1. Pascal’s Wager Warrants Some People’s Belief that God Exists Nathan D. Smith, PhD HCC-Northwest Philosophy Club, November 7 2012

2. Metaphysical Arguments vs. Epistemological Arguments Metaphysical arguments are demonstrations that God exists. Epistemological arguments are demonstrations that there are rational grounds (epistemic justifications) for belief in the existence of God. Two reasons to focus on epistemology: ◦ Pascal’s Wager is an epistemological and normative argument, not a metaphysical argument. ◦ Metaphysical arguments have reached a stalemate and it is unlikely that we can devise any argument that clearly demonstrates either God’s existence or the denial of God’s existence.

3. Our Epistemic Position The metaphysical stalemate leads us to a position of epistemic neutrality. We need some reason or grounds (warrant) to tip the balance. (For the moment, I rule out the agnostic position.) Two ways the atheist tips the balance in favor of his position: ◦ Principle of parsimony: given two equally plausible explanations, we should prefer the one that is simpler (and arguments from natural causes are always simpler than arguments from supernatural causes). ◦ Russell’s teapot: the burden of proof is on the theist. What the theist needs in order tip the balance in her favor: ◦ Desideratum: There is some state of affairs X such that given two people P and N: if P believes in the existence of God (while N does not), then P has an explanation for X that N lacks and P’s belief in God solves some epistemic problem posed by X that N cannot.

4. My Claim I claim that when Pascal’s Wager is properly understood, it satisfies the theist’s desideratum of providing adequate epistemological grounds for (some people’s) belief in the existence of God. My strategy: The epistemic grounds for belief in God’s existence will become apparent when we appreciate that the wager is targeted at a particular subset of people who are aware of a fundamental, existential tension in human nature and desire for this tension to be resolved.

5. Pascal’s Wager “Let us then examine this point and say: either God is or he is not. But to which side shall we incline? Reason can determine nothing here. There is an infinite chaos that separates us. At the extremity of this infinite distance, a game is being played in which heads or tails will turn up. How will you wager? You have no rational grounds for choosing either way or for rejecting either alternative.…. Let us see: since there is an equal chance of winning and losing, if there were two lives to win, you could still wager. But if there were three lives to win, you would have to play (since you must necessarily play), and it would be foolish, when you are forced to play, not to risk your life to win three at a game in which there is equal chance of losing and winning. But there is an eternity of life and happiness [to win]…. “It is no use saying that it is uncertain whether you will win… All players take a certain risk for an uncertain gain; and yet they take a certain finite risk for an uncertain finite gain without sinning against reason…. But the uncertainty of winning is proportional to the certainty of the risk, in proportion to the chances of winning and losing…. Thus our proposition is infinitely powerful, when the stakes are finite in a game where the chances of winning and losing are even, and the infinite is to be won.” (Pensées S680/L418, 213)

6. Unpacking this Passage “There is an infinite chaos that separates us”: whether or not God exists is incomprehensibly far from any ready evidence we have available to us. (This confirms the metaphysical impasse noted earlier.) “You have no rational grounds for choosing either way or for rejecting either alternative”: we seem to lack a reason to tip the balance in favor of one position rather than the other. (This characterizes the position of epistemic neutrality discussed above.) Assume a ½ chance that God exists, then your decision to wager will depend on the amount you wager and the amount you stand to gain: ◦ Wager 1 life to gain 2 lives: 2*(1/2) + 0*(1/2) = 1 ◦ Wager 1 life to gain 3 lives: 3*(1/2) + 0*(1/2) = 1.5 “It would be foolish” not to risk 1 life to gain 3. (And if this is true for 3 lives, it must hold true for any number of lives ≥ 3 lives.)

7. Continued… So, given an infinity of lives to gain, surely it would be unreasonable not to risk one. It is no use to argue that the reward is uncertain; every decision involving risk involves uncertainty. What we should do is measure the chance of winning in proportion to what is wagered and the amount you stand to gain. - W*(C) + G*(C) Where the chance of winning is ½ and the amount you stand to gain is infinite, no matter what you stand to lose, you must wager. - f*(1/2) + ∞*(1/2) = ∞

8. Decision Matrix God existsGod does not exist Wager for the existence of God ∞n1n1 Wager against the existence of God n2n2 n3n3 Where n is some finite (positive or negative) number.

9. Some Comments The decision-theoretical stance of the wager suggests that this is not a metaphysical argument for the existence of God. ◦ Decision theory involves a balance between probability and values. It involves measures of “utility” that may refer to pleasure, desire, objective goods, or some other normative standard. ◦ The decision matrix is neutral about whether or not God actually exists. The decision is made on the probability of God’s existence. Pascal is not clear what values must be placed in the various boxes of the decision matrix except that the three values {n 1, n 2, and n 3 } are all finite, while the fourth value is infinite.

10. A Discourse for the Man-Machine Pascal titled the portion of text that includes the wager, “Discourse on the Machine.” Like Descartes, Pascal accepts that human beings resemble machines with souls: ◦ The soul is responsible for all rational thought ◦ The machine is responsible for all of the mechanisms of the body, including the passions or emotions. So, I propose we understand Pascal’s wager to be addressed not primarily to the generic rational element in human beings (the soul), but to the emotions or passions (the man-machine). ◦ “Work, then, on convincing yourself, not by adding more proofs of God’s existence, but by diminishing your passions.” (S680/L418, 214) ◦ “Custom is our nature. He who is accustomed to faith believes it, can no longer fear hell, and cannot believe anything else.” (S680/L419, 215) ◦ “It is the heart that experiences God, and not reason. Here, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by reason.” (S680/L424, 215) ◦ “The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.” (S680/L423, 216)

11. Pascal’s General Apologetic Strategy Pascal’s apologetics focus on a fundamental tension in human nature, which he thinks Christianity is uniquely capable of revealing, thanks to its doctrine of original sin. And Christianity provides a unique solution to this fundamental tension. ◦ “Man’s greatness and wretchedness are so evident that the true religion must necessarily teach us both that there is a great principle of greatness and a great principle of wretchedness in man. It must then account for these astonishing oppositions. To make man happy, it must show him that God exists; that we are required to love him; that our true bliss is to be in him and our sole ill to be separated from him. It must recognize that we are full of darkness preventing us from knowing and loving him, and that thus, as our duty requires us to love God and our concupiscence turns us away from him, we are full of inequities.” (A.P.R. lecture, S182/L149, 46) We can generalize this account from Christian theology to an observation about humanity’s existential situation. ◦ “For, in the end, what is man in nature? A nothing compared to the infinite, an everything compared to the nothing, a midpoint between nothing and everything, infinitely removed from understanding the extremes: the end of things and their principle are hopelessly hidden from him in an impenetrable secret.” (“Man’s Disproportion,” S230/L199, 59)

12. The Tension Between Greatness and Wretchedness Must be “Felt” “Man’s greatness lies in knowing himself to be wretched. A tree does not know itself to be wretched. So it is to be great to know that one is wretched” (S146/L114, 32) But Pascal suggests that knowledge of wretchedness requires some intuition: “We know the truth, not only through reason, but also through the heart…. That is why those to whom God has given religion by intuition of the heart are very fortunate and, in fact, properly convinced. But to those who do not have it, we can give it only through reasoning, until God gives it to them by intuition of the heart. Without this, faith is only human and useless for salvation.” (S142/L110, 31). If a person feels no tension, then there is no state of affairs that the belief in God explains or resolves.

13. Restatement of Pascal’s Theological Assumptions The true religion ought to reveal the wretchedness of human nature. Yet, being aware of wretchedness is what makes human beings great. Because human beings are aware of their greatness, they desire to be loved, they desire to be recognized for their greatness. But given that they are aware of their wretchedness, human beings also feel that they are not worthy of love. The desire for love and awareness of the lack of being worthy of love leads to a fundamental tension between greatness and wretchedness. This fundamental tension is an essential part of the nature of the man-machine. The true religion should account for this fundamental tension.

14. Return to our Desideratum Desideratum: There is some state of affairs X such that given two people P and N, if P believes in the existence of God (while N does not), then P has an explanation for X that N lacks and P’s belief in God solves some epistemic problem posed by X that N cannot. State of affairs X: the fundamental tension between greatness and wretchedness; human beings desire to be recognized for their greatness (i.e., to be loved), but they are also aware that they are wretched and not worthy of it. Once a person recognizes this fundamental tension, the wager warrants belief in God. ◦ The possibility of God’s existence raises the possibility of the ultimate resolution of the fundamental tension between greatness and wretchedness. This outcome is so desirable that it outweighs any finite amount that might be lost. However, this only works if someone recognizes the fundamental tension…

15. Revised Desideratum So we should consider a possible revision to the desideratum that restricts the scope of possible instances of P and N. ◦ For all N, P who are members of the set of people who feel the tension between greatness and wretchedness, there is a tension between greatness and wretchedness such that, if P believes in God (while N does not), P has an explanation of the tension between greatness and wretchedness that N lacks and P’s belief in God resolves the tension posed by the dual nature of human beings. This may sound trivial, but I think it demonstrates a very important feature of belief in the existence of God: ◦ Disputes about belief in the existence of God cannot be resolved by appealing to fundamental principles that everyone could accept. ◦ Instead, convincing someone that God exists amounts to convincing someone that she needs salvation. ◦ For a person who feels the need for salvation, the mere possibility of God’s existence promises such a great reward that it outweighs any potential loss and tips the balance in favor of belief in God’s existence. ◦ So, awareness of the fundamental tension plus the wager warrants belief in the existence of God.

16. Conclusion Pascal’s wager is not a proof of the existence of God in terms of a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality. Moreover, the wager is not an epistemological argument that warrants belief in God for any rational being. Instead, the wager is meant to convince someone who already recognizes the need for salvation and understands that if God exists, salvation is possible. The need for salvation is revealed by the fundamental tension between greatness an wretchedness. 1.The greatness of human nature leads to a desire for that greatness to be recognized, i.e., for the person to be loved. 2.The wretchedness of human nature leads to the recognition that a person is not worthy of love. 3.The duality of human nature leads to a tension of wanting to be loved but lacking the worth necessary to be loved. 4.Only God’s existence and the possibility of salvation can resolve that tension. 5.Therefore, belief in God is justified just in case a person recognizes that human beings have a dual nature, simultaneously great and wretched.

17. Sources Carraud, Vincent. Pascal et la philosophie. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris: 1992. Hájek, Alan. “Pascal’s Wager.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 edition), Edward N. Zalta ed. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/en tries/pascal-wager/ http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/en tries/pascal-wager/ Pascal, Blaise. Pensées, edited and translated by Roger Ariew. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, IA: 2004.