2. LECTURE PRESENTATION FOR Thomas Rid, Cyberwar will not take place Manjikian 2016 1

3. HIS CONTROVERSIAL THESIS  “In several ways, cyber attacks are not creating more vectors of violent interactions;  Rather they are making previously violent interactions less violent.” p. viii Manjikian 2016 2

4. PLEASE WATCH THIS ONE HOUR DISCUSSION WITH THOMAS RID, DISCUSSING HIS BOOK Manjikian 2016 3

5. PART ONE: WHY CYBERWAR IS PERHAPS NOT WAR Manjikian 2016 4

6. MICHAEL HAYDEN, DIRECTOR OF CIA AND NSA  “Rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less clarity and less apparent understanding than this phenomenon.” p. 3 Manjikian 2016 5

7. WHY DOES RID ARGUE THAT CYBERWAR IS NOT ‘REAL WAR’? WHAT CRITERIA DOES IT FAIL TO MEET?  An offensive act has to be:  1. instrumental  2. political  3. violent or potentially violent Manjikian 2016 6

8.  Rid argues that cyber attacks are used to CONTROL, INVOKE conventional weapons (i.e. Putting a virus in a conventional weapon so it won’t work, sabotaging an autonomous vehicle)  Code is “parasitic on the target” (p. 13)  Cyberweapons (things like viruses) are not IN AND OF THEMSELVES capable of killing people Manjikian 2016 7

9. WHEN IS WAR, NOT WAR?  Not a single human being has ever been killed or hurt as a result of a code-triggered cyber attack  Computer code can only directly affect computer-controlled machines, not humans Manjikian 2016 8

10. ROLE OF THE BODY  War has traditionally injured bodies, produced bodies, corpses  Thus far, computer attacks have not DIRECTLY targetted humans, but rather machines. Manjikian 2016 9

11.  BUT WHAT IF..... A virus shut off machines at a hospital? Shut of fire alarms or sprinkler systems during a fire?  Rid suggests we may not have the same EMOTIONAL reaction to cyberwarfare Manjikian 2016 10

12. STOP AND THINK Manjikian 2016 11

13.  Clausewitz: “War is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.”  INSTRUMENTAL: War is the MEANS of achieving a payoff.  Rid: this gets confused in cyber. Cyber war may be BOTH the payoff and the means. (i.e. Shutting down someone else’s network).  BUT, a cyberstrike is not lethal in the same way that conventional war is. Manjikian 2016 12

14.  In order for a state to profit from carrying out a particular strike, people need to know who did it.  This enhances the credibility of the striker and forces the other side to surrender ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM Manjikian 2016 13

15. WHAT DOES RID SAY IS A BETTER ANALOGY FOR CYBER ACTIVITY THAN CYBER WAR?  He describes a spectrum of cyber activity ranging from cyber crime to cyber war.  He suggests that most of the actions that we have seen to date are better understood as cyber crime.  3 examples: Estonia; Georgia; Stuxnet (Iran) Manjikian 2016 14

16. PARADOXES REGARDING THE UTILITY OF CYBER WAR  “It is a massive challenge to use cyber weapons as instruments in the service of a wider political goal, not just in one- off and impossible-to-repeat sabotage stints.”  Cyberwar is not a strategy, though one might engage in tactical cyberwar as part of an overall military strategy Tactic: plan for achieving an immediate goal Manjikian 2016 15

17. HOW DOES RID DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND POWER?  Force used by a sovereign isn’t simply violence; it is institutionalized, is equivalent to power  “violent cyber attacks are unlikely to ever be an implicit part of a legal order.”  Compares violetn cyber attacks to espionage, sabotage, subversion rather than LEGAL VIOLENCE as part of the political order Manjikian 2016 16

18. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DISTINCTION  Rid: cyber attacks therefore cannot be used to maintain or establish trust in a regime (in the same way that conventional violence could) Manjikian 2016 17

19. STOP AND REVIEW Manjikian 2016 18

20. PART TWO: WHAT IS A WEAPON? Manjikian 2016 19

21. WEAPON (DEFINED):  A tool that is used or designed to be used with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional or mental harm to structures, systems or living things Manjikian 2016 20

22. CYBER WEAPON (DEFINE)  Computer code that is used kor designed to be used, with the aim or threatening or causing physical, functional or mental harm to structures, systems or living beings Manjikian 2016 21

23. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION  Weapons are used not just to hurt people but also to THREATEN them  People are aware of the weapon’s potential to harm them  (This is why deterrence works)  Weapons are used not just to hurt people but also to THREATEN them  People are aware of the weapon’s potential to harm them  (This is why deterrence works) Manjikian 2016 22

24. WHAT IS NOT A WEAPON  Rid: sabotage  Weaponization of gadgets  Scada attacks – i.e. Attacks on an electrical grid, nuclear powerplant, etc.  Distinguishes between INTRUSIONS and INSTRUMENTS OF HARM Manjikian 2016 23

25. IMPLICATIONS OF RID’S ARGUMENT  Affects how we think about deterrence in cyberwar (see my article)  Affects how we think about ethics of cyberwar Manjikian 2016 24

26. AN OPPOSING VIEWPOINT Manjikian 2016 25