1. Ken Collins & Andrew Campbell

2. Addressing risk in modern research laboratory facilities Ken Collins& Andrew Campbell

3. Society faces triumph & challenges

4. The Research Laboratory Why are they important? What drives the need for modern research? http://beautybanter.com/wp-content/uploads/image-import/- Z1daRrbWFqY/TbCX_rUPlnI/AAAAAAAAGiI/w5OT1Vcb3wc/s400/A23799564DB443FB9B2A5EB270FB4975.jpg http://www.ampcapital.co.nz/AMPCapitalNZ/media/contents/MobileApps/Thumbnails/thumb-cash-nz.jpg

5. The Modern Research Laboratory What is the modern research lab? What are they used for? What different types of lab are there? Who uses them?

9. AS/NZS 2982: 2010 Laboratory design and construction Any building or part of a building used or intended to be used for scientific and related woks that may be hazardous including research, quality control, testing, teaching or analysis. Such work may include the use of chemicals, (including dangerous goods, and hazardous substances), pathogens, and harmful radiation, or processes including electrical or mechanical research and testing work

10. Hazard and Risk is inherent to a Laboratory Research needs demand presence of hazards – You need the problem to find the cure You cannot get a WOF without taking your car to the garage!! Serious Loss Significant Consequence Why does design need to address risk? http://www.talktomymechanic.com/wp-content/themes/TTMM_Minimal/images/Confused-Mechanic.png

11. Why must design address risk? http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-npV9lLuf5hQ/T7AKoK4M-1I/AAAAAAAAAEU/MJfrsOykm3c/s1600/lessidealundergrad.jpg http://ehs.georgetown.edu/LessonsLearned/Lesson3/Lesson3.htm

12. Laboratory Hazards ChemicalBiologicalExplosiveElectricalCryogenicPhysicalHealth & SafetyFire

13. Risk ‘managed’ through compliance Compliance Path NZBCNZSASHSNO Private COP Academic COP

14. Laboratory Design Process

15. Key design requirements NZBC AS/NZS 2243 (series) Safety in Laboratories AS/NZS 14644 Cleanrooms and associated controlled environments AS 1940 The storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids AS 3780 The storage and handling of corrosive substances AS 4326 The storage and handling of oxidising agents AS/NZS 4452 The storage and handling of toxic substances AS/NZS 2982 Laboratory design and construction AS /NZS 4801 Occupational health and safety management systems HSNO

16. Fire Design Process

17. 1992 Building Code Clauses (C1 – C4) 2012 Building Code Clauses (C1 – C6) Lack of specificity Qualitative High variability quality of design & documentation. Quantitative Performance-based Certainty of regulatory approval

18. NZBC Clauses C1 – C6 C/ASXC/VM2 Specific Design InflexibleFlexible

19. Limitations of Compliance Regulatory Compliance = General – Does not / cannot address special risks Compliant design = inherent special risks – Specialised buildings Compliance can impose conflict = risk Is the Building Code minimum enough???

20. Dangerous goods stores – Rapid, flash fires Mechanical services – Increase hazard of smoke, recirculation Fume cupboard vs sprinkler standard – Exposure risk to user Fire fighters – Unexpected, limited information, unsafe conditions Special Risks: Laboratory

21. Ideally risks should be identified here Often ‘special’ risks not identified until here

22. Preliminary fire design - Fire Engineering Brief Fire Engineering Strategy - Verification of design Construction Monitoring -Commissioning -Handover

23. Addressing Special Risks Lessons learned – investigation Early identification essential – Minimise and remove through design The design must be driven by functional and operational requirements How can the objectives be established to inform the mitigation of risk?

24. Design must address end user needs Special risks often created out of user needs Regulatory Compliance can be achieved...but – special risks remain unmitigated User behaviour can exacerbate risk Nature of the Scientist: – Historically under-resourced – Do ‘Lots with little’ – Source of Pride – Tolerant of risks

25. The Scientific Researcher: Committed Studious Dedicated Invested Long-term Focussed Isolated Constrained http://clipartist.net/openclipart.org/Artists/AhNinniah/mad_scientist_ahninniah-1969px.png http://ak4.picdn.net/shutterstock/videos/3787454/preview/stock-footage-scientist-in-laboratory- examining-liquid-in-glass-beaker-shot-on-canon-d-mk-with-a-frame-rate-of.jpg

26. User integrated process Client input - early Lab-works ‘Ways of Working’ – Drives brief – Design is inclusive – End-user based, not ‘executive’ – Continuous stages of design Design is bespoke End-user influence Tailored outcomes

27. Fire Design: Risk Based Risk based design – consider special risks Risk assessment process throughout design Identify specific hazards / risk – inform fire strategy and design development Not focussed on minimum code requirements – Address specific design and user risks Inform & enhance operational procedures

28. © 2008 New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engineering© Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2014

29. Fire Design Risk Assessment © Crown Copyright 2006 1. Fire Hazard Identification 2. Identify People, contents, activities, research output at risk - Client input, prelim assessment, acceptance criteria tested 3. Evaluate, remove, reduce, protect - Trial design appraisal and analysis – re-assess against client brief - Trial design revision and re-analyse - Determine solution 4. Record, plan, inform - Design solution and Verification 5. Review

30. Fire Engineering Brief Brief & Architectural review Design philosophy Materials and construction Layout and geometries Means of escape and access Occupant characteristics User needs User activities Establish Fire Safety Objectives Life safety Property protection Asset protection Contents protection Business continuity Environmental impact Fire hazard Identification Design hazards Consequences User influences Establish who / what at risk People Contents Processes Identify Acceptance Criteria Life safety Contents Building fabric Establish Trial Fire Designs Aim Locations Fire characteristics Fire systems impact Modes of failure Identify Analysis Methods Approach Computational analysis Hand calculations ASET RSET Structural effects Images from IFEG, 2005 BSI, 2002 PD7974-0

31. Client Need Identified Client Desired Outcome Client approval throughout design Risk Based Design Process Risk Management Risk identification & mitigation throughout design Client Desired Outcome

32. Value of Fire Engineering Brief Collaborative identification of risks – Based on end-user operational input Severity / Consequence evaluated – Different stakeholder discipline perspectives End-user involvement – solutions weighed against operational effectiveness / capability / disruption Tailored fire design approach Inclusive to Laboratory design process

33. Sustainable Risk Based Solutions

35. Often little or inadequate information – Not specific or well informed – Resistance to provide data – Increase risks to fire fighters? – Increase risk to contents? Operational Pre-planning limited Fire Service awareness = NZFS Operational Effectiveness http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-tj95SdTuPLg/UZqOUISFSsI/AAAAAAAADxQ/BgqIQRVi18A/s1600/dice.png

39. Fire Engineering Design FEB FRA: Brief Prelim Design FRA: Design Trial Designs Fire Strategy Verification FRA: Occupation Operational Fire Plan RISK

40. Client Brief / Concept Design / Consent Construction Handover Occupation Risk assessment Hazard identification

41. Thank you for listening Questions?