1. The Migration/Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean EU Perspectives and Strategies FEMISE Conference, 13–14 February 2016 Prof. Panayotis Tsakonas University of the Aegean

2. No precedent for such a large and abrupt flow of war refugees No prospects for the refugees early return home # Quite the Opposite if adding to the equation the current situation in the Middle East, i.e. post-conflict Afghanistan and conflict-ridden Iraq & Syrian imbroglio # Climate change will further exacerbate existing threats/challenges and/or create new ones

7. Contributes to violent conflict and disputes from the local to the international level Leads to state fragility, radicalization and degrading state capacities to ensure public order and stability  which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability Degrade human security and livelihoods via increased risks of disasters, food insecurity, energy poverty etc. A threat multiplier, which may create or exacerbate insecurities and tensions from the individual to the international level

8. # Cannot Stop it # # Cannot Solve it # # Can only attempt to better manage it # Yet in a highly complicated and unpredictable security environment

9. A complex security environment

11. EU Confronts the Migration/Refugee crisis

12. March 2015 The first wake-up call for lethargic Europe EU’s Confession of Inefficacy and Failure “The situation in the Mediterranean is a tragedy” Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement

14. July/August 2015 The second wake-up call Things can get worse with the “Mediterranean tragedy”

15. 2015 (first 8 months) : Refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean: exceeded 300,000 (almost 200,000 people landing in Greece and 110,000 in Italy) 2014 (the whole year): 219,000 people crossed the Mediterranean.

20. SHOW INCREASE IN 2015 IN THE EASTERN MED ROUTE Through GREECE (via Kos and Lesvos)

22. Security Prioritization of Threats and Challenges into EU’s External as well as Internal Security documents; linkages with terrorism, WMD, illegal trafficking, crime, failed states etc. Institutionalization of cooperation with countries of origin and transit countries "Five Year Programs" (Tampere, The Hague, Stockholm): "Common European Asylum System" linking JHA with EU's external action Development Address the root causes; aid for development of the countries of origin Through EU's Med. Institutional Initiatives, i.e. EMP, ENP (Action Plans) “The Perception – Implementation Gap” ACTION "Policies on paper" "Implementation" Short-term Deterrence and Management of EU External Borders Medium and Long-term "Externalization of EU instruments and policies" EU instruments: FRONTEX, EUROSUR, EUROPOL etc. National instruments: Operation "Mare Nostrum", Evros Fence etc. "Decision" "Talk" Since early 1990s: migration is perceived and approached as a threat (“Fortress Europe”) Migration and border policing are "securitized" and "operationalized" DISCOURSE

23. Rise of anti-immigrant extreme right-wing parties and/or governments (Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic), who are in favor of tightly controlled borders that would leave Muslims outside # Politically toxic Islam is “the elephant in the room”# EU is divided along new fault lines # “ Responsible members ", i.e. those supporting "compulsory solidarity" and the " buck-passers ", i.e. those in favor of "voluntary solidarity“, not willing to accept any burden-sharing scheme#

24. Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives" # Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action #

25. 4 March: EU Commission launches its work on a “European Agenda on Migration” 20 April: 10 points for immediate action (EU HRFASP F. Mogherini – Commissioner D. Avramopoulos) Expanding emergency nautical rescues, destroying traffickers' boats and an "emergency mechanism for the resettlement" of refugees 23 April: EU Council special meeting: 4 Measures The EU will "do everything possible to save people from dying at sea" 28 April: A new European Agenda on Security 13 May: (EU Commission) A European Agenda on Migration Rules for access to the European Union (who will take how much quota of immigrants and which kind of immigrants get access to the EU)

26. Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives" # Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action # Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy # The EU is Governed by Summits #

27.  Special EU Council Meeting, June 2015  Emergency Ministerial Meeting of Home and Justice Affairs, 14 September 2015  Special EU Council Meeting, 23 September 2015  Meeting of the Western Balkans Migration Route, 25 October 2015  EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 29 November 2015  Special meeting ……..

28. Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives" # Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action # Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy # The EU is Governed by Summits # Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action # “ It's the implementation, stupid” Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts#

29. Institutional Decisions vs. National Actions FUNDING Since Sep. 2015: EU institutions committed 2.8 billion euros to tackling the crisis (500 million euros are earmarked for the Syria Trust Fund, 1.8 million for the Africa Trust Fund and 500 million for humanitarian assistance) and Member-States pledged only about a half a billion euros (18 million for the Syria Trust Fund, 12 million for the Africa Trust Fund and 416 million for humanitarian aid) Shortfall of 2.35 billion euros. OPERATIONAL FRONT FRONTEX asked for additional 775 officers: 10 countries dispatched 447 European Asylum Support Office requested additional 374 experts: 6 member-states provided 81 Only 6 countries notified their reception capacities for the relocation of 160.000 people to their territories Hungary is refusing to even send liaison officers to Greece and Italy (based on the relocation deal to which it was forced to agree) COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM Almost all EU members fail to implement important provisions pertaining to either one or all elements of the Common European Asylum System September 2015: EU Commission launched 40 new infringement procedures against 19 member states on top of the 34 cases already open

30. Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives" # Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action # Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy # The EU is Governed by Summits # Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action # It's the implementation, stupid" Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts# Ineffective compromise deal with Turkey

32. Forthcoming "verbal policy" & "new institutional initiatives" # Tough-talk vs. soft and ill-defined action # Series of subsequent and extraordinary meetings, reflect the lack of a comprehensive plan/strategy # The EU is Governed by Summits # Institutional Decisions vs. National (In)action # It's the implementation, stupid" Need to do, what we agreed at all fronts# Ineffective compromise deal with Turkey Half-measures (EBCG and …some of NATO)

33.  Implement more rapidly the agreed (160.000) relocation scheme  Still in the very beginning: less than 500 refugees relocated so far //  Germany’s attempt to form a “Coalition of the Willing”  Implement the agreed European Common Asylum System Reform “Dublin II”  Promise given by the EU Commissioner to be implemented in the coming spring  Enabling refugees to access legal travel routes --thus eradicating the very rationale of the smuggling networks  Through a form of “extra-territorial asylum processing”  Create “sanitary zones” or “hot-sports” in the major refugee hosting countries, e.g. Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon;  Establish small consular posts (e.g. Bodrum/Turkey or Zuwara, Libya) quickly screening refugees and allow them access to Europe (provide “humanitarian visas”)