1. Shiraz A. M. Ewida- Subeh

2. Introduction Since the catastrophic events of Sept 11 and the war on Terror followed by the war on Iraq, the idea of talking with those who are accused of all these horrible incidents could be either complete insanity or blatant betrayal to all the victims of terror….

3. Introduction\ cont. However, after eight years of continuing war in Afghanistan and after the huge losses of money and soldiers that the US and its allies have to pay and when there is no sign of the termination of neither Al- Qaeda nor the Taliban, it’s the time to consider other alternatives such as the negotiations table.

4. The Framework of the paper This paper will focus on whether the United States together with or without its allies in Kabul or NATO should negotiate with the Taliban.

5. The main Key Issues This frame work focuses the inquiry on 4 key issues: 1) the two sides’ main interests. 2) Their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) 3) Potential negotiated outcomes. 4) The direct and indirect costs. The frame work then focuses on the dilemma of legitimacy, commitment as well as morality.

6. The Two Parties “Core Interests”:

7. Taliban strong interest is not to extinct but to survive regain influence &prosperity after the withdrawal of the foreign forces financial interests &interest in the public trust.

8. The Two Parties’ BATNA: It would seem that time is on the side of the Taliban regarding BATNAs, as no foreign power has ever successfully maintained control of Afghanistan or imposed central rule…

9. The Two Parties’ BATNA: that the most logical alternative is to empower the central government in Kabul to legitimately govern the country as a whole, which it remains to be seen as disadvantage to the US BATNA since the Karzai’s government still unable to fill the gaps of power and authority in a devastated country like Afghanistan.

10. Potential Negotiated Outcomes: It seems that a ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement) will emerge only when the Obama administration determines that the security and international standing of the U.S. would not be excessively threatened by allowing a critical mass of “reconcilable” Taliban members to maintain some measure of power in Afghanistan.

11. Potential Negotiated Outcomes: it’s extremely important to determine whether U.S. security and reputational interests would be unduly threatened by such a negotiated outcome: “Reputation effect is a two-edged sword for commitment”, that’s why requires a balancing test between those interests and the administrations’ other interests, including financial and domestic political interests.

12. The Direct and Indirect costs of the Negotiations The direct costs of negotiating with the Taliban reconcilable include the time, money, and manpower spent in seeking out—perhaps even helping to consolidate—and then negotiating with the reconcilable. Direct costs would also include any information that may be released to the Taliban during the negotiation “Positional Bargaining: playing soft or hard.”

13. Indirect Costs Whereas the indirect costs of negotiating with the Taliban reconcilable include the signal it may send “behind the table” to U.S. allies and domestic voters. In negotiating with the Taliban, the U.S. may also have to encounter the indirect cost of setting an example that the U.S. will now “negotiate with terrorists.”

14. To save the face To minimize this cost, the Obama administration could initiate negotiations secretly and ultimately reclassify its negotiation partners as “reconcilables,” “Pashtun rebels,” or Taliban “affiliates.”

15. Legitimacy, Commitment &Morality Closely related to the indirect costs of the negotiation process are questions of legitimacy, commitment and morality. Mnookin and Blum note that “providing a counterpart with ‘a place at the table’ acknowledges their (Taliban) existence, and (to some degree) the validity of their interests and claims.”

16. Conclusion I believe that negotiations could be “A strategic move to alter the beliefs and actions of others in a direction favorable to yourself.”To negotiate doesn’t mean being weak, there are several examples in History where negotiations between two difficult parties could save millions...

17. Thank You & Merry Christmas