1. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS HSS 100. 01/.02 /.03 /.04 /.05 SLIDES 2

2. FORD PINTO CASE On August 10, 1978, a Ford Pinto was hit from behind. The impact of the collision caused the Pinto’s fuel tank to rupture and burst into flames, leading to the deaths of three passengers. In the seven years since the introduction of the Pinto, there had been some 50 lawsuits related to rear-end collisions.

3. FORD PINTO

4. As, this time Ford was charged in a criminal court for the deaths of the passengers, this would indicate that Ford was grossly negligent in the deaths of the passengers and could result in jail terms for the Ford engineers or managers who worked on the Pinto. It was claimed that Ford engineers were aware of the faulty design of Pinto’s gas tank and the design was not in line with accepted engineering standards, even though it did meet applicable federal safety standards at the time.

5.  During the trial, it was determined that Ford engineers were aware of the dangers of this design, but management, forced the engineers to use this design.  Their concern was getting the Pinto to market rapidly at a price competitive with subcompact cars already introduced or planned by other manufacturers.  It was the late 60s, when the demand for sub- compacts was rising on the market. Lee Iacocca became president and almost immediately began a rush program to produce the Pinto.

6. Iacocca wanted that little car in the showrooms of America with the 1971 models. So he ordered his engineering vice president, Bob Alexander, to oversee what was probably the shortest production planning period in modern automotive history. The normal time span from conception to production of a new car model is about 43 months. The Pinto schedule was set at just under 25.

8.  Iacocca's specifications for the design of the car were uncompromising: "The Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over 2,000 pounds and not cost a cent over $2,000."  During design and production, however, crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank. In crashes over 25 miles per hour, the gas tank always ruptured. To correct it would have required changing and strengthening the design.

10. FORD’S COST – BENEFİT ANALYSIS BENEFITS Savings : 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2,100 burned vehicles. Unit Cost : $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle. Total Benefit : 180 X ($200,000) + 180 X ($67,000) + $2,100 X ($700) = $49.5 million. COSTS Sales : 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks. Unit Cost : $11 per car, $11 per truck. Total Cost : 11,000,000 X ($11) + 1,500,000 X ($11) = $137 million.

11. When it was discovered the gas tank was unsafe, did anyone go to Iacocca and tell him? "Hell no," replied an engineer who worked on the Pinto, a high company official for many years, who, unlike several others at Ford, maintains a necessarily hidden concern for safety. "That person would have been fired. Safety wasn't a popular subject around Ford in those days. Whenever a problem was raised that meant a delay on the Pinto, Lee would chomp on his cigar, look out the window and say 'Read the product objectives and get back to work."

12.  A Ford engineer, who doesn't want his name used, comments: "This company is run by salesmen, not engineers; so the priority is styling, not safety." He goes on to tell a story about gas-tank safety at Ford: Lou Tubben is one of the most popular engineers at Ford. He's a friendly, outgoing guy with a genuine concern for safety. By 1971 he had grown so concerned about gas-tank integrity that he asked his boss if he could prepare a presentation on safer tank design. Tubben and his boss had both worked on the Pinto and shared a concern for its safety. His boss gave him the go-ahead, scheduled a date for the presentation and invited all company engineers and key production planning personnel. When time came for the meeting, a grand total of two people showed up - Lou Tubben and his boss.

13. "So you see," continued the anonymous Ford engineer ironically, "there are a few of us here at Ford who are concerned about fire safety." He adds: "They are mostly engineers who have to study a lot of accident reports and look at pictures of burned people. But we don't talk about it much. It isn't a popular subject.

14. In February of 1978, a California jury created a nationwide sensation when it awarded the record- breaking sum of $128 million in a lawsuit (Weinberger Romeo, 45). This one lawsuit was three times what Ford executives and engineers had estimated their final cost would be. Due to the assumed engineering, safety, and reliability problems, Time magazine included the Pinto on its list of the 50 worst cars of all times.

15. RESPONSIBILITY BEHIND DESIGN  1978 Ford Pinto Trial › Criminal charges for the deaths of passengers  Previous civil cases against Ford could only result in financial punishment  Outcome could result in jail terms for Ford engineers or managers  Gross negligence: knowingly using a design that is flawed  Engineers were aware that design was dangerous  Management forced engineers to use the design

16. THE ENGINEERİNG DILEMMA Balance between safety and competitive pricing The engineers had opposing voices to answer to Duty to public versus duty to employer The wrong choice in this case saved a few dollars per car but led ultimately to loss of lives and millions of dollars in direct costs plus countless more in lost sales

17. WHAT IS A PROFESSION? “ Job”: any work for hire “Occupation”: Employment trough which someone makes a living “Professional soccer player”: Practitioner, not an unpaid amateur “Professional carpenter": skills trough many years of experience, quality service

18. DICTIONARY.COM profession Pronunciation: /prə-‘fesh-ən/ Function: n a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation the whole body of persons engaged in a calling

19. OXFORD DICTIONARY profession (pro|fes¦sion) Pronunciation: /prə ˈ f ɛʃ (ə)n/ Definition of profession noun a paid occupation, especially one that involves prolonged (extended) training and a formal qualification: his chosen profession of teaching [treated as singular or plural] a body of people engaged in a particular profession: the legal profession has become increasingly business- conscious

20. WHAT ARE THE ATTRIBUTES /CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROFESSION? 1. Sophisticated skills, use of judgment and exercise of confidentiality and autonomous decision making. Not routine, can’t be mechanized Judgment: significant decision based on formal training and experience Confidentiality:private the quality of behaving or speaking in such a way as to avoid causing offense or revealing private information: Confidentiality in medicine The ethical principle or legal right that a physician or other health professional will hold secret all information relating to a patient, unless the patient gives consent permitting disclosure. Autonomous decision making : the freedom to decide what should be done in a particular situation:

21. WHAT ARE THE ATTRIBUTES /CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROFESSION? 2. Membership in the profession requires extensive formal education, not simply practical training or apprenticeship (çıraklık); 3. Special societies and organizations that are controlled by members of the professions to set standards of conduct for members, and to enforce these standards; 4. Significant public good results from the practice of the profession.

22. ARE ENGINEERING & ARCHITECTURE PROFESSIONS? 1. Extensive and sophisticated skills; engineering and architectural designs are use of judgment; exercise of confidentiality: employer, client confidentiality; & autonomous decision making about safety and design purpose ; Not routine, new design or modification can not be mechanized. 2. Four years of undergraduate training; serves to public good

23. ARE ENGINEERİNG & ARCHITECTURE PROFESSIONS? 3. Engineering and architectural societies serves to set professional standards 4. Significant public good results: communication systems, transportation, bridges, highways etc.

24. “ It is a sad fact about loyalty that it invites single-mindedness. Single-minded chase of a goal is sometimes delightfully romantic, even a real inspiration. But it is hardly something to advocate to engineers, whose impact on the safety of the public is so very significant. Irresponsibility, whether caused by selfishness or by magnificently unselfish loyalty, can have most unfortunate consequences.” Marcia BARON

25. SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT

26. WHO’S WHO ORGANIZATIONS NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, responsible for space exploration. The space shuttle is one of NASA’s programs. Marshall Space Flight Center A NASA facility that was in charge of the solid rocket booster development for the shuttle. Morton Thiokol A private company contracted by NASA to build the solid rocket booster.

28. WHO’S WHO PEOPLE NASA Larry Mulloy Solid Rocket Booster Project (SRBP) manager at Marshall Space Flight Center Morton Thiokol Roger Boisjoly Arnie Johnson Engineers who worked on the SRB Program Joe Kilminster Engineering manager on the SRB Program Alan McDonald Director of the SRBP Bob Lund Vice president for engineering Jerald Mason General manager

29. KEY DATES 1974 - Morton-Thiokol awarded contract to build solid rocket boosters. 1976 - NASA accepts Morton-Thiokol's booster design. 1977 - Morton-Thiokol discovers joint rotation problem. November 1981 - O-ring erosion discovered after second shuttle flight. January 24, 1985 - shuttle flight that exhibited the worst O-ring blow-by. July 1985 - Thiokol orders new steel billets for new field joint design. August 19, 1985 - NASA Level I management briefed on booster problem. January 27, 1986 - night teleconference to discuss effects of cold temperature on booster performance. January 28, 1986 - Challenger explodes 72 seconds after liftoff.

31. On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger, exploded just over a minute into flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors:  including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters,  insufficient (not enough) low temperature testing of the O- ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed,  and lack of communication between different levels of NASA management.

40. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING CODE OF ETHICS (ASME) “1.Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties. a. Engineers shall recognize that the lives, safety, health and welfare of the general public are depending upon engineering judgments,decisions and practices incorporated into structures, machines, products, processes and devices…”

41. “It is a sad fact about loyalty that it invites…. single-mindedness. Single-minded pursuit of a goal is sometimes delightfully romantic, even a real inspiration. But it is hardly something to advocate to engineers, whose impact on the safety of the public is so very significant. Irresponsibility, whether caused by selfishness or by magnificently unselfish loyalty, can have most unfortunate consequences.” Marcia BARON