1. APEC Earthquake Response Cooperative Program on Energy Supply Systems Coordination of Energy Infrastructure Restoration in Australia Mr Allan Gillespie FTSE Hon FIE Aust

2. Introduction Risk of Earthquakes not well recognised Earthquake Design Standards not always employed Emergency Response Structure addresses cyclones, floods, storms, bushfires and in more recent times, Security

3. Australian Earthquake Activity Australia is seismically active Earthquakes pose a substantial risk Newcastle earthquake 1989 –5.6 RM Largest earthquake that can occur is estimated at 7 RM 1988 Tennant CK earthquake was 6.9RM was> 1994 Northridge in USA

5. Commonwealth Role National Emergency Management Cttee Emergency Management Organisation Counter Disaster taskforce Disaster response Plans

6. State/Territory Organisations Peak Committee Emergency/disaster controller SES Police Fire Services Communications Utilities

7. Disaster Management System

8. SES A National Network Mostly Volunteers Provides coordinating role at local levels Provides a resource of trained rescuers to support full-time emergency services Covers all emergencies

9. Electricity Supply Organisations Little experience with earthquakes Considerable experience with other natural disasters –Cyclones, storms, bushfires, flooding Each organisation has limited resources and for major events depends on other organisations Common emergency radio communication channels

10. Energy Supply Organisations Coordination and Planning Emergency Management Plan filed with State/Territory Counter Disaster Organisation Representation on State/Territory Counter Disaster Committee Key executive nominated as controller Provision made for large influx of personnel Simulation trials

11. Energy Organisations Damage Assessment Generally not well done Tendency to underestimate damage in early stages Over last decade approach has been to initially over resource Telephone call system analysis of damage with automated response messages

12. Electricity Infrastructure “Skinny” Backbone transmission System Duplication of major System Interconnections Good Interconnection, remote monitoring, data acquisition and control in urban areas Automatic reconfiguration of high voltage systems for a range of failures All new urban lines underground

13. Electricity Infrastructure (Cont) The major earthquake risk is for above ground structures and these are now being designed to appropriate design standards The current major concern for electricity infrastructure is vulnerability to Terrorist attack

14. Gas Infrastructure More vulnerable to failure than electricity infrastructure Very little capacity to bypass constraints and damage Automatic supply shutdown limited to major gateways Manual operation of valves required for most of urban systems Up to 5 days supply can remain in system. Plastic supply lines limit earthquake damage.

15. Effect of National Competitive Energy Markets Reduced cooperation between energy companies Reduction in size and disaggregation has reduced response capability Some combined gas and electric utilities Greater reliance on Government emergency response systems Risk of protection systems not coordinating

16. Effect of National Security Concerns Earlier intervention from Government at all levels Risk assessment of all energy infrastructure now required State governments reviewing critical infrastructure Security concerns will override all other considerations for restoration of supply

17. Conclusion There is an effective emergency response structure operating nationally capable of dealing with earthquakes The implementation of competitive energy markets has reduced capacity to respond and made restoration more dependant on government systems National Security concerns are now starting to override previous response plans and action