Download presentation
Presentation is loading. Please wait.
Published byClyde Howard Modified over 8 years ago
1
The Imbalances within the WTO Srividhya Ragavan University Of Oklahoma Law Center
2
Issues for the Hong Kong Meeting Two outstanding issues mark the expectations from Hong Kong Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration Issues relating to agricultural subsidies
3
The issues highlight the imbalance in the WTO process Normative Structure/ Enforcement mechanism sustains the power imbalances and preserves the bargaining inequality Preserves a rule oriented Lockean system rather than the envisaged utilitarian system. Normative Structure & Imbalance
4
WTO Creating an integrated multilateral trading system by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous relationship consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development The Envisaged Utilitarian System
5
Instead we have created a rule oriented system that is increasingly detached from the objectives With the objective of preserving property The Lockean System
6
Reduces the line between domestic issues and & market access issues. Does not balance rights & obligations (Art. 7) Allows powerful nations to avoid the rules by not making them Preserves Bargaining imbalances Problems from the Normative Structure
7
1. Mail Box dispute between India and US. It is a a domestic subject because: investments required to set up the interim mechanisms investments to smoothly transition into the patent regime. Suspends sovereign determination of art 27 (3) [morality] issues (America v. Antigua is another example). Reduces the Line between Domestic & Market Access Issues
8
Curtailed developing country member’s right to independently determine whether an invention can be allowed into their channels of commerce. Assuming the invention fails the test of patentability after five years, owner enjoys market exclusivity Consumers in developing countries pay a privilege for 5 years for what is in public domain. Cost of the obligations of the interim mechanism not balanced with the benefits At the end of 5 years, countries reexamined all the mail-box applications contributing to backlogs and further degeneration of the system; or allowed unpatentable items to be patented. Balance of Rights & Obligations
9
Powerful nations can avoid the rules by not making them. Agricultural subsidies Avoiding the Obligations
10
Upland Cotton Dispute with Brazil Dispute & DSB’s adoption of panel report US agreed to implement by July, 2005 July 2005, US notified that the matter had been sent to Congress and that it would need additional time Brazil requested for countermeasures: Intellectual property suspension Imposing duties on US items US pointed to a bilateral agreement with Brazil DSB ruled that countermeasures will be illegal Preserves Bargaining Imbalances
11
Other examples include EC Sugar subsidies and the Harmones Dispute which the EU refused to implement. Bargaining Imbalances
12
Trade sanction Does not work for developing nations Cost ineffective Dispute where Brazil and India chose not to impose sanctions Counter measures – bilateral agreements/ donor country theory Rule based Construction
13
Recognition of: Reverse interest theory for protectionism Theory of necessity Theory of Trade Benefit – justifying the move from a power based structure Solution
14
Issues for the Hong Kong Meeting Two outstanding issues mark the expectations from Hong Kong Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration Issues relating to agricultural subsidies
15
The issues highlight the imbalance in the WTO process Normative Structure/ Enforcement mechanism sustains the power imbalances and preserves the bargaining inequality Preserves a rule oriented Lockean system rather than the envisaged utilitarian system. Normative Structure & Imbalance
16
WTO Creating an integrated multilateral trading system by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous relationship consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development The Envisaged Utilitarian System
17
Instead we have created a rule oriented system that is increasingly detached from the objectives With the objective of preserving property The Lockean System
18
Reduces the line between domestic issues and & market access issues. Does not balance rights & obligations (Art. 7) Allows powerful nations to avoid the rules by not making them Preserves Bargaining imbalances Problems from the Normative Structure
19
1. Mail Box dispute between India and US. It is a a domestic subject because: investments required to set up the interim mechanisms investments to smoothly transition into the patent regime. Suspends sovereign determination of art 27 (3) [morality] issues (America v. Antigua is another example). Reduces the Line between Domestic & Market Access Issues
20
Curtailed developing country member’s right to independently determine whether an invention can be allowed into their channels of commerce. Assuming the invention fails the test of patentability after five years, owner enjoys market exclusivity Consumers in developing countries pay a privilege for 5 years for what is in public domain. Cost of the obligations of the interim mechanism not balanced with the benefits At the end of 5 years, countries reexamined all the mail-box applications contributing to backlogs and further degeneration of the system; or allowed unpatentable items to be patented. Balance of Rights & Obligations
21
Powerful nations can avoid the rules by not making them. Agricultural subsidies Avoiding the Obligations
22
Upland Cotton Dispute with Brazil Dispute & DSB’s adoption of panel report US agreed to implement by July, 2005 July 2005, US notified that the matter had been sent to Congress and that it would need additional time Brazil requested for countermeasures: Intellectual property suspension Imposing duties on US items US pointed to a bilateral agreement with Brazil DSB ruled that countermeasures will be illegal Preserves Bargaining Imbalances
23
Other examples include EC Sugar subsidies and the Harmones Dispute which the EU refused to implement. Bargaining Imbalances
24
Trade sanction Does not work for developing nations Cost ineffective Dispute where Brazil and India chose not to impose sanctions Counter measures – bilateral agreements/ donor country theory Rule based Construction
25
Recognition of: Reverse interest theory for protectionism Theory of necessity Theory of Trade Benefit – justifying the move from a power based structure Solution
Similar presentations
© 2025 SlidePlayer.com. Inc.
All rights reserved.