1. Descartes II

2. First Argument for the Existence of God (P1)There must be at least as much reality and perfection in a cause as in its effect. (P2)If an idea contains some “presentational reality” that is not in its cause, then something has come from nothing. (P3)But nothing can come from nothing. (P4)While my ideas of physical objects could have come from me, I also have an idea of God, who is (among other things) infinite. (P5)Being finite, I “would not have the idea of infinite substance in me unless it came from a substance that really was infinite.” (180) (P6)“[S]ince the idea of God is completely clear and distinct and contains more presentational reality than any other idea, no idea is truer per se and none less open to the suspicion of falsity.” (180) (C)Therefore, God exists.

3. Second Argument for the Existence of God I exist. Either: a)I created myself; b)I have always existed; c)My parents or some other being(s) less perfect than God created me; or d)God created me.

4. Is God a Deceiver? (P1)The idea I have of God is of an infinitely perfect being. (P2)The cause of such an idea must itself be infinitely perfect. (P3)Therefore, God is infinitely perfect. (P4)Deception is a sign of imperfection. (P5)Being perfect, God cannot deceive. (C)Therefore, God is not a deceiver.

5. Proof of Independence of Mind and Body (190) (P1)It is possible for God to create anything I can clearly and distinctly perceive. (P2)If God creates something to be independent of another, they are distinct from each other. (P3)I clearly and distinctly understand my existence as a thinking, non-extended thing. (P4)I clearly and distinctly understand my body as a non-thinking, extended thing. (C)So I am distinct from, and can exist without, a body.

6. Proof of Existence of Physical Objects (191) (P1)I have a passive ability to sense. (P2)I wouldn’t be able to use this ability if there weren’t some active power to produce sensory ideas. (P3)Since this active power is prior to my understanding, and does not operate according to my will, it cannot exist in me. (P4)And so, this active power must exist in some substance distinct from me. (P5)Either, then, (i) this substance is the physical objects themselves; or (ii) this substance is God. (P6)If this substance were God, I would know this, for God is not a deceiver, and I have a “strong inclination” to believe that the ideas come from physical objects. (C)So the substance is the physical objects themselves, and therefore, physical objects exist.