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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. Aviation Safety Oversight 17 th COSCAP-SEA Aviation Safety Oversight 17 th COSCAP-SEA 1-2 March 2016 Bangkok, Thailand 1 Capt. Brit Etzold Deputy Chief Engineer, Aviation System Safety
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Copyright © 2014 Boeing. All rights reserved. 3 Other includes 727, 717 and MD products 3,711 3,242 1,864 633608 402 367 Source: Flightglobal Ascend Online Data Boeing Model Distribution by Region Passenger and Cargo aircraft - 2016
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4 Global Air Traffic is Growing RPKs (billions) Other China Asia Pacific (excl. China) Europe North America 39% Middle East 52% 73% Source: Boeing 2013 CMO
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Copyright © 2015 Boeing. All rights reserved. 5 left margin center right margin title line subtitle line content top margin center content bottom margin title line subtitle line content top margin center content bottom margin left margin center right margin North America Europe Latin America Africa CIS Asia-Pacific Middle East Source: Boeing CMO 2015
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6 Flight Global Annual Report-2015 Commercial Aviation Safety at All-Time High
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Copyright © 2015 Boeing. All rights reserved. Global Commercial Safety Enhancement Improve Regulatory Policy and Safety Oversight Support Customer Regulatory Approval + + Enhance Aviation Safety Through Accident Prevention Initiatives Our Vision: A safe, efficient and growing global air transportation system Regional Safety Enhancement Initiatives Regulatory Safety Oversight Improvement Customer Regulatory Readiness 9
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Copyright © 2015 Boeing. All rights reserved. 11 Hull Loss Accident Rates by Region of the World 10-year rolling average United States & Canada Latin America & Caribbean Europe China Africa Oceania Western-built transports >60,000-pounds hull loss accidents, by airline domicile Hull Loss Accidents per million departures World CIS Asia (excluding China) Middle East 0.5 2004 2.4 10.1 0.2 2.6 0.7 2.6 0.3 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.0 1.6 0.1 2.8 8.2 2.5 0.6 2.2 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.7 1.4 4.6 1.7 0.7 2009 2014
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Copyright © 2015 Boeing. All rights reserved. 12 Fatality Risk* of Commercial Jet Air Travel by Region 10-year rolling average United States & Canada Latin America & Caribbean Europe China Africa Oceania Western-built jet transports >60,000-pounds onboard fatal accidents, by airline domicile * Fatality Risk – Full passenger load loss equivalents per million departures World CIS Asia (excluding China) Middle East 0.15 2004 0.96 1.81 0.00 0.97 0.26 0.54 0.16 0.62 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.35 0.06 1.89 2.25 0.59 0.23 0.61 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.32 1.06 0.37 1.74 0.22 0.20 2009 2014
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Copyright © 2014 Boeing. All rights reserved. 13 Trade Associations Manufacturers Pilot Unions Controller Unions Flight Safety Foundation Regional Aviation Safety Groups cooperatively develop & implement a prioritized safety agenda Regional Aviation Safety Groups cooperatively develop & implement a prioritized safety agenda Industry Regional Aviation Safety Group (RASG) Government Regulator (CAA) Aircraft Certification Flight Standards System Safety Air Traffic Operations Research ICAO ECAST Accident Investigation Research Military – some States
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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. 14 Regional Aviation Safety Group – Asia Pacific ASIAS and IATA FDX information is shared to monitor the effectiveness of the implemented DIPs RASG-APAC Allows increased Industry engagement APRAST Safety Enhancements to address top risks DIPs to implement the new Safety Enhancements Issue Analysis Team to shares ASIAS and FDX information IATA and ICAO Monitor implementation of DIPS in States and Industry
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Boeing Regulatory Capability Support Aviation System Safety Support to Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs): Boeing has a highly experienced team of aviation regulatory professionals who have made a global impact by helping countries improve their safety oversight. Assist CAAs in meeting international safety standards. Work with CAAs to help prepare for ICAO and FAA audits and assist with their corrective action plans if required. Conduct gap assessments of compliance to ICAO standards and offer guidance on areas in need of improvement. Promote adherence to the ICAO 5 phase certification process to support new airplane model introductions to an AOC. 16
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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. 17 Boeing Regulatory Capability Support 43 countries over the last five years 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 India Philippines Thailand Bangladesh Indonesia Vietnam Laos Cambodia
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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. 18 Djibouti Angola Kazakhstan Eritrea Malawi Haiti Lebanon Nepal Botswana Georgia Uruguay ICAO Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs) December, 2015 Countries in good standing with ICAO Countries with ICAO SSCs Thailand Kyrgyzstan
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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. 19 Ghana Bangladesh Indonesia Uruguay Barbados Curacao St. Maarten FAA Category 1 & 2 Countries December, 2015 Cat. 1: Country meets minimum ICAO Standards Cat. 2: Country does not meet minimum ICAO Standards Un-assessed: Country has not undergone an IASA Thailand 19
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Copyright © 2016 Boeing. All rights reserved. 20 Sudan DR Congo Zambia Mozambique Sierra Leone Congo Afghanistan Angola Benin Gabon Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Liberia The following countries have one airline within that country on the banned list: Suriname Comoros Iraq Sao Tome and Principe Libya Eritrea Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Nepal Madagascar EU List of Banned Carriers December, 2015 Countries allowed to fly into EU community airports Entire country on EU Ban List Partial country on EU Ban List N. Korea Iran Kazakhstan
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2 Regulations 3 Organization 4 Technical Staff Qual and Training 5 Technical Guidance & Tools ESTABLISH IMPLEMENT 1 Legislation 7 Continuous Surveillance 6 Licensing, Certification and Approval The 8 Critical Elements Dubai, June 2012 8 Resolution of Safety Concerns 21
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Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments CE-1 Primary Aviation Legislation Typically few if any findings but changes in this area require a very long lead time to implement CE-2 Specific Operation Regulations Adoption of other CAAs regulations/guidance (FAA, EASA, etc.) without proper translation/customization CE-3 State Civil Aviation System & Oversight Functions Lack of appropriate funding to hire and train sufficient personnel Accident investigation group not independent from CAA 22
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CE-4 Technical Personnel Qualification and Training Lack of Qualified Personnel in both quantity and required qualification Too few or no type rated FOIs on CAA payroll FOIs not type rated in aircraft they oversee Training and/or records incomplete Overuse of seconded personnel or contract personnel paid by the airlines CAA Inspectors still flying for the airline they are assigned to – conflict of interest Lack of local training on the CAA internal system (differences training on country specific laws, regulations and procedures) Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments 23
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CE-5 Technical Guidance, Tools and the Provisions of Safety Critical Information Lack of Regulatory Guidelines for CAA to perform their duties Including authority to revoke, suspend or cancel an AOC or authorization No ability to stop an aircraft from departing with known safety issues No authorization for inspectors to board an aircraft for purposes of inspection Lack of guidance material on qualification, selection, appointing and terminating designees and contractors No internal CAA Function to monitor changes in ICAO requirements nor implementing updates to the internal regulations No process for filing of differences to ICAO requirements Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments 24
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CE-6 Licensing, Certification, Authorization & Approval Obligations Lack of implementation of the ICAO 5 Phase Certification Process AOC files with no records of 5 Phase process Adding new aircraft to the AOC without proving/validation flights, ditching demos, mini evacs and other required demonstrations (part of phase 4-demonstration) CAA inspectors observing and approving demonstrations not properly trained and qualified to oversee and approve demos Lack of involvement of Airworthiness personnel in review and approval of special programs, e.g. MEL approval, ETOPS approvals, RVSM, etc. Special authorizations (e.g. ETOPS, RVSM, CAT II, III, etc.) not properly approved and inspectors not properly trained Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments 25
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CE-7 Surveillance Obligations Surveillance plan established but not implemented due to lack of manpower Surveillance plan for local operators but no plan for foreign operators, ATOs or AMOs Unavailability of appropriate checklists nor proper training and use of checklists No system for safety related data sharing between operators in country or regionally Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments 26
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CE-8 Resolution of Safety Concerns Lack of guidance material for enforcement activity No penalties defined for first, second or subsequent offenses No system for monetary sanctions Lack of penalties for the AOC holder instead of the individual No training for inspectors on collection of enforcement material and items of proof After a finding, no follow-up system to verify conditions were corrected and closed properly Review of Common Findings from CAA Assessments 27
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29 Boeing Regulatory Approval Support Support to Operators: Assist operators with the AOC application approval process for new model introductions and operational capabilities. Identify unique operational regulatory requirements. Assist operators to develop their operational approval plans and obtain operational approval for certified airplane capabilities. Facilitate regulatory engagement to address operational approval concerns. Provide an Operational Compliance Evaluation report to demonstrate airplane compliance with operating regulations for the proposed operations.
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30 Many CAAs share common challenges Sharing resources through Regional Safety Oversight Organizations and Regional Accident Investigation Groups can help Regulators and Lead Carriers can work together to improve safety oversight Support from all key stakeholders is useful for continuous safety oversight improvement Summary
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Copyright © 2014 Boeing. All rights reserved. 31 Thank You
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