1. New Sino-US ties: Regional Implications By Kavi Chongkittavorn Senior Fellow, ISIS—Thailand DAV-KAS Seminar: ASEAN and US-China Relations 10 March 2016 Hanoi, Vietnam

2. From The Nation, 15 February 2016

3. US diplomatic challenges  Turning inward, economic slow-down  Presidential electoral period, lots of policy options, less actions  Rebalancing policy gains some balance--Obama personally weighted in to host special Asean-US summit in Sunnylands, California  Burden sharing with alliances and friends, still big disappointments  Strengthening alliances, esp Japan/S Korea, to prevent security anxieties  Positive attitude towards Asia against Russia’s expansion  Maintain stable/predictable ties with China, cooperation and confrontation (short of war) is necessary sometimes to maintain influence  Endorsing ASEAN Centrality and support ASEAN-led mechanism, keep China’s influence at bay

4. China’s diplomatic challenges  Rising confidence with increased nationalism and people’s expectations  Economic “new-normal”—slow down  Maintaining political stability and unity  Managing US-China relations, prevening demonization  Territorial disputes and regional security in neighborhood  Assuming greater global responsibility  Promote and protect China’s strategic and economic interests  Setting up China’s “Alternative” Global Order – A New Model of International Relation  Framing future Asean-China ties for the next 25 years—golden age

5. US new approach to ASEAN  More flexibility and pragmatism in engaging ASEAN—a central pillar of the US Rebalance to Asia  Want to “reliable” partnership on key issues: 1. peace and security: South China Sea, maritime security counter violent extremism, transnational cyber cooperation, global health security, climate change and natural disaster; 2. promoting greater trade and investment facilitation to attract ASEAN i.e. Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA), Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) 3. narrow development gaps, promoting “Creative ASEAN” 4. strengthening people-to-people links with ASEAN (YASEALI engages 60,000 young leaders, 18-35 years old)

6. China’s new approach: strategic partnership  China is using varieties of “strategic partnership” frameworks with ASEAN--different features, closeness and cooperation and “strategic values”  But all are flexible inf form and model: multilateral security mechanism or security dialogue  China has no attention to form military alliance but would give more military aid for selective ASEAN members  China uses economic clouts/industrial capacity building cooperation with ASEAN i.e. Gaotie Waijiao, AIIB, One Belt-One Road Initiative, RCEP

7. US and China woo ASEAN centrality  At Sunnylands, US expressed “respects and supports” of ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN-led mechanism, so is China  But different in real practice: China used to be more forthcoming than the US in supporting ASEAN Centrality but since November 2015 Obama has given stronger push  Before become a strategic dialogue partner, US demanded an equal partnership with Asean in many ASEAN-led mechanism i.e. ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, ADMM plus  Other less important powers support ASEAN Centrality

8. ASEAN views: China-US relations  US and China have a high level of strategic mistrust regarding the Asia Pacific region  Both have serious differences: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, cybersecurity, arms sales to Taiwan  War is not possible, tension manageable due to close economic links, some would say culture  Despite unfriendly and negative views on China—welcome the rise of China, the notion that Asia-Pacific is big for the US and China  Increase mutual understanding and cooperation on some issues: climate change, denuclearization but mute on others  Increased role in hot spots in Asia: Korean Peninsular, South China Sea, Taiwan Straits

9. ASEAN strategic responses  Intensify consultation and dialogue with both powers in all ASEAN-led mechanisms  Engage China on Code of Unplanned Encounter at Sea (Cues), coupling with COC formulation—urging Laos and Myanmar to join  Promote free trade frameworks: TPP and RCEP, complimentary  ASEAN must strengthen rule-based regional order and expand common views and positions on political and security areas  Reaching speedier decision making during emergencies and revival troika  Promote ASEAN Centrality and carry ASEAN flags whenever possible i.e. peacekeeping, anti-extremist violence, climate change, etc.

10. Only One Conclusion ASEAN IS HERE TO STAY TO FACILITATE AND ENHANCE REGIONAL COOPERATION AMID THE INCREASING FLUID AND DIVIDED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT— along with continued complaints lacks of guts and action

11. BUT MANY THANKS Chezu tinbatte Xie xie Salamat po Kobjai lai Terima kesih Kobkhun maak c ả m ơ n Ou khun