2.  Ethnic conflict has many dimensions  the territorial one.  Northern Ireland: the very creation of Belfast’s ‘peace line’ represents an effort to give concrete geographical shape to a profound interethnic division.  Cyprus in 1974: the ethnic map of the country was radically reformed, as the long-established bicommunal patchwork yielded to a partitioned country, a ‘green line’ extending through Nicosia and the rest of the island separating the Turkish North from the Greek South.  Intercommunal conflict in Lebanon was eventually transformed into competition over territory, with another ‘green line’ stretching through Beirut and partitioning it into western (Muslim) and eastern (Christian) sectors.  Kashmir and Israel/Palestine

3.  demands for autonomy within a state, for separation from it, or for unification with another state.  The link between ethnicity and territoriality  Ethnic affiliation and territorial location: sources of national identification.  people and land as the two primary stimuli of patriotism and nationalism, in that they act as powerful foci for group loyalty

4.  As the gap between the territory actually occupied by the ethnic community and the territory of its state increases, so too does the probability of ethnic tension, other things being equal.

5.  Great diversity of types of conflict  apart from the differential impact of language, culture, religion and perceived descent in the process of ethnic group formation, other factors add to the complexity of the issue.  a colonial or quasicolonial relationship forms part of the picture: some local ethnic groups may have been favoured over others by the metropolitan power, as was the case in varying degrees in Ireland, Cyprus, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya and Tanzania.  In such cases former metropolitan or other external powers may play a continuing role in the conflict.  In addition, there may be competing settlement myths, with two or more groups claiming to have ‘got there first’; this was the case between Swedes and Finns in Finland, Germans and Czechs in the former Czechoslovakia, Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and Sindhis and Muhajirs in Pakistan

6.  The process of ethnic mobilization is kick-started by a sense of economic and social grievance and by allegations of discriminatory treatment by the state authorities.  characterized by a demand for equality of all citizens: for individual rights, resting on an assumption of a fundamental identity of all humans. This phase often begins in a period in which the subordinate group’s identity is other-defined (i.e. it is the dominant group which is most anxious to highlight and maintain the ethnic boundary) and in which it is discriminated against.  The history of the Jews and of the Romany populations of Europe provides numerous examples of subordinate groups of this kind, and the European colonial empires and the United States in the slave-owning era. In Ireland, Catholics were prohibited by law from owning or bequeathing property, from voting and from occupying a whole range of public sector positions

7.  In many cases, though, the institutionalization of formal equality before the law was not sufficient to remove de facto patterns of apparent discrimination that survived from the period of formal inequality.  These patterns could be maintained by the use of surrogate criteria of ethnic selection (such as literacy tests, wealth thresholds or residency requirements), by leaving large sectors of public administration and private enterprise open to unregulated management by institutions controlled by the dominant ethnic group, or by simply leaving established patterns of social and economic inequality to continue under their own momentum. In such cases the initial, ‘individual rights’ phase might extend into the contemporary period, as in the case of Blacks in the United States or Catholics in Northern Ireland.  Right up to the present, then, subordinate ethnic groups have demanded equality—in effect, full implementation of their basic human and civil rights, subsequently incorporated in most western constitutions and reformulated in the UN-sponsored Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

8.  Some groups may be happy with the gains made in the first phase; for others, the agenda may shift to a new set of demands; and for yet others political mobilization may begin at this point.  recognition of its separateness.  While its members may be satisfied with the attainment of at least formal equality, ethnic self-consciousness may, depending on concrete circumstances, push subordinate groups to make an additional set of demands.  members of the ethnic minority are different, and that this difference should receive institutional recognition.  The demand for individual rights has been followed by a demand for ethnic group rights.

9. 1. A demand for equality of citizenship, ranging from a call for formal equality before the law to a demand for special measures to ensure economic and social equality, possibly extending to positive discrimination. 2. A demand for cultural rights, ranging from symbolic use of the minority language in public (for example, in signposting) and in the educational system to the right to transact business with all public institutions through the medium of the minority language, and the right to receive an education at all levels through its medium (subject to practicalities of scale). 3. A demand for institutional political recognition, ranging from symbolic autonomy in local government or symbolic representation in state institutions to fully-fledged confederalism and consociationalism. 4. A demand for secession, ranging from frontier adjustment to allow the minority to be incorporated in a neighbouring state to independence as a separate state.

10.  In terms of their implications for the territorial structure of the state, the demands become more serious as one progresses from the first (which has no territorial implications) to the fourth (which has little else).

11.  The extent to which an ethnic group makes territorial demands on the state is related to the absolute size of the group and the group’s relative size.  These demands are likely also to depend on the pattern of territorial distribution of the group itself.

12.  group’s territorial claims become stronger as  (1) the group increases as proportion of the population of ‘its’ territory  (2) the proportion of the total membership of the group within this territory increases.  the four resulting ideal types give a useful perspective on the dilemmas of ethnoterritorial relationships.

13.  1- The locally weak, territorially dispersed group: most of the population of the group’s designated territory consists of nonmembers of the group, and most members of the group live outside this territory.  designated an ethnic territory of the Soviet Jews, only 5.4% of the local population was Jewish, and the territory accounted for only 0.6% of the Soviet Jewish population.  The Tatar Republic is a second example: only 47.7% of the local population was Tatar, and the republic accounted for only 26.0% of the total Tatar population.

14.  2- The locally weak, territorially concentrated group (the Bosnia model): most of the population of the group’s designated territory consists of nonmembers of the group, but most members of the group live within this territory.  Bosnia. This was the former Yugoslav republic associated with ethnic Muslims, who, however, accounted for only 39.5% of the population; nevertheless, the republic included 81.5% of Yugoslavia’s ethnic Muslims.  The former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, similarly, though populated predominantly by non-Kazakhs (only 36.0% of the population were Kazakhs in 1979), was the territory in which the vast majority (80.7%) of Kazakhs lived.

15.  3. The locally strong, territorially dispersed group (the Åland model): most of the population of the group’s designated territory consists of members of the group, but most members of the group live outside this territory.  The autonomous Åland Islands: they are 93.8% Swedish-speaking, but they account for only 8.3% of Finland’s Swedishspeaking population  the Åland Islanders are part of the Swede-Finn community rather than constituting a separate group of their own (similar questions arise regarding the relationship between Quebecois and French Canadian identity).

16.  4. The locally strong, territorially concentrated group (the Slovenia model): most of the population of the group’s designated territory consists of members of the group, and most members of the group live within this territory. Slovenia within the former Yugoslavia offered such an example—it was not only overwhelmingly Slovene (90.5%), but also accounted for the great bulk of the Slovene population of Yugoslavia (97.7%).  Slovakia and Flanders

17.  the power of the subordinate ethnic group increases as we move from the first to the fourth of these types.  This is especially the case to the extent that the subordinate group’s demands have territorial implications.  Territorial solutions imply on the one hand territorial concentration of the group making the demand, and on the other hand ethnic homogeneity of the territory on behalf of which the demand is being made. To the extent that these conditions fail to be satisfied, any concession of a demand for a territorial settlement is likely to run into opposition from members of other groups.

18.  potential strategies that the state may adopt in response to pressure from ethnic minorities, taking account of their territorial status?  There are in principle two strategies open to the state in doing this: it may alter territorial boundaries, or it may seek to redistribute the ethnic group itself. The strategies are not mutually exclusive; the state may in practice attempt both.

19.  First, some states are content to adhere to internal boundaries hat have evolved as a consequence of historical accident and that have been given a particular legitimacy by the passage of time. The principal components of the United Kingdom (including England, Scotland and Wales);  the German Länder— and the Swiss cantons.  Second, the criterion of administrative rationality or convenience may be used to justify radical reform, possibly underpinned by economic or geographical considerations. The French départements are the prototype of this approach, which has been very widely followed in Europe (for example, the provinces in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy and the counties in Norway, Sweden and Finland).  Third, ethnic criteria may be dominant, as in the former Soviet Union, whose republics and other major territorial subdivisions were based largely on ethnic considerations.

20.  While these distinctions hold up quite well in theory, it may be more difficult to classify boundaries in practice according to this typology.  Boundaries devised in terms of administrative or ethnic criteria, for instance, may in time be given added permanence by eventually being seen as sanctified by history.  In other cases, more than one criterion may be in operation: in Canada, for example, the provinces have evolved from a mixture of historical accident and administrative considerations, and in post- 1945 Yugoslavia a mixture of ethnic and historical criteria was used to justify the boundaries of the new republics.

21.  the state can fundamentally redefine the territorial relationships of ethnic groups within its borders by altering internal boundaries.  The interwar Republic of Czechoslovakia recognized the territorial distinctiveness of its two principal Slav minorities, the Slovaks and the Ruthenes (Ukrainians), at least to the extent of acknowledging territories named Slovakia and Ruthenia, but withheld such recognition from the largest minority, the Germans

22.  The term confederation is generally to refer to a loose form of political association.  Daniel J. Elazar: a confederation is “a common government” formed when “several pre-existing polities (have) joined together for strictly limited purposes, usually foreign affairs and defence, and more recently economics.”  Such a common government “remains dependent upon its constituent polities in critical ways and must work through them.”

23.  From the perspective of international law, a confederation cannot be regarded as a unified sovereign state.  Its individual member states have their own international personality and are recognized by the international community as sovereign states.  A confederation does not have supreme legislative or executive branches, and does not necessarily have a single army, a single tax system or single citizenship.

24.  Cooperation between the member states is restricted to a few areas of competence, such as defence, foreign affairs and foreign trade. It is governed by a common consultative institution.  The decision making organ in a confederation is the confederal assembly (congress or diet) composed of delegates from the member states.  The decisions of the confederation need to be approved by all member states, often unanimously: Both majority rule and veto systems are used. The veto system is mostly exercised when the decision concerns the unity of the confederation; on defence and security matters, for example whereas a simple majority vote can be effective regarding some less important decisions.

25.  Every member state has equal status.  The member states retain the right to withdraw from the confederate union. It is this feature that distinguishes confederalism from other forms of governance and which received many criticisms from the early federalists.  The early federalists considered the confederation so weak and lose a form of governance that unity was  difficult to obtain and the union was permanently in danger of break-up.  Confederation has acquired a negative reputation: that its loose structure of government can no longer offer a feasible solution to contemporary political demands.  According to John Coakley confederations appear to be half-way house between federation and independence.

26.  Four main differences between federations and confederations.  1- a federation is “concerned with nation-building” and tends to have single national identity, whereas a confederation is “most ambiguous on that subject” and each constituent unit of a confederation can preserve its own national identity.  A federation is “either to create one nation out of many or to preserve a nation by a timely recognition of its inner diversity.” The formation of a confederation, on the contrary, responds to the basic needs of the member states, for example when they face a severe external threat or feel prompted to unite by a powerful common economic interest. It is designed to create not a single nation-state, but a union of states based on a treaty.  The confederal treaty will not change the status of its member states or deprive them of their statehood. They will thus retain full sovereignty.

27.  2- Both are founded on different types of arrangements that determine the distribution of functions between the federal level of governance and the constituent units.  A federation is based on a constitution, and a confederation on an inter-state treaty.  The scope and effect of the basic laws in a federation and a confederation thus differ greatly.  In a federation, the basic law may start off as an agreement between the constituent units, but as a consequence of the integration of the constituent entities, this agreement will be included in a constitution, or will have the same status as a constitution

28.  In a confederation, the treaty as a written basic law governs only some given fields such as defense, foreign affairs or particular economic matters, while the other policy areas are regarded as being the domestic affairs of the member states.  The treaty as a basic law is directly enforceable only on the member states, and not on their populations, except only in special circumstances (such as in time of war).  3- In both the relationship between the center and the constituent units, and that between the central government and the citizenry, differ greatly.

29.  In a federation, the two levels of government have distinct areas of competence, whose relationship is laid down in the constitution. Their hierarchical order favours the federal level of governance, as it controls “the most crucial sovereign functions.”  In a confederation, the hierarchical relationship between the Union and the member states favours the latter because a confederal treaty is designed to preserve the sovereignty of the constituent units. The authority of the Union remains subordinate to that of its member states.

30.  The people in a federation are involved both in the affairs of the federated state in which they live and in those of the federation as a whole.  Citizens have dual allegiances and loyalties: to the federation and to their own states or regions.  In a confederation, the people are directly involved only in the affairs of the member states, and their loyalties remain focused on their home state.

31.  4- The two forms of polity differ greatly in their decision-making bodies and systems.  In a federation, the main decision-making organ is usually a bicameral system comprising two chambers, one of which represents the people as a whole while the other represents the component units of the federation.  Federal legislation needs to be approved by a majority of the delegates of both chambers.  The federated states may derive some income from direct or indirect taxes, but the federal government usually keeps control over the main sources of taxation.

32.  Due to its financial independence, the federal government does not depend on the federated entities.  In a confederation, joint decision- making takes place in a confederal assembly (congress, or diet) that consists of representatives of the constituent units.  A mixture of “majority rule” and “veto” systems may be used in decision- making, but on crucial issues the constituent states retain a right of veto, since confederal decision-making must seek to avoid crises that may break up the union.

33.  As the union does not usually have its own sources of income, the confederal level of governance depends on its member states for financial support.  Despite the equality of the confederated entities under the law, this may lead to the hegemony of a larger entity that uses its financial power to dominate confederal decision-making.

34.  The term ‘consociational democracy’ is most closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart and was examined by him as a type of democratic system in greater detail for the first time in the late 1960s, when making reference to the political systems of Scandinavian countries and of the Netherlands and Belgium. o ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1, April 1968, pp. 3-44 o The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (University of California Press, 1968) o Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977)

35.  Revised by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary o Northern Ireland: Consociational Engagements (2004)

36.  Ulrich Schneckener power sharing arrangements: ‘the former antagonists are forced to work together and make decisions by consensus; the ultimate goal is to turn opponents into partners’.  Consociational or power-sharing theorists put greater emphasis on political institutions and the role of politicians in attaining political stability or instability.  For them, political instability results from the unwillingness or the inability of political elites to negotiate and maintain political compromise and they have specific theories to explain power-sharing failures and successes.  Lijphart defines consociational democracy as “government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into stable democracy”.

37.  Furthermore, Lijphart identified four features shared by consociational systems: o a grand coalition government (between parties from different segments of society) o segmental autonomy (in the cultural sector) ‘good fences make good neighbours’ o proportionality (in the voting system and in public sector employment) o minority veto (NON DECISIONS ARE PREFERABLE TO BAD DECISIONS)

38.  These characteristics, more or less prominently, were exhibited by all the classic examples of consociationalism: Lebanon, Cyprus, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Fiji, and Malaysia  With some of these consociations having succeeded in the long run, such as in Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and others having failed, like Lebanon, Cyprus, Fiji, and Malaysia, Lijphart also established conditions conducive to consociational democracy  overarching, i.e., territorial, loyalties  a small number of political parties in each segment  about equal size of the different segments  existence of some cross-cutting cleavages with otherwise segmental isolation  small size of the territory to which a consociational structure is applied and its direct and indirect internal and external effects  tradition of compromise among political elites

39.  For consociational settlements to work for ethnic conflicts, three fundamental conditions are required:  Integration or assimilation of the respective other group must not be on the agenda of either of the ethnic groups in conflict with each other in the short or medium term  Successive elites must be motivated to work for the preservation of the consociational settlement  Elites themselves must enjoy a sufficient degree of autonomy within their communities enabling them to make compromises and concessions without having to fear outbidding and outflanking by ethno- centric radicals.