1. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning ROSA Rail Optimisation Safety Analysis

2. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Background of ROSA ERA (the European Railway Agency) is working on the definition of safety targets for the railway as a system which may affect the competitivness of the railway system compared with other systems of transport. DB AG and SNCF carry out preliminary safety analysis of the overall railway systems in Germany and in France It shall make possible to assess the consequences of the implementation of Common Safety Targets (CST). The intention is to avoid discrimination against the railway versus air or road as a result of excessive safety targets. The compliance with safety targets in the railway industry is ensured today by historically grown protection functions (for instance, protection against overspeed) or procedures (for instance, types of command).

3. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Project Overview Involved Partners Project Duration and Costs 01.12.2006 to 30.06.2009 Estimated 2.500.000,-- EURO The ROSA project receives funding from both the French “Predit” and the German “Mobilität und Verkehr” programmes, which is gratefully acknowledged! Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) Reseau Ferré de France (RFF) Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) Technical University of Dresden (TUD) INRETS

4. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Aims of ROSA Impact Analysis: identification of the possible consequences resulting from ERA’s Common Safety Targets (CST) to the level of subsystems and components Maintaining the competitivness of the railway system compared with other systems of transport Optimisation: aggregated levels, invest money best Bilateral: enhancing the mutual understanding of the respective safety systems of DB AG and SNCF as applied to their increasing cross-border traffic

5. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Relations to European Boards Exchange of informations with ERA Intended mapping with SD (EU Safety Directive) Intended mapping with results of MODTRAIN, AEIF*-lists and others Consideration of CENELEC* EN 5012x *AEIF: Europ. Association for Raillway Operability CENELEC: European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization

6. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Project Structure CBA methods in railway sector CBA examples CBA evaluation approach Harmonised CBA scheme Method for integration of new safety functions to the model Method for change of barriers and datas Evaluation of validation in reality Rail Optimisation Safety Analysis ROSA DB AG SNCF Working Package WP 1 Generic Hazards Analysis TU* Dresden WP 2 Generic Tool DB AG WP 3 Cost-Benefit-Analysis (CBA) INRETS WP 4 Verification, Validation SNCF WP 5 Project Management DB AG, SNCF System borders System definition Definition of generic hazards Definition of accidents categories Common Cause Analysis Functional model Methods for linkage of hazards and accidents Methods for failure analysis Calculation programme for validation Administration Organisation Moderation Coordination * TU Techn. University

7. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning ROSA Model (1) Risk Control Model (RCM) Barrier Quantification Model (BQM) Basic System Model (BSM) Basic generic safety functions Safety requirements Advanced generic safety functions Starting Point Hazards (SPH) Neutralising Factors (NF)

8. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning ROSA Model (2) Basic System Model (BSM) Ideal and virtual railway system Characterised by the physical conditions of the railway Hazard identification Starting Point Hazard (SPH) Result of hazard identification Risk Control Model (RCM) Control of the development of the hazards by – Generic barriers (safety functions) – Neutralising factors Risk analysis Barrier Quantification Model (BQM) Quantification of barriers

9. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning List of Starting Point Hazards SPH 10: Wrong absolute/relative position registered SPH 11: Train detection failure

10. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Example: Fault Tree SPH 11:Train detection failure –Train is not detected –“Train detection failure” occurs due to failure of track occupancy detection –it leads to unrecognised train in track and may result in wrong Movement Authority SPH 10: Wrong absolute/ relative position registered –Wrong absolute position means that the train has not yet or has already passed the registered position –Wrong relative position means that the distance to a certain position is registered incorrectly –Incorrect registration of train position can lead to wrong actions on train: Train is too fast for its position (Inappropriate speed for infrastructure or Insufficient braking distance) Train is too close to danger point Train receives wrong Movement Authority

11. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Example: Event Tree Switches SPH 10: Wrong absolute/relative train position registered Accident Rear-end collision Conflicting rear end train (authorised) Accident Head-on Collision Conflicting head on train (authorised) Dead-lock Accident Flanc Collision Conflicting flank train (authorised) SPH 13 Wrong route for train Accident Derailment Train runs into moving switch Train approaches unprotected LC LC Accident Conflicting route Train too close to danger point Accident Collision Conflicting station operations Overspeed Insufficient braking distance Inappropriate speed for infrastructure Curves Loss of train guidance Accident: Derailment Switches Accident: Derailment Loss of train guidance Straight trackAccident: Derailment Loss of train guidance Conflicting route Conflicting station operations Switches Train approaches unprotected LC … … … … Conflicting route Conflicting station operations Switches Train approaches unprotected LC … … … … Wrong MA due to faulty position registration NF: no proceeding train NF: no head on train NF no flanking train Barrier: one directional track operation NF No conflicting Station operations NF: no moving switch NF: trailable points Barrier: Human attention NF: no road user on LC Barrier: Track occupancy Barrier: Speed signaling NF: reduced speed Barrier: Overlap Hazard Accident

12. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Cost-Benefit-Function Costs Increase of safety 0 01 1 Costs of accidents with safety increasing measures Cost of safety increasing measures Total cost saving remaining costs EXAMPLE of cost functions Minimum of costs

13. DB AG, 07.05.08, Dr. Schulte-Werning Thank you for your attention !