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Introduction to International Regimes By: R. Widya Setiabudi S., S.IP.,S.Si.,MT & Lenny Puspa Dewi, S.IP.,M.Si. Department of International Relations University.

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Presentation on theme: "Introduction to International Regimes By: R. Widya Setiabudi S., S.IP.,S.Si.,MT & Lenny Puspa Dewi, S.IP.,M.Si. Department of International Relations University."— Presentation transcript:

1 Introduction to International Regimes By: R. Widya Setiabudi S., S.IP.,S.Si.,MT & Lenny Puspa Dewi, S.IP.,M.Si. Department of International Relations University of Padjadjaran 2008

2 Theory of Regimes Regimes as a means by which states attempt to overcome collective action problems Regimes as a means by which states attempt to overcome collective action problems States see suboptimal outcomes from independent decision- making and seek to develop collective decision-making and collective behavior to achieve better outcomes States see suboptimal outcomes from independent decision- making and seek to develop collective decision-making and collective behavior to achieve better outcomes 1. Conflict – independent decision-making by different states leads to suboptimal outcomes 2. Harmony – independent decision-making by different states leads to acceptable outcomes 3. Cooperation – interdependent decision-making by different states leads to better outcomes than available under conflict. Cooperation as attempt to resolve situations that would otherwise become conflict

3 Basic Elements of Regime Theory Power – realism Power – realism Interests – neoliberalism Interests – neoliberalism Ideas and identity – constructivism Ideas and identity – constructivism

4 Basic Elements of Regime Theory (2) Notice how Kratochwil and Ruggie show that realism and neoliberalism are both rationalist – i.e., they are both based on notions that states attempt to pursue their interests in power and wealth Notice how Kratochwil and Ruggie show that realism and neoliberalism are both rationalist – i.e., they are both based on notions that states attempt to pursue their interests in power and wealth Important to understanding of how theories are formed and revised in response to other theories Important to understanding of how theories are formed and revised in response to other theories Better to think in terms of variables rather than theories Better to think in terms of variables rather than theories Variables work together or are in competition but they are shared by competing theories – e.g., institutionalists do NOT think that power or ideas don’t matter Variables work together or are in competition but they are shared by competing theories – e.g., institutionalists do NOT think that power or ideas don’t matter

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6 Theories about International Regimes Hegemonial stability theory Hegemonial stability theory Regimes change when the distribution of international power changes; regimes tend to favor hegemonial powers. Regimes change when the distribution of international power changes; regimes tend to favor hegemonial powers. Epistemic communities Epistemic communities Regimes cannot emerge in the absence of consensus among activists and technical experts (e.g., environmental regimes) Regimes cannot emerge in the absence of consensus among activists and technical experts (e.g., environmental regimes) Constructivism Constructivism Regimes are artificial social constructions that do not necessarily depend on power distributions or scientific/technical consensus Regimes are artificial social constructions that do not necessarily depend on power distributions or scientific/technical consensus

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8 Definition Principles (beliefs), norms (general standards), rules (specific prescriptions/proscriptions) and decision-making processes (collective choice rules) around which actors’ expectations converge. Principles (beliefs), norms (general standards), rules (specific prescriptions/proscriptions) and decision-making processes (collective choice rules) around which actors’ expectations converge. System of governance for a particular issue area. System of governance for a particular issue area.

9 Definition (2) Thinking about definition of regimes Thinking about definition of regimes Behavioral definition – if its only a regime if at least some actors comply than what are treaties that are ignored? Isn’t it analytically valuable to have regimes that "don’t work?" Doesn’t this help separate causes from effects rather than entangling them definitionally? Behavioral definition – if its only a regime if at least some actors comply than what are treaties that are ignored? Isn’t it analytically valuable to have regimes that "don’t work?" Doesn’t this help separate causes from effects rather than entangling them definitionally? Explicit or implicit rules Explicit or implicit rules

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11 3. International Regimes First half of definition really means regimes First half of definition really means regimes The principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in an international issue-area The principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in an international issue-area Development Stages: creation, adaptive evolution, change (in framework vs. of the framework), decay Development Stages: creation, adaptive evolution, change (in framework vs. of the framework), decay International regimes and organizations are two different things; often related, often not. Some organizations run projects of value but have no real role in rule making and enforcement; ex: UNESCO International regimes and organizations are two different things; often related, often not. Some organizations run projects of value but have no real role in rule making and enforcement; ex: UNESCO

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13 Questions for this week’s class: 1. Is all the definitional discussion of the Hasenclever book merely intellectualized but meaningless debate?  What is the value of the different potential definitions discussed here? Which ones do you think are most useful and why?  Be prepared to discuss institutions, regimes, organizations and how they differ. Also think about formal vs. informal institutions and regimes.  Also think about norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures.  How do all these matter to our understanding of international regimes generally? 2. What are the types of factors that the authors you read so far think cause and shape regime formation and regime effectiveness? 3. What seem to be some of the key research questions that these authors say are important to study in international regime research today?  Which of these would you like to do your research paper on?

14 Example of Regime Example of domestic "regime": drunk driving Example of domestic "regime": drunk driving Norms: social as well as legal Norms: social as well as legal Rules: legal Rules: legal Organizations and actors: networks of friends, MADD, general social pressure, explicit legal authorities Organizations and actors: networks of friends, MADD, general social pressure, explicit legal authorities Monitoring and enforcement: authorized and non- authorized Monitoring and enforcement: authorized and non- authorized

15 Example of Regime (2) Example of international "regime": human rights Example of international "regime": human rights Norms: what can and can’t do to citizens of your country Norms: what can and can’t do to citizens of your country Rules: treaties and conventions Rules: treaties and conventions Organizations and actors: treaty secretariats, human rights organizations, individuals Organizations and actors: treaty secretariats, human rights organizations, individuals Monitoring and enforcement: through public perceptions, some diplomatic pressure, some economic pressure Monitoring and enforcement: through public perceptions, some diplomatic pressure, some economic pressure

16 Realist view : Regimes have no influence Regimes have no influence Behaviors only reflect short-run self-interest Behaviors only reflect short-run self-interest Power and interests cause behaviors and cause structure of regimes: Power and interests cause behaviors and cause structure of regimes: E.g., membership in UN Security Council and decisions reflect power and interests. E.g., membership in UN Security Council and decisions reflect power and interests. UN Security Council resolutions on Israel have no influence UN Security Council resolutions on Israel have no influence P & I outcome regimes

17 Regime theory view: Regimes/institutions matter. Outcomes can reflect long-run self- interest. Regimes/institutions matter. Outcomes can reflect long-run self- interest. First, what are the causes of regime formation? First, what are the causes of regime formation? Second, what are the effects of regimes? Second, what are the effects of regimes? Regimes as intervening variables: regimes lead to outcomes that are different than power and interests would otherwise dictate. Regimes as intervening variables: regimes lead to outcomes that are different than power and interests would otherwise dictate. Regimes do not lead actors to do things against their interests!! Regimes do not lead actors to do things against their interests!! Evidence of regime influence is not in violating their interests generally Evidence of regime influence is not in violating their interests generally Rather evidence of regime influence lies in engaging in behaviors that are contrary to their SHORT-RUN interests Rather evidence of regime influence lies in engaging in behaviors that are contrary to their SHORT-RUN interests Over long term, regimes lead states to view their interests differently, including long-term and interdependent concerns in their rational calculus, not just short-term and independent concerns. Over long term, regimes lead states to view their interests differently, including long-term and interdependent concerns in their rational calculus, not just short-term and independent concerns. P & I outcome regimes But also

18 Constructivist view General norms, ideas, and mental constructs influence how states behave and even what constitutes a state and state behavior General norms, ideas, and mental constructs influence how states behave and even what constitutes a state and state behavior Norms, idea & Knowledge P & I But also outcome regimes v What is considered to be "power," how states define their interests, what regimes states create and what outcomes occur are all influenced by what norms and ideas and understandings the people who make up states have What is considered to be "power," how states define their interests, what regimes states create and what outcomes occur are all influenced by what norms and ideas and understandings the people who make up states have

19 Two key questions posed by regimes 1. Why, how, and under what conditions do states decide to form, and succeed in forming, regimes? I.e., what factors determine when states create regimes? 2. Why, how, and under what conditions do the regimes states form lead to state (and nonstate) behaviors different than we would have observed otherwise? These will be the two main questions we will address in the course and you will address one or the other in light of a particular case in your final paper These will be the two main questions we will address in the course and you will address one or the other in light of a particular case in your final paper

20 For the treaty you are looking at answer the following questions Why did countries want to negotiate a treaty on this topic? What interests drove them to sign it? Why did countries want to negotiate a treaty on this topic? What interests drove them to sign it? Would you expect powerful or weak states to have been the major countries supporting this treaty? Would you expect powerful or weak states to have been the major countries supporting this treaty? What are the major requirements of the treaty? What are the major requirements of the treaty? What evidence would you collect to evaluate if this treaty was effective at accomplishing its goals? What evidence would you collect to evaluate if this treaty was effective at accomplishing its goals? Would you expect it to have been effective and, if so, would you expect its effectiveness to vary over time or across different countries? Would you expect it to have been effective and, if so, would you expect its effectiveness to vary over time or across different countries?

21 How do regimes form? Necessity is not the mother of invention, so how can they arise? A. Problems regimes arise to resolve General source of regime: one or more states see status quo as suboptimal and believe that contingent behavior coordinated with other states will lead them better off General source of regime: one or more states see status quo as suboptimal and believe that contingent behavior coordinated with other states will lead them better off At least three basic types of problems regimes arise to respond to: At least three basic types of problems regimes arise to respond to: Coordination Coordination Collaboration: Collaboration: Asymmetric externalities Asymmetric externalities

22 How do regimes form? B. Hegemonic provision: powerful states can help states overcome the collective action problem, since they receive enough benefits to make it worthwhile to provide the regime 1. Benevolent variant 2. Malevolent variant

23 How do regimes form? C. Collective action – despite difficulty can work sometime D. Political and normative entrepreneurs 1. Suggest a regime that no one expects to work at first 2. Gains power over time E. Organic development from tacit or informal regimes 1. Law of the sea and 6 then 12 mile territorial seas based on length of canon shots

24 What do regimes do? Functions of regimes: because regimes provide means of doing these things better than could accomplish independently, states willing to invest in them Functions of regimes: because regimes provide means of doing these things better than could accomplish independently, states willing to invest in them A. Generally, attempt to make it more likely that others behave as you desire and less likely that they don’t. 1. Increase costs of noncompliance 2. Increase benefits of compliance 3. Clarify what is expected. B. Manage complexity: reduce decisions to be made, e.g., tariff levels, environmental legislation C. Increase reciprocity: specific (arms control, tariff levels) and diffuse (human rights) 1. Increase iteration: single behavior seen as part of larger game, e.g., political dissidents 2. Formalize linkages: financial mechanisms in ozone treaty 3. Reciprocity through operation of norms

25 What do regimes do? (2) Functions of regimes: D. Reduce transaction costs: easier to negotiate single multilateral trade or environment treaty, rather than multitude of bilateral ones. One long agreement within single forum (e.g., oil pollution regulation) rather than string of separate agreements.. GATT/WTO is perfect example E. Changes legitimacy of actions: need to justify certain actions in different ways F. Improve information: joint information has more credibility, can’t collect information individually. Reduces misperception and miscommunication G. Establish normative expectations and increase costs of certain rhetorical strategies relative to others

26 Why do regimes succeed? How do we define success? How do we define success? Different types of regimes to accomplish different goals Different types of regimes to accomplish different goals Regulatory: establish set rules and induce compliance. Oil pollution Regulatory: establish set rules and induce compliance. Oil pollution Programmatic: establish ongoing programs for things that don’t exist otherwise. International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Programmatic: establish ongoing programs for things that don’t exist otherwise. International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Procedural: ongoing process for making complex and interdependent decisions. Scientific research regimes. International whaling commission or fisheries treaty Procedural: ongoing process for making complex and interdependent decisions. Scientific research regimes. International whaling commission or fisheries treaty

27 Defining effectiveness: Different definitions 1. Variety of definitions for any regime – what would it mean in a given regime? What’s the proper definition of success of NAFTA? What’s the proper definition of success of NAFTA? 2. Behavior-changing: compliance with rules, but can be broader. 3. Problem-solving: have you resolved problem that motivated creation of regime? Behavior change not always sufficient. Too late, too little, too hard problem. Behavior change not always sufficient. Too late, too little, too hard problem. Can’t solve some problems. Can only manage them. Can’t solve some problems. Can only manage them. 4. Goal achievement vs. Counterfactual definition of effectiveness Did regime lead to achievement of goals? Did regime lead to achievement of goals? Did regime lead to outcomes that were different than would have been otherwise? Did regime lead to outcomes that were different than would have been otherwise? Glass is half empty, Glass is half full: often regimes fail at goal achievement effectiveness but succeed at counterfactual effectiveness. E.g., whaling, endangered species, tariffs (not yet zero) Glass is half empty, Glass is half full: often regimes fail at goal achievement effectiveness but succeed at counterfactual effectiveness. E.g., whaling, endangered species, tariffs (not yet zero)

28 Summary What are regimes? What are regimes? Why do they form? Why do they form? What they do? What they do? When do they succeed? When do they succeed?


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