77 th PIChE National Convention Boracay Ecovillage Resort & Convention Center February 17 – 20, 2016 By: Engr. Ireneo A. Raule, Jr.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 DEFINITION ( http://www.api.org/Environment-Health-and-Safety/Process-Safety ) Process safety is part of safety management and focuses on the concerns of major hazards impacting, safety, environmental damage and business losses. The goal of process safety management is to develop plant systems and procedures to prevent unwanted releases that may ignite and cause toxic impacts, local fires or explosions. Introduce HEMP, RAM and Bow-Tie Diagrams Integrate safety management in key business management systems, e.g. strategic planning, objectives setting, reward and recognition Task/Objective: Share experience and insights in how we could create a process safety mindset in your organization: Let me add: “…to mitigate the effects of released hazards” Begin to plant the seed of safety culture in the organization. Shift the paradigm toward safety being viewed more as an investment than an expense.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : 250,000 liters of gasoline overflowed; a vapor cloud formed which ignited causing a massive explosion and a fire that lasted five days. Consequence : No fatalities but 40 injured; 20 tanks destroyed; 5 companies criminally charged and found guilty; fined £ 4.1 million; £ 1 billion in losses Cause : a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure Before the fire Source: http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefi eld-report.pdf After the fire

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : Runaway reaction causing the release of gas including dioxin TCCD (its presence unknown at the time), which is 100,000 times more toxic than cyanide. Consequence : 1,800 has. of land contaminated; 80,000 domestic animals killed; locally grown food banned for months; cases of cancer, dermatitis, neuropathy, deformed babies and abortion Cause : a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway reaction not factored in design; c) delayed order to evacuate https://www.google.com.ph/search?q= 1976+seveso+italy&rlz=1C1GGGE

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : Refinery explosion and fire during startup of isomerization unit Consequence : 15 fatalities and 180 people injured; community alarmed as houses within 1,200 meters were damaged; $ 1.5 billion in losses Cause : a) raffinate splitter tower was overfilled; b) pressure relief devices opened resulting in a flammable liquid geyser from a blow down stack that was not equipped with a flare Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/csbfinalreportbp.pdf

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : Detonation of 20-120 MT of ammonium nitrate (equivalent to 20 to 40 tons of TNT) Consequence : 31 fatalities; thousands hospitalized; air and water pollution; 172 commercial establishments impacted; $ 2 billion in losses Cause : mixing of incompatible chemicals while in storage Source: https://www.google.com.ph/search?q=2 001+toulouse+france+incident&rlz=1C1 GGGE A huge crater, 65 x 45 x 7 meters deep, caused by the explosion

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : Warlike explosion (equivalent to 15 tons of TNT) due to ignition and rapid deflagration of massive vapor cloud of escaped cyclohexane (40 tons released in 30 seconds) Consequence : 53 casualties; hundreds injured; 1,821 houses and 167 shops destroyed Cause : a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor damage not determined. Source: https://www.google.com.ph/search?q=1974+flixborough+disaster&rlz=1C1GGGE

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Event : 27 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) released into the air at 1 am when nearby residents were asleep Consequence : About 5,000 fatalities; 350,000 people suffered respiratory ailments; Plant operation shutdown; plant eventually sold Cause : a) water entered the tank (negligence or sabotage?) and reacted with the stored MIC leading to violent exothermic reaction; b) cooling system not working (Top) Now-defunct Union Carbide plant Source: https://www.google.com.ph/ search?q=1984+bhopal+gas+tragedy &rlz=1C1GGGE

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 IncidentCausesPossible Interventions 2005 Buncefield a) Failed level control system; b) overflow undetected for 24 minutes; c) containment failure 1.HAZOP especially during early design stage 2.Management of Change 3.Principles in MOS/OOS 4.Chemical Handling Safety 5.Commissioning Process Systems 6.IPF Component Testing 7.Monitor and Control Conditions / Alarm Management 8.Near Miss/Incident Reporting 9.Operator Safety Check Training 1976 Seveso a) standard procedure skipped; b) runaway reaction not factored in design; c) delayed evacuation (dioxin presence unknown then) 2005 Texas BP a) raffinate splitter tower overfilled; b) blow down stack had no flare 2001 Toulouse mixing of incompatible chemicals while in storage 1974 Flixborough a) Process change (reactor bypass) not sufficiently evaluated; b) cause of reactor damage not determined 1984 Bhopal a) Violent exothermic reaction of water and MIC; b) cooling system not working

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 NUMBER OF UNDERLYING CAUSES: “People” branch – 11 “Fire” branch – 54 Total - 65 Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/c sbfinalreportbp.pdf 2005 BP TEXAS CITY INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 BUNCEFIELD INCIDENT ( Source: http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/buncefield-report.pdf ) Immediate Cause/s: Failure of Design and Maintenance of Overflow Protection System Underlying Cause/s (partial) Deficient management systems; no effective audit system Increased pressure on staff due to higher throughput Lack of engineering support from head office Culture that focused on operating, while safety did not get attention or priority Unclear understanding of risks and the safety critical systems designed to control Leadership and top-level management involvement lacking TEXAS BP INCIDENT ( Source: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/csbfinalreportbp.pdf ) Immediate Cause/s: Flammables released from blowdown stack and formed a vapor cloud Underlying Cause/s (partial) Safety culture (failure to invest; cost cutting, startup in spite of malfunction) Regulatory oversight (past inspections not comprehensive, then 301 violations) Process safety metrics (injury rate was the key metric in spite of loss history, not encouraged to report safety problems) Human Factors (poor shift turnover, fatigue, training program inadequate)

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 --- ( taken from the sample accidents) --- 1.HAZOP especially during early design stage 2.Management of Change 3.Principles in MOS/OOS 4.Chemical Handling Safety 5.Commissioning Process Systems 6.IPF Component Testing 7.Monitor and Control Conditions / Alarm Management 8.Near Miss Incident Reporting 9.Operator Safety Check Training 10.Incident Investigation 11.Logic Tree --- (some more) --- 10.Process Hazard Analysis 11.Job Hazard Analysis 12.Emergency Response 13.Crisis Handling 14.Personal Protective Equipment 15.Permit to Work Systems 16.Lock out Tag out (LOTO) 17.(and many more) H OW CAN WE SYSTEMATICALLY KNOW THE HAZARDS TO BE ADDRESSED AND THE RISKS THAT THESE POSE, AND HENCE THE APPROPRIATE INTERVENTIONS ?

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 The StepsApproximate Translation Hazard Identification“What can harm us?” Hazard Assessment“Is there a better way?” “Can we eliminate or avoid the hazard?” “How can the hazard be released?” “How serious will the consequence be?” “How probable is the consequence?” Hazard Control“What are the required controls?” ”Are the current controls adequate? effective?” Hazard Mitigation or Recovery “What are the required recovery?” ”Are the current recovery adequate? effective?” A hazard has the potential to cause harm to people; damage to assets (property, product, process, information); reputation and the environment.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 1. Accident Records / Benchmarking 2. Hazard Data Base 3. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 4. Process Hazard Analysis 5. Job Hazard Analysis 6. Safety Procedures 7. Use Technical Standards 8. Use Material Safety Data Sheets 9. Others

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016

1. Accident Records / Benchmarking 2. Hazard Data Base 3. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 4. Process Hazard Analysis 5. Job Hazard Analysis 6. Safety Procedures 7. Use Technical Standards 8. Use Material Safety Data Sheets 9. Others

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 HAZOP RESULTS TO: Improvement of system or operations ‒ Reduced risk and better contingency ‒ More efficient operations Improvement of procedures ‒ Logical order ‒ Completeness General awareness among involved parties Team building Examination of a process or operation to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks or prevent efficient operation WHEN TO USE HAZOP: At the initial concept stage when design drawings are available When the final piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) are available During construction and installation to ensure that recommendations are implemented During commissioning During operation to ensure that plant emergency and operating procedures are regularly reviewed and updated as required

CONSEQUENCES – those of credible scenarios that can develop from the release of the hazard. The potential consequences, rather than the actual ones, are used. A scale of consequences from 0 to 5 indicates increasing severity. Example: reaction overpressure. - Actual outcome: shutdown; high level alarm set off - Potential consequence: serious pollution, even fatality LIKELIHOOD – estimated on the basis of historical evidence or experience that such consequence has materialized within the industry, company or smaller unit. This should not be confused with the likelihood that the hazard is released – it is the likelihood of the potential consequences occurring

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 You are developing a safety management system for your petroleum plant You are to evaluate the risks when receiving gasoline in the storage tank farm A release (but not fire or explosion) has occurred once in your plant; it is an occurrence in the industry Identified risk categories: P A E R 3C (E) 4B(A)5C (P) 4C (R) The overall risk for a hazard is classified according to which consequence has the highest rating; in this case, it’s a HIGH RISK.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 If risks are intolerable with respect to policy and strategic objectives, alternative ways to carry out the operation should be evaluated ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) – the level (objectively assessed) at which the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained. HAZARDXHAZARDX CONSEQUENCESCONSEQUENCES Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat n Consequence 1 Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence n Recovery Measures Controls Top Event Threat 5 Prevents the threat from successfully releasing the hazard Mitigates or reduces the impact of the release of the hazard The Bow Tie Diagram

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 RISK LEVEL REQUIREDTHREAT AND RECOVERY MEASURES HIGHRequires a minimum of three (3) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of three (3) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event. MEDIUMRequires a minimum of two (2) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of two (2) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event. LOWRequires procedure be in place to control each threat. Requires a minimum of one (1) effective recovery measure for each identified consequence. I N ALL CASES, BRING DOWN THE RESIDUAL RISK LEVEL TO ALARP.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 You are developing a safety management system for your petroleum plant You are to evaluate the risks when receiving gasoline in the storage tank farm A release (but not fire or explosion) has occurred once in your plant; it is an occurrence in the industry Identified risk categories: 5C (P), 4B (A), 3C (E), 4C (R) The overall risk for a hazard is classified according to which consequence has the highest rating; in this case, it’s a HIGH RISK. RISK LEVEL REQUIREDTHREAT AND RECOVERY MEASURES HIGHRequires a minimum of three (3) effective threat controls in place for each threat. Requires a minimum of three (3) effective recovery measures for each identified consequence; one (1) recovery measure must be to automatically detect occurrence of the top event.

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARDTHREATCONTROLTOP EVENTRECOVERY MEASURECONSEQUENCE TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION FIRE

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARDTHREATCONTROLTOP EVENTRECOVERY MEASURECONSEQUENCE LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL THROUGH-WALL CORROSION VAPOR CLOUD FORMATION WRONG VALVE LINE-UP FIRE

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARDTHREATCONTROLTOP EVENTRECOVERY MEASURECONSEQUENCE LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED PERSONNEL IS ASSIGNED TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL VISUAL MONITOR AND CONTROL HIGH LEVEL ALARM THROUGH-WALL CORROSION INSPECTION PROGRAMVAPOR CLOUD FORMATION CATHODIC PROTECTION VOLUME LEVEL ACCOUNTING WRONG VALVE LINE-UP USE CHECKLISTFIRE HOLD/INSPECTION CHECK COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 THE BOW TIE WORKSHEET (using example of receiving gasoline in a storage tank) HAZARDTHREATCONTROLTOP EVENTRECOVERY MEASURECONSEQUENCE LEVEL IS NOT MONITORED PERSONNEL IS ASSIGNED TANK OVERFLOW OR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT AUTO GAS DETECTIONSPILL INSIDE THE BUND WALL VISUAL MONITOR AND CONTROL CORRECT CONTAINMENT SIZE HIGH LEVEL ALARMAQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET THROUGH-WALL CORROSION INSPECTION PROGRAMAUTO GAS DETECTIONVAPOR CLOUD FORMATION CATHODIC PROTECTIONISOLATE IGNITION SOURCES VOLUME LEVEL ACCOUNTING AQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET WRONG VALVE LINE-UP USE CHECKLISTAUTO GAS AND FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM FIRE HOLD/INSPECTION CHECKAQUEOUS FILM FORMING FOAM (AFFF) BLANKET COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEMS FIRE FIGHTING RESPONSE & RESCUE OPERATION

 All safety accidents can be prevented, or risks minimized  Use HEMP to systematically identify, assess, control and mitigate HAZARDS 77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 IDENTIFY RECOVER CONTROL ASSESS HEMP HAZOP, JHA, Accident records, MSDS, etc. RAM HAZARDXHAZARDX CONS E Q U E N C ESCONS E Q U E N C ES Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Consequence 1 Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence n Recovery Measures Controls Top Event The Bow Tie Diagram

IDENTIFY RECOVER CONTROL ASSESS HEMP Leadership and Commitment Management Review Corrective Action & Improvement Audit Policy and Strategic Objectives Organisation, Responsibilities Resources, Standards & Doc. Corrective Action & Improvement Monitoring Planning & Procedures Hazard and Effects Management Implementation Corrective Action Leadership Commitment Linkage to policy and strategic goals Continuous improvement Systematic and periodic review Audit

77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 HSE critical activities should be among the performance objectives of accountable personnel; Ensures that the activity owner is properly motivated Establish KPIs to track whether the critical activities are performed to the required standards. “Whatever gets measured/rewarded gets done” HAZARDXHAZARDX CONSEQUENCESCONSEQUENCES Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat n Consequence 1 Consequence 2 Consequence 3 Consequence n Recovery Measures Controls Top Event Threat 5 Accountable Staff to operate, maintain, develop, or improve The Bow Tie Diagram HSE critical activities

 All safety accidents can be prevented, or risks minimized  Use HEMP to systematically identify, assess, control and mitigate HAZARDS  Implement HEMP under an HSE or quality management system  Integrate HSE critical activities into the reward and recognition process Remember: Safety is everyone’s responsibility We, in the line and on the process floor are best equipped to identify hazards. It is our duty to make management know and understand the potential consequences of these hazards. 77 th PIChE National Convention February 17 – 20, 2016 Begin to plant the seed of safety culture in the organization. Shift the paradigm toward safety being viewed more as an investment than an expense.

77 th PIChE National Convention Boracay Ecovillage Resort & Convention Center February 17 – 20, 2016 By: Engr. Ireneo A. Raule, Jr.

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77 th PIChE National Convention Boracay Ecovillage Resort & Convention Center February 17 – 20, 2016 By: Engr. Ireneo A. Raule, Jr.

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Presentation on theme: "77 th PIChE National Convention Boracay Ecovillage Resort & Convention Center February 17 – 20, 2016 By: Engr. Ireneo A. Raule, Jr."— Presentation transcript:

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