1. 1 Addressing the Iranian Security Issue and Tackling the Nuclear Question * Maurizio Martellini University of Insubria and Landau Network-Centro Volta (LNCV), Como, Italia Presented at the “4 th Naples Seminar, Mediterranean Special Group, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 1-2 July 2007, Naples, Italy”

2. 2 IRAN AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY TODAY Iran today: a continuous oscillation between ideological dogma and pragmatism, on the level of both internal and regional/international politics. This “duality” is also demonstrated in the definition of foreign policy guidelines. The search for a new security architecture in the region: the absence of a new “security order” in the region following the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the defeat of the Taleban in Afghanistan has caused Teheran to try to fill the resulting geopolitical vacuum, with the aim not of exporting Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution but of consolidating the country’s role both as a great Middle Eastern power and as the pivot of the “Shi’a Crescent” that stretches from Lebanon to Afghanistan and Iraq.

3. 3 Foreign policy: it is the “algebraic sum” of three conflicting factors: 1.Islamic ideology; 1. national interests; 1.the existence of varying political currents with different agendas – from the “reformist faction” to the “pragmatists’ or technocrats faction” and the “hard-liner conservatives faction”, and to the so-called “Pasdaran faction”, which came to power after 2005 and the election of President Ahmadinejad.

4. 4 The “siege” sensation: the growing US presence in the region since 1991 and subsequent stress by Iranian leaders on a sense of “strategic isolation” and being “under siege”, especially since the Bush administration again proposed a “regime change” in the country: these are the reasons behind Iran’s “securitization” agenda.

5. 5 THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM Since 2003, the year in which it was revealed, Teheran has continued a clandestine nuclear program underway for almost twenty years, thus infringing many of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (TNP) of which it is a member as a non-nuclear weapon state.

6. 6 Reasons: 1.The nuclear question represents a phenomenon that is a mixture of Iranian nationalism, third world anti-imperialism (US) and the syndrome that developed following the coup d’état in which Mossadeq, the nationalist Prime Minister of Iran, was removed by the USA in August 1953. 2.Nuclear power enables Iran to maintain a latent military capacity, for Teheran the best means of raising the brinkmanship stakes in its dealings with the international community.

7. 7 The nuclear fuel cycle : Any civilian nuclear program requires the preparation of nuclear fuel, which involves “uranium enrichment” technologies. One example of this is the use of centrifuges operating in “cascades”. The same technologies used for civilian purposes can also be employed to create bomb-grade, high enriched uranium (HEU): theoretically, a nuclear bomb of the kind used at Hiroshima would needs approximately 25 kg of HEU.

8. 8 The two “thresholds”: 1.that related to the achievement of the complete mastering of the entirely uranium enrichment technology – according to the May 2007 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has nearly reached this threshold and, by this summer, Teheran will have assembled and have activated 3000 centrifuges at its enrichment plant in Natanz; 2. that required to produce an “explosive nuclear device” – according to the IAEA, Iran will be capable of producing it in 3 – 8 years from now on.

9. 9 The HEU break-out scenario: in this scenario, once Iran has achieved an effective capacity in terms of enrichment technology and practice, today conducted under the umbrella of Article IV of the NPT, Teheran will withdraw from the Treaty, citing Article X – as North Korea did in 2003 - in order to become a new nuclear weapon state along with the nine that already exist. UN Security Council resolutions: the possible scenario of a withdrawal from the NPT has led the international community to ask, with UN Security Council Resolution N. 1696 (July 2006), n. 1737 (December 2006) and n. 1747 (March 2007) for the suspension of all enrichment activities and the creation of a sanctions regime to be imposed in line with Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

10. 10 The current situation: on 23 May 2007, after the 60 days requested by UNSCR n. 1747 of 24 March 2007 for the suspension of all enrichment activities and to respond fully to all of the questions with “military dimensions” posed by the IAEA, Teheran had still not fulfilled these obligations and, consequently, to quote El Baradei, Director General of the IAEA, the Agency to date, and after three and a half years of intense investigations, still cannot guarantee the “exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s atomic program”. Consequences: the international community prepares to introduce a third round of stricter sanctions.

11. 11 A technical detail: assuming that the 3000 centrifuges ( of the first Pakistani model, P1) at Natanz operate uninterruptedly and at maximum capacity, it is estimated that:  Fuelled with natural uranium 1 nuclear bomb per year;  Fuelled with low enriched uranium, LEU, for reactors (e.g. Busher) 6 nuclear bombs per year The proponents of the military option posit the real threshold for this extreme measure at the threshold where enrichment is effectively achieved.

12. 12 WHAT IS TO BE DONE Experts have identified 5 possible options for dealing with the question of Iran’s nuclear program, none of which guarantee success or are free from serious and undesirable collateral effects: 1.Maintain the status quo of resolution-after-resolution; 2.Induce a regime change in the country; 3.Conduct military strikes against all of Iran’s nuclear facilities (for example, Natanz, Isfahan, Arak, etc…); 4.Negotiate a comprehensive grand bargain aimed at resolving all aspects of friction between Iran and the international community (and, in particular, the US); 5.Establish a strategy of containment-and-engagement in which Washington should begin an incremental policy of détente towards Teheran.

13. 13 A policy of containment-and-engagement: if this strategy is to have any chance of success, then the negotiators of the P5+1 (Germany) should renegotiate the benchmarks of the agreement proposed to Teheran in June 2006, in the light of recent events, in particular Iran’s almost acquisition of enrichment capabilities: Iran could be guaranteed:  a limited degree of enrichment (no more than 3000 centrifuges or less) through, for example, an international consortium at Natanz;  the conditional suspension of the UN sanctions currently in place in exchange for:  the adoption and ratification of the Additional Protocol (AP) on Safeguards;  acceptance of a strict regime of IAEA inspections and the permanent presence “in loco” of Agency’s inspectors;  complete disclosure of all of Iran’s past nuclear activities.

14. 14 The effectiveness of this two-track strategy of containment- and-engagement will be enhanced even further if accompanied by confidence building measures such as direct talks between Washington and Teheran on the sidelines of the P5+1 nuclear negotiations, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Iran and the US and the end of Washington’s unilateral regime of sanctions. CONCLUSIONS