1. John Rawls Justice as Fairness

2. Background John Rawls (1921-2002) Books: –A Theory of Justice 1971 –Political Liberalism 1993 –The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited 1999 –Collected Papers 1999 –Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy 2000 –Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 2001 –Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy 2007 –A Brief Enquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith 2009

3. Nozick on Rawls ‘A Theory of Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. It is a fountain of illuminating ideas, integrated together into a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not.’ (Anarchy, State and Utopia, 183)

4. Cohen on Rawls ‘… at most two books in the history of Western political philosophy have a claim to be regarded as greater than A Theory of Justice: Plato’s Republic and Hobbes’s Leviathan […]. Rawls grasped his age’. Cohen, G. A. Rescuing Justice and Equality, 11.

5. Project To discover the principles of justice ‘that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association’ TJ, 10.

6. The Primacy of Justice ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust’ TJ 3.

7. Two steps The content of the principles of justice The argument for the principles of justice from the OP

8. The Site of Justice The subject of justice is the BS: The ‘way in which the main social and political institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time’ JFR, 10.

9. BS Society is a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage marked by conflict as well as identity of interests’ TJ 109. There are no pre-political entitlements We need public rules. Justice must be done, but also be seen being done. Principles of justice govern only the BS. People are able to pursue their ends within the BS. Principles of justice do not govern everyday behaviour.

10. The principles of justice 1.‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.’ 2. ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged [the difference principle]..., and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.’ (TJ, 266)

11. Principles of Justice The principles of justice are lexicographical: No trade-offs between them are allowed. People would not waive some liberties in order to get more wealth or income.

12. First Principle Scheme of basic liberties: ‘political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and liberty of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law’. TJ 53.

13. Liberties I Basic liberties given by a list. Doesn’t aim to maximise total freedom. –Traffic lights, seat-belt regulation, etc. Some liberties are not basic

14. The idea is to ‘consider which liberties are essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the [capacity for a sense of justice, and the capacity for a conception of the good] over a lifetime’ PL 293.

15. Liberties II Basic liberties are those essential for the satisfaction of citizens two moral powers: –Sense of justice –Capacity for a conception of the good

16. Economic liberty The first principle includes some personal property But it doesn’t include liberty of contract, and other economic liberties. This principle isn’t committed to capitalism.

17. Economic liberties Is capital accumulation essential to the fulfillment of the basic interests? Classic new-Rawlsian: yes (J. Tomassi) High Rawlsians: no What private property regime we choose will depend on the second principle of justice.

18. Fair Value of political liberties Distinction between formal and substantive liberties Liberties of political participation: ‘all citizens have an equal right to take part in, and determine the outcome of, the […] the laws with which they are to comply’ 194. The value political participation ;lose much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantage to control the course of public debate’ 198

19. Fair Value of political liberties II Measures to ensure their FV: Everyone should have the means to informed about political issues (198) Citizens should have a fair chance add alternative proposals to the agenda (198) Public funding of political parties Limits to private donations Dispersion of wealth and capital (POD) Public funding for independent public media

20. Fair value of political liberties III Universal suffrage is an insufficient counterpoise; for when parties and elections are financed not by public funds but by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures needed to establish just constitutional rule are seldom properly presented’ 199

21. Capitalism vs POD or DS Economic liberties are not basic because they threat the FVPL IF they were basic, why shouldn’t they also have fair value for everyone Fair value of economic liberties might be secured by non-capitalism.

22. Interpretations of the second principle ‘Greatest benefit to all: ‘Efficiency vs. Difference principle’ ‘Open to all’: COT vs. FEO

23. The role of nature ‘The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into a society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way institutions deal with these facts’. TJ. 87.

24. Intuitive argument Unequal distributions must not arise from causes that are arbitrary from a moral point of view. 2 different causes: Natural + Social ‘No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society’. Thus, ‘the BS can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate’. TJ 87.

25. Four interpretations Natural Liberty: Efficiency + COT. –Fails because it allows inequalities from moral arbitrary causes (social and natural) Liberal Equality: Efficiency + FEO –Tackles only social causes of inequality, leaves natural causes untouched Natural Aristocracy: DP + COT –Tackles only natural causes of inequality, leaves social privileges untouched Democratic Equality: FEO + DP –Rawls’s preferred interpretation

26. FEO ‘those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances. […] assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system. […] The expectations of hose with the same abilities and aspiration should not be affected by their social class’. TJ 63.

27. FEO FEO addresses inequalities in social goods. It leaves natural inequalities untouched. The DP targets natural assets. Why not treat them both together? Is this inconsistent?

28. DP The difference principle is constrained by FEO it allows inequalities which are to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged. It doesn’t equalise the product of natural assets. It arranges production in a way that benefits the worst off.

29. Choice problem Model the circumstance of choice in a way that whatever is chosen counts as fair (An example of pure procedural justice). Perfect procedural justice: Cake Imperfect procedural justice: Trials Pure procedural justice: Fair gambles

30. Original Position Treat everyone as free and equal. Circumstance of choice which ensures fairness. Draws from shared intuitions about justice: e.g. the fact that someone is an privileged position does not gives her a reason to tailor arrangements that favour that position, nor to expect that others accept those arrangements.

31. OP and RE OP is an hypothetical situation. It is neither historical nor utopian. OP is an ‘expository devise’ TJ, 19, helpful to achieve RE and provide guidance

32. Veil of ignorance Intuitive appeal: Elster’s tennis match. Principles of justice must be sensitive only to features that are relevant to justice. VI makes some morally irrelevant information unavailable. Information about: race, sex, class, religion, social position, psychological dispositions (risk aversion), age, abilities and talents, conception of the good.

33. Social Primary Goods The parties choose from an index of primary goods (Rawls’s notion of advantage). ‘Regardless of what an individual’s plans are in detail, it is assumed that there are various things which he would prefer more of rather than less’. TJ 79.

34. Choosing the principles Rawls thinks that the parties in the OP would choose his two principles of justice from a list. Choice is akin to Maximin in choice theory.

35. Liberty ‘the parties regard themselves as having a highest-order interest in how all their other interests […] are shaped and regulated by social institutions’. ‘[…] free persons conceive themselves as beings who can revise and alter their final ends and who give first priority to preserving their liberty in these matters. Hence, they do not only have final ends that they are in principle free to pursue or to reject, but their original allegiance and continual devotion to these ends are to be formed and affirmed under conditions that are free’. TJ 131.

36. Maximin P1 P2 P3 Total A 50 100 400 550 (Max utility) B 110 140 200 450 (Maximin) C 100 100 100 300 (Equality)

37. Maximin Difference between choice under uncertainty and under risk The former can’t assign probabilities to possible outcomes. Empirical evidence that people is more risk-averse under uncertainty than under risk Importance of what we are choosing!

38. Utility and Perfection The principle of utility fails to be chosen: –Separateness of persons: ‘Since each desires to protect his interests […] no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction’ TJ, 13. Perfection fails because there is a conflict of interests. The parties have a reason to protect their liberty to pursue a plurality of conceptions of the good. They wouldn’t tie themselves to a particular conception.

39. Problems and criticisms Do hypothetical agreements have any force? General questions about contractualism as opposed to consequentialism Is the VI too thick? Perhaps it leaves important information out. Would the parties choose maximin from the list? Are there any other principles that the parties would choose (albeit not in Rawls’s list)?