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Published byMonica Hubbard Modified over 8 years ago
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Verifiable Distributed Oblivious Transfer and Mobile-agent Security Speaker: Sheng Zhong (joint work with Yang Richard Yang) Yale University
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Outline → → Problem Formulation OT → DOT → VDOT VDOT Design –Secret Sharing + One-round OT –Cheater Identification Application in Mobile-agent Security
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Problem Formulation Oblivious Transfer (OT) Distributed Oblivious Transfer (DOT): Extension of OT with Distributed Proxy Verifiable Distributed Oblivious Transfer (VDOT): Extension of DOT with Verifiability
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Why VDOT? What if a proxy server cheats (deviates from the protocol) ? –Receiver gets wrong shares; cannot recover chosen item correctly. →DOT only works in semi-honest model. → Needs Verifiable DOT = VDOT –Receiver can verify consistency of shares before recovery (i.e., can detect cheating)
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Additional Requirement Now Receiver can detect cheating. Then what to do if cheating is detected? –Receiver should identify who has cheated –Receiver should accuse cheater(s) –Public should verify the accusation
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Summary of VDOT Security Sender’s privacy: Receiver colluding with τ 1 proxy servers knows nothing about the item not chosen Receiver’s privacy: Sender colluding with τ 2 proxy servers knows nothing about which item is chosen Verifiability of share consistency Verifiability of accusation if cheating is detected
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Progress of Talk Problem FormulationProblem Formulation OT → DOT → VDOT → →VDOT Design –Secret Sharing + One-round OT –Cheater Identification Application in Mobile-agent Security
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VDOT Design Basic Idea: One-round OT + Secret Sharing –Bellare-Micali OT + Feldman VSS Major difficulty: Allow verification of consistency of both items (but only one item will finally be decrypted) → Need to verify on encrypted shares
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Secret Sharing Feldman’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) –Secret: s –Share: P j =P(j), where P is a poly. with s as the constant term –Commitment to share: P’ j = λ Pj, where λ is a primitive root
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Potential Problem in Cheater Identification Receiver only needs τ shares to recover an item. Therefore… –If he can see more shares, maybe these are the shares of the other item → he derives the other item with the help of cheating servers Need to limit the number of shares the receiver sees! –But (uncarefully designed) cheater identification procedure may allow receiver / cheating servers to see more shares
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Solution to Potential Problem Re-randomize all shares using randomness whose discrete log is unknown Identify cheaters on these re-randomized shares Use ZK proofs to force honest behavior in re-randomizations See paper for details
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Progress of Talk Problem FormulationProblem Formulation OT → DOT → VDOT VDOT Design –Secret Sharing + One-round OT –Cheater Identification → → Application in Mobile-agent Security
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Mobile Agent Computation: Architecture (threshold extension of [ACCK2001])
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Mobile Agent Computation: Basic Idea [ACCK2001]: apply Yao’s garbled circuits, which needs OT between trusted proxy and receiver. Our proposal: threshold extension. –Replace trusted proxy with group of servers –Needs threshold extension of OT with verifiability. →Use VDOT
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Performance: Overhead of Garbled Circuits
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Performance: Overhead of VDOT
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THANK YOU!
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