1. ‘Responding to Risk’
Mark Smitherman

2. Context Background Noise – Is it a problem? Unbalanced development!
Expectations – Community & Commercial.
Confidence – within and beyond the Service.
Transition from inspectorate to Chief Advisor.
Economic efficiency – unprecedented expectations.
Audited efficiency / Statutory requirements

3. Safety Critical risk - The bedrock issues
Command training.
Training for Generic Risks.
Dynamic assessment process.
Safety critical training provision.
Management of risk information.

4. Premise # 1
Effective command and control is the primary means of maximising the operational safety of firefighters.

5. Command in context
Fast moving, emotionally charged and pressurised situations.
Others risks – not of our own making.
Difficult to control or mitigate all aspects of our working environment.
High levels of public expectation.
Critical decisions based on incomplete information.
Multiple players (human factors).
Organisational goals and norms.

6. Safe person concept Individual Organisation Competent
Effective team member
Discipline
Adaptable to changing circumstances
Vigilant for his or her own safety and the safety of colleagues and others
Ability to recognise personal limitations
Command aware
Robust selection
Risk aware culture
Information & communication
Systems of work
Training & Instruction
Supervision

7. Premise # 2
In reality, the ability of an officer to command an incident is inextricably linked to the ability of individual firefighters to operate as a safe person and to be part of the total command process and not merely a result of it!

8. Managing Operational Risk
Risk information must be communicated.
Linked to individual firefighter to local commander to sector commander and ultimately to incident commander.
A team approach to risk management must be facilitated within the overall Incident Command System.
Each source of information must be integrated and routed by an effective communications network.

9. Our attitude towards risk
In a highly calculated way, firefighters:
will take (*some) risk to save saveable lives.
may take some risk to save saveable property.
will not take any risk at all to try to save lives or properties that are already lost.
(*Note, amendment incorporated from 3rd edition Fire Service Operations 2008)

10. Ten years on! Does the Philosophy hold?
Are we addressing the needs of the Safe Person Concept?
Do we need to be risk adverse to be safe?
How do we create safer operational environments whilst fulfilling our core responsibilities?

11. Level of uncontrollable risk Quality of dynamic information
Dynamic Risk
Level of uncontrollable risk
Quality of dynamic information
DRAssessment
DRAwareness

12. Where should the risk philosophy sit?
Using dynamic information effectively
Information
on progress
Evaluating
Hazards
& Safety
information
Resources
Incident
Objectives
Gathering
& Thinking
Plan
Communicating
Controlling
Outcome
The proposed revision to national Incident Command Model is to refer to it as the Decision Making Model.
Deciding
Acting
Where should the risk philosophy sit?

13. Premise # 3
The adoption of Command modes of working is pointless if the basis of evaluation and decision-making is flawed as a result of ineffective information gathering.

14. What do the stats say?

18. Premise # 4
The safety of our firefighters is first and foremost a product of our culture!

19. Training must dig deep
“Sharp end” risk is just as much a product of culture and leadership as it is an issue of systems and procedural efficiency.
We now live in a world where we must prepare and train beyond traditional levels of experience and expectation.

20. A robust culture means:
Highly trained risk aware commanders’ controlling operations.
Firefighting teams who enhance risk awareness.
Highly developed risk information systems supporting the command process.
Training emphasis which recognises that real world experience is reducing.
Operational assurance (local & national).
An embedded cycle of learning and improvement.

21. Organisational learning
Deeper than simple post incident review.
Leads to modified understanding of organisational problems.
Learning that results must become embedded.
It is beyond symptomatic.
The process must ultimately affect individual, team and organisational capabilities.
Must look further than simple root causes.

22. Experience can be overestimated!
But in all my experience, I have never in any accident…of any sort worth speaking about. I have seen but one vessel in distress in all my years at sea. I never saw a wreck and never have been wrecked nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.
E.J. Smith, 1907, Captain, RMS Titanic

23. Where are we now? Pro-active inspections by the HSE…Focus
Command training.
Training for Generic Risks.
Dynamic assessment process.
Safety critical training provision.
Management of risk information.

24. Managing risk effectively – DRAwareness must be part of our DNA
Risk management is at the core of our business.
Improving the safety of our staff is at the core of our culture.
We must demonstrate that safety is at the core of our people.
Philosophical concept or critical awareness?
We do not need to be risk averse if we are risk aware.

25. Thank you

26. UK safety in perspective
Context - Recognising the full safety critical aspects of the operational environment.
Tension - Dealing with political and economic pressures.
Confidence - Working towards a clear understanding of our business.

27. The legal duty of care - driving the need to manage risk
Safety legislator – corporate action
Police – Manslaughter & Criminal action
Direct Crown Prosecution
Public inquiry
Inquest Coroner’s ruling

28. What do the HSE expect?
Suitable risk assessments – leading to safe systems.
Appropriate training – For hazards likely to be encountered.
Able to respond to operational demands - Rapidly changing situations.
Appropriately equipped.
Adequate supervision - Within the command and control structure.
Able to address dynamic risks – With dynamic decisions ‘as far as reasonably practicable’.

29. What should the FRS expect from the HSE?
Clear contextual understanding of our business.
Local consistency of application.
Recognition of public & private expectation.
Clearly defined terms of engagement.
Leadership from the top.

30. Expectations in summary
Inputs
Training
Equipment
Supervision
Information management
Command & Control
Outputs
Risk assessment
Control measures
Operating procedures
Safe systems of work
Dynamic awareness

31. Engagement – Aims to:
Establish clear contextual understanding of FRS activities.
Ensure consistency of approach National & Local.
Promote a culture where risks are dealt with in a sensible and proportionate way.
Set out clear understanding regarding the dynamic management of operational risk.
Enhance confidence across the service regarding the interpretation of the context within which the F&RS operates.
Promote opportunities for ensuring early and wide learning from incidents, developments and research.

32. Thank you

33. HSG65 Policy Development Organisational Development
Planning and Implementation
Measuring Performance
Reviewing Performance
Auditing
Policy Development
Organisational Development
Developing techniques of planning, measuring and reviewing
Feedback loop to improve performance 33

34. Organisational learning
Strategic
Generic
Dynamic
Policy
Priorities
Resource allocation
Positive Culture
Hazard identification
Risk assessment
Implementation of Control measures
Recognition
Operational risk assessment
Supervision
Standard operating procedures
Review, Evaluation & Improvement