1. Workshop on “ Origins and Patterns of Political Violence I: Violence in Civil Wars ” January 16-18, 2004, Santa Fe InstituteIngroup-Favoring and Outgroup-Bashing Behavior Toshio Yamagishi Hokkaido University

2. In this paper, I will explore psychological foundations of intra-group and inter-group behaviors such as ingroup favoring behavior and spiteful behavior against outgroup members. I’ll present critical evaluation of social identity theory that claims that a set of psychological mechanisms in humans is at the core of spiteful behavior against outgroup members. Preview of my Talk

3. Social Identity Theory People ’ s self-concepts are comprised of both personal identities (who they are as unique individuals, different from all others) and social identities (who they are as group members, sharing important characteristics with others). The categorization leads people to engage in social comparison (with other relevant categories as a means of understanding the value of their own category membership, and, hence, social identity. Positively discrepant comparisons — comparisons that favor group members ’ own category over another — are assumed to reflect positively on group members, leading to an enhancement of their social identities. positively differentiate their ingroup from a relevant outgroup As a result, group members actively strive to positively differentiate their ingroup from a relevant outgroup as a means of social identity enhancement.

4. ・ Ss are divided into two group on a trivial criterion. Preference of Klee and Kandinsky, estimation of the number of dots on a slide, etc. ・ There is no interaction within group members, and there is no conflict of interest between the groups. ・ Each S allocates rewards (money) between one “ingroup” member and one “outgroup” member. ・ Ss in such minimal group experiments often allocated more money to an ingroup member than to an out-group member.  Social categorization alone produces ingroup favoring behavior. Minimal Group Experiment (Tajfel et al., 1971)

5. Do people favor ingroup members and discriminate against outgroup members for no reason other than the fact that they share the same and different social categories? An affirmative answer to this question implies that inter-group conflicts are deeply rooted in our psychological composition—in the category-based processing of social cognition. The series of experiments we have conducted so far clearly invalidate the social identity theoretic interpretation of ingroup-favoring and outgroup bashing behavior in the MGE. How Valid Is the Conclusion of the MGE?

6. Karp, Jin, Shinotsuka & Yamagishi, 1993 Money allocated to an ingroup and an outgroup member (out of 500 yen) by subjects who were also a target by other subjects' allocations (Target Condition) and those who were paid a fixed amount (Not a Target Condition) A replication of the original Tajfel et al.’s minimal group experiment.

7. Karp, Jin, Shinotsuka & Yamagishi, 1993 Ss gave more money to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member in the condition that replicated the original experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971). Ss disregarded the in/out distinction and almost exactly the same amount to an ingroup and an outgroup member when it was made salient that the money Ss themselves would receive did not come from other members of their own group.  Ss gave more money to an ingroup member expecting that they would receive more from ingroup members.

8. Jin,Yamagishi & Kiyonari (1996) The same result was replicated by Jin, Yamagishi & Kiyonari (1996)

9. Furthermore, only those who expected their favors to the ingroup member to be reciprocated practiced ingroup favoritism.

10. Ingroup favoritism typically observed in earlier experiments was replicated; Ss were more cooperative when they played with an ingroup member than with an outgroup member. Jin & Yamagishi, 1997 (Cooperation rate: proportion of the endowment of 100 yen given to the PD partner) Cooperation in one-shot PD (Cooperation rate: proportion of the endowment of 100 yen given to the PD partner)

11. In-group favoring behavior did not exist when the ingroup partner did not know that the subject was in the same group.

12. Kiyonari (2000) The same pattern was obtained by Kiyonari (2000) more clearly. Whether the partner was an ingroup or an outgroup member did not matter unless the partner knew that and thus the player could expect similar ingroup favoring behavior from other ingroup members.

13. Generalized Exchanges of Favors The results of the these (and other) experiments indicate that the ingroup-favoring and outgroup- bashing behavior in the minimal group experiment is a generalized reciprocation of the favor people expect from ingroup members. Once it is made salient that generalized exchanges do not exist in the minimal group (i.e., in the truly minimal group), ingroup-favoring and outgroup- bashing behavior disappears.  Social categorization alone is not sufficient to produce ingroup-favoring or outgroup-bashing behavior.

14. Implications for Ethnic Violence 1.The psychologists’ (or social identity theorists’) claim that outgroup-bashing behavior is grounded in social cognition—how we humans process social information—needs to be critically re-evaluated. 2.At least in minimal groups, ingroup-favoring and outgroup-bashing behaviors are (preemptive or retroactive) responses to (anticipated or past) behaviors of others. 3.Participants expectations that they would be treated favorably by ingroup members and unfavorably by outgroup members are in fact confirmed by their own responses to the expectations.

15. Inter-group Conflict as a Self-Fulfilling Prophesy 3. Participants expectations that they would be treated favorably by ingroup members and unfavorably by outgroup members are in fact confirmed by their own responses to the expectations. For example, participants in Jin & Yamagishi (1997) expected more money (76 yen) from ingroup members than from outgroup members (45 yen). These expectations were supported by the ingroup members’ and outgroup members’ behaviors. The former gave (61 yen) and the latter (42 yen). Jin & Yamagishi, 1997 Responses to Expectations Expectations

16. Real Categories? Do people exhibit ingroup-favoring and outgroup- bashing behaviors in the absence of the expectations of such behaviors from other people when the group involves real social categories rather than meaningless categories.

17. With nationality groups (Japanese versus Australian) Japanese Data Ingroup=Japanese Outgroup=Australian Australian Data Ingroup=Australian Outgroup=Japanese Yamagishi, Foddy, Makimura, Matsuda, Kiyonari & Platow, 2004

18. Foddy, Yamagishi & Platow, 2003 With schools (La Trobe U. vs. Melbourne U. or RMIT) Choose the Dictator Game  The Faith Game (Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 1999)  Played by two players.  Player 1 plays a dictator game, allocating AU$16 between him/herself and the partner anyway he/she prefers.  Player 2 (real subject, a student of La Trobe U.) decides between the two allocators—an ingroup allocator (another student of La Trobe U.) and an outgroup allocator (a student of Melbourne U.)  Mutual Knowledge condition: Both the allocator and the recipient (real subject) know their schools.  Unilateral Knowledge condition: Only the recipient know the two players’ schools. The allocator makes the decision without knowing who the recipient is.

19. Foddy, Yamagishi & Platow, 2003 Percentage of the choices of the ingroup allocator Ss preferred the ingroup allocator ONLY when the allocator knew that Ss were ingroup members.

20. Ingroup-Favoring Behavior VS Evaluation In these experiments, Ss often evaluate ingroup members higher than outgroup members.  Ingroup evaluation However, ingroup evaluation is not correlated with ingroup-favoring behavior involving real money (though it is correlated with ingroup-favoring behavior involving abstract points).  Feeling and thinking positively about ingroup members may involve a different psychological module than behaving favorably toward ingroup members. Exchange mechanism and slidarity mechanism.

21. Altruistic Punishment of Ingroup and Outgroup One-shot Punishment: Shinada, Omura & Yamagishi, 2003 Two 4-person groups are involved. Within each group, 3 Ss play a one- shot giving game. Each of the 3 Ss decides how much of 200 yen to give to another group member. The money provided by a player is doubled, and the recipient receives twice the amount a player gave to him/her. The groups are students’ majors. N=85

22. One of four group members in each group is assigned the role of an observer. The observer is provided with who gave how much to whom. Then, he/she decide how much to pay to punish each of the 6 game players (3 in each group). He/she can spend up to 200 yen per target. The target of punishment is confiscated three times as much money as the amount of punishment S paid.

23. S was the only real human participant. The other seven were computer responses. The game was repeated 3 times. In the first two games, S played the giving game. In the third game, S was assigned the role of an observer.

24.  Cooperators* punished the ingroup defector more than the outgroup defector.  Non-cooperators punished the outgroup defector more than the ingroup defector. *Cooperators: gave 200 yen in the second game. * Non-cooperator: did not give 200 yen in the second game. Proportion of money spent on punishing a defector

25. 内集団の場合は寄付しなかった人間が罰されたが、外集 団相手の場合には寄付の程度と罰金の額とは関連してい ない。 内集団に対しては一般交換の維持につながる愛他行動。 外集団に対しては、 spiteful な行動。

26. Altruistic Punishment in Repeated Games Terai & Yamagishi, 2003 (unpublished experiment) N=72 (in 9 8-person groups) Each S played a similar giving game as in the previous experiment 24 times, AND they played the role of an observer in each trial. All Ss were real humans. All Ss were Japanese, but they were led to believe that four were Japanese and the other four were Americans, connected over Internet. Each S chose either a Japanese or an American participant as the target of their giving. Then, he/she decided how much to give to the target. Each S also chose to monitor either a Japanese or an American. They could reduce the target’s income with a cost to themselves (third-party punishment).

27. Ss gave as much to outgroup members (Americans; 55 points) as to ingroup members (Japanese; 52 points); They monitored ingroup members more often outgroup members, and spent more money to punish ingroup members, than outgroup members. Ss monitored each ingroup member 4.23 times, and spent 4.73 points to punish an ingroup member. They monitored each outgroup member 2.85 times, and spent 3.27 points to punish an outgroup member.  Altruistic punishment is directed more toward ingroup members than outgroup members.

28. Cooperativeness of the target: The points the target of monitoring gave.

29. Conclusions and Implications 1.Ingroup-favoring and outgroup-bashing behaviors that have been observed in the laboratory derive from psychological mechanisms related to the promotion of within-group cooperation. Outgroup-bashing is a by- product of this psychological mechanism. 2.Expectations of others’ behavior play a critical role in promoting ingroup-favoring and otugroup-bashing behaviors. These behaviors are preemptive or retroactive responses to others’ behaviors. 3.The expectation  behavior circle often generates inter- group conflict in a self-fulfilling manner. A member of group A acts aggressively against a member of group B as self-defense against anticipated aggression from the latter. This constitutes an evidence that A is antagonistic to B and has an intent to act aggressively toward B. Given this, B acts aggressively as preemptive self-defense, etc.

30. Remaining Questions My research is based on a benign view of human nature— humans as social-exchangers and cooperation seekers. In this view, between-group conflicts are by-products of psychological mechanisms that are designed to promote within-group cooperation. The question is: Are we endowed with psychological mechanisms that are designed to make us antagonistic toward outgroup members?