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Lecture 2. Can Investors Influence Managers?  Theoretically, managers work for owners but in reality, firms actually seems to belong to management. 

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Presentation on theme: "Lecture 2. Can Investors Influence Managers?  Theoretically, managers work for owners but in reality, firms actually seems to belong to management. "— Presentation transcript:

1 Lecture 2

2 Can Investors Influence Managers?  Theoretically, managers work for owners but in reality, firms actually seems to belong to management.  There is a race of win-lose between shareholders and management but most of the time, management has always having the upper hand.

3  Different proposals are made by the shareholders but are defeated when it comes in the annual shareholders meeting.  There are normally two types of proposals; . Those relate to governance (e.g. suggesting changes in board structure) . Those relate to social reform (e.g. proposing to stop selling chemicals to rogue countries) etc; etc.

4 . Without management approval, proposals have little chance of succeeding. . Shareholders have to trust management and must go with their wants which leads to chaos in the firms.

5  Example  Carly Fiorina’s Takeover of COMPAQ (2002) ◦ Carly Fiorina (CEO Hewlett-Packard) announce acquisition of Compaq on Sept 4, 2001 for $25.5Billion. ◦ Faced negative reaction by stock market, industry experts and the business media.

6  Cont: ◦ Hewlett-Packard stock was down by 18% and Compaq’s stocks by 10% following the announcement. ◦ Two major shareholders i.e David W. Packard and Walter Hewlett were against this decision. ◦ They placed their pressure on other shareholders but all in vain. ◦ Fiorina went ahead with her plan.

7 Monitoring . Investing public doesn’t know about the firm’s operational level.  . Only managers know. . Consequently managers may not act in the shareholder’s best interest which demonstrates the need for MONITOR.

8 Monitoring . Investing public doesn’t know about the firm’s operational level. . Only managers know. . Consequently managers may not act in the shareholder’s best interest which demonstrates the need for MONITOR.

9 Stakeholders Monitors Creditors Stockholders Government SEC IRS Outside Company Auditors Analysts Investment Banks Credit Agencies Within Company BoDs Managers Controllers Society Employees

10 . Similarly market force is helpful in monitoring. . Stakeholders can also monitor by participating. . Creditors can also check by ensuring that the firm is properly handling its debt processing. . Employees, such as, internal auditors can play a vital role in monitoring. . Society can inject a sense of responsibility at the executive level by acting as a noble corporate citizenship. . Unfortunately, all of these mechanism can fail at one time or another.

11  An Integrated System of Governance ◦ The corporate governance system is integrated and complicated. ◦ Every concern stakeholder is keen to get the perks i.e. executives, auditors, boards, banks, analysts and so on.

12  MGT Board Regulator s Analyst s Credito rs Accounta nt Auditor Consultants Investment Banks

13  Summary ◦ corporate form of business allows firm to have excessive capital ◦ it contributes a lot toward country’s economy ◦ main disadvantage lies in the relationship between the owner and controller

14  Cont:- ◦ The shareholders and executives interest can be aligned through incentives involving stock options. ◦ these incentives can’t guarantee to reduce the level of RISK.


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