of Education NCLB web site)

3 RAND EDUCATION Page 3 NCLB mandates state-level test- based accountability (TBA) systems  Key components:  Standards that communicate what students must learn  Tests to measure attainment of those standards  Publication of information from tests  Systems of consequences attached to test scores  TBA is often treated as synonymous with “accountability”  Information value of tests is emphasized  All stakeholders are believed to benefit from testing and the information it provides

4 RAND EDUCATION Page 4 TBA is neither a panacea nor a curse  Like any education reform, design and implementation of test-based accountability policies is subject to enormous variation  Effects have not been uniformly positive or negative.  Debates typically fail to address importance of policy variation, implementation differences, and local context.

5 RAND EDUCATION Page 5 What do we know about tests?  Extensive variation across states  Format (multiple-choice, essay)  Subjects tested  Methods for score reporting (norm-referenced, criterion- referenced)  Scores may be unstable even when technical quality (e.g., reliability) is high  Alignment between tests and standards is often weak or unmeasured Quality of tests is key, but may be undermined by insufficient capacity.

6 RAND EDUCATION Page 6 What do we know about TBA?  Scores often rise when stakes are introduced  Information value of scores is limited  Scores become inflated  Teachers do not find most existing tests useful for instructional purposes.  Testing influences classroom activities  Tests have stronger influence than standards  Targets are often unrealistic …but TBA systems may be designed to address problems and maximize benefits.

7 RAND EDUCATION Page 7 Rise in scores  In almost every case, scores have risen for the first few years after a TBA system is introduced  Makes TBA a relatively inexpensive way for policymakers to demonstrate progress  Difficult to separate the effects of TBA from other policy initiatives that occur at the same time Question: What evidence is there to support inferences about the positive effects of TBA?

8 RAND EDUCATION Page 8 Information value of tests  “Score inflation” is common  Audit mechanisms can help—e.g., NAEP  However, discrepancies in test-score trends are difficult to understand without mapping tests to standards  Teachers typically do not rely heavily on information from standardized tests.  There are efforts to improve information value of tests for teachers  Supplementary assessment system may help  Information value of tests for other stakeholders is unknown Questions: How do stakeholders use test data, and what changes are needed to make data more informative? What inferences do users make from scores?

9 RAND EDUCATION Page 9 Test scores rise, but increases do not always generalize Source: Linn, 1999

10 RAND EDUCATION Page 10 Influence on curriculum and instruction  Teachers and administrators respond to testing by shifting curriculum and instruction toward tested content and away from untested content  School personnel learn how to “game” the system  These actions affect validity of information Questions: What changes have teachers and principals made in response to tests? What do teachers perceive as key leverage points? What resources are teachers given to promote positive changes?

11 RAND EDUCATION Page 11 Teachers’ responses to tests can affect validity of scores 7. Cheating Negative Teacher Responses 1. Providing more instructional time 2. Working harder to cover more material 3. Working more effectively Positive Teacher Responses 4. Reallocating classroom instruction time 5. Aligning instruction with standards 6. Coaching students to do better by focusing instruction on incidental aspects of the test Ambiguous Teacher Responses Based on Koretz, McCaffrey and Hamilton, 2001

12 RAND EDUCATION Page 12 Practices are affected more by tests than by standards Content and Performance Standards School Policy Curriculum Professional development Instructional materials Testing Program Classroom Practices Curriculum emphasis Instructional strategies Student groupings Student Outcomes Knowledge Skills Attitudes Ideal model

13 RAND EDUCATION Page 13 Practices are affected more by tests than by standards Content and Performance Standards School Policy Curriculum Professional development Instructional materials Testing Program Classroom Practices Curriculum emphasis Instructional strategies Student groupings Student Outcomes Knowledge Skills Attitudes Reality

14 RAND EDUCATION Page 14 Targets are difficult to reach  NCLB and many state policies demand gains that have never been achieved before  Burden is highest on initially low-performing schools  Expectation for universal proficiency fails to address outside influences Questions: How are low-performing schools attempting to meet targets? Do staff view targets as realistic and attainable?

15 RAND EDUCATION Page 15 NCLB “relative gains” model

16 RAND EDUCATION Page 16 Conditions required for TBA to work  Solvable problems  Attainable, publicly-endorsed standards  High-quality information  Salient and appropriate incentives  Effective intervention  External political environment supportive of reform

17 RAND EDUCATION Page 17 Solvable problems  TBA policies rely on incentives and locally-developed interventions to fix failing schools.  Assumptions is that problems are due either to unmotivated staff or to staff who don’t know how to improve their effectiveness.  TBA may not work if problems stem from other sources (e.g., high levels of mobility or other external factors that affect students’ ability to learn; severe lack of resources in schools)

18 RAND EDUCATION Page 18 Attainable, publicly-endorsed standards  Quality of standards is central, but their effectiveness also depends on how they are communicated and measured.  Must reflect some degree of public consensus regarding what knowledge and skills are valued.  Must be perceived as attainable by teachers, parents, students, administrators.

19 RAND EDUCATION Page 19 High-quality information  Tests must measure student attainment of standards with a sufficient degree of reliability and validity.  Evaluating technical quality of tests is difficult; appropriate way of measuring reliability, for example, depends on how test was constructed and what kinds of scores are reported.  Alignment between tests and standards is critical, but there is disagreement on what “alignment” means and how to measure it.  System can be designed to reduce (but not eliminate) score inflation.  Information must be communicated in a way that meets stakeholders’ needs.  Limitations must also be communicated.

20 RAND EDUCATION Page 20 Salient and appropriate incentives  Incentives must motivate improved performance on the part of educators; must be perceived as meaningful and important.  Incentive system must recognize role of students and families in influencing outcomes.  System must balance individual- and group-level incentives.  Effort must be made to reduce incentives that encourage undesirable actions.

21 RAND EDUCATION Page 21 Effective intervention  Intervention strategies must work better than what schools are currently doing.  States or districts must have resources to intervene in all necessary cases  Interventions must not promote narrow test preparation or other undesirable practices.

22 RAND EDUCATION Page 22 External political environment supportive of reform  TBA functions in a broader political environment  Design of TBA systems is influenced by political considerations  Understanding the broader context is critical for understanding how TBA will work in practice


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