1. Cognition and Culture : Processing Models for Hindsight Bias Hiroshi YAMA (Kobe College, Japan) The 4 th London Reasoning Workshop 27 th -28 th August 2009

2. Outline 1.Hindsight bias and paradigms 2.A cross-cultural study on hindsight bias (Choi & Nisbett, 2000) 3.A causal Model for hindsight bias 4.Analytic (Westerners) vs. holistic (Easterners) cognition (Nisbett, et al., 2001) 5.Individualism (Westerners) vs. collectivism (Easterners) (Triandis, 1995) 6.Explanation of cultural differences in cognition based on the distinction between individualism and collectivism 7.Two possible explanations for the cultural differences in hindsight bias 8.The general paradigm of the experiments 9.Experiment 1 10.Experiment 2 11.General discussion 12.Future perspectives (framework for cultural differences)

3. 1.1 Hindsight bias Hindsight bias A mistaken belief that one can have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. (The ‘knew-it-all-along effect’) A false meta-judgment on one’s former judgment. (It describes an inability to retrieve a pre-outcome explanatory perspectives.) ex) Manchester United lost the CL. I could have predicted it! C. Ronaldo wanted to move to Real Madrid, hence he could not concentrate on the final.

4. 1.2 Two paradigms of measuring hindsight bias Memory paradigm 1. Participants are given many questions about facts in the world and asked to answer them. (e.g. In what year did Shakespeare die?) 2. Participants are given correct answers. 3. Participants are asked to recall their original answers 4. Hindsight bias : The effect of correct answer on the recall of original answer. Hypothetic paradigm 1. Participants are given a scenario that leads a plausible outcome. 2. (1). Control condition : No outcome information is given (2). Outcome condition: Outcome information is given 3. Participants are asked to estimate the probability. (2) Outcome condition: ‘hypothetically’ supposing as if they did not know the outcome information. 4. Hindsight bias : The decrease of estimated probability by the outcome information.

5. 2. A cross-cultural study on hindsight bias Choi and Nisbett (2000) Method: Korean and American participants were asked to estimate the probability of ‘help’ in Good Samaritan scenario. When Korean participants knew an unexpected outcome (no help), they estimated the probability of ‘help’ lower even though they were asked to suppose ‘hypothetically’ that they had not known it. → Greater hindsight bias → Koreans have more ‘complex models’ for events (holistic cognition) than Americans. Hindsight bias as one of the forms of holistic cognition

6. Fig.1 A model for the process of hindsight bias based on the causal model theory (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Scenario Initial Causal models Original Prediction Added information (unexpected outcome) Revised Causal models New prediction Magnitude of hindsight bias Implicit access to causal factors

7. 3.1 Analytic vs. holistic cognition Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) Westerners – analytic cognition - Individualist culture Easterners – holistic cognition - Collectivist culture Analytic cognition Detachment of the object from its context A tendency to focus on attributes of the object A preference for using rules Holistic cognition An orientation to the context of field as a whole A preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships between the objects and its context

8. 3.2 Attention between analytic and holistic Masuda and Nisbett (2001) Report American - more on the target fishes Japanese - more on field information : color of water, plants, etc. Recognition of the target fishes American – little differences between with background and without background Japanese – better when with background – field dependent attention

9. 3.3 Reasoning between analytic and holistic Peng and Nisbett (1999) Proverbs with contradiction vs without contradiction ex) Too humble is half proud Chinese are less sensitive to contradiction in proverbs, and like the proverbs with contradiction better than Americans do. cf. Philosophical tradition of Taoism and naïve dialectics Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002) Americans prefer to formal reasoning (rule-based), whereas Koreans like intuitive reasoning (similarity-based) in induction Koreans are more susceptible to belief bias in deduction

10. 3.4 The distinction between individualist culture and collectivist culture Triandis (1995) Individualism A social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives (family, co-workers, tribe, and nation), are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others, give priority to their personal goals over the goals of others, and emphasize rational analyses of the advantages and disadvantages to associating with others. Collectivism A social pattern that consists of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives, are primarily motivated by the norms of, and duties imposed by, those collectives, are willing to give priority to the goals of these collectives over their own personal goals, and emphasize their connectedness to members of these collectives.

11. 3.5 Explanation based on the distinction between individualist culture and collectivist culture Nisbett (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett et al., 2001) For Easterners in collectivist culture, harmony is more important than for Westerners in individualist culture, hence their cognition is focused not only on an object itself but also on the relationship between the object and its context. Ontology (naïve metaphysics) Westerners : Greek philosophy, abstract logic Tradition of debate Easterners : Taoism, yen and yan are closely related In-group harmony

12. 4.1 Two possible explanations for the cultural differences in hindsight bias (Choi & Nisbett, 2000) Easterners’ more ’Complex models’? The ‘Rule – dialectics’ hypothesis Westerners are more apt to ‘hypothetically’ follow the ‘rule’ based on the scenario, hence they did not revise their causal models even if they were given the outcome information. e.g. If X is kind, generous, and religious, X is very likely to help a victim. Easterner use dialectics and consider both the rule and the outcome information, the hindsight bias gets greater. The ‘Explicit – implicit’ hypothesis Easterners (Koreans) revised the causal models more implicitly, hence they were more unlikely to recognize the revision?

13. 4.2 Rule-based or dialectic? Peng and Nisbett (1999), Norenzayan et al. (2002) Easterners’ society – collectivist culture Rule-based reasoning is inappropriate Dialectic reasoning does not break harmony in group decision

14. 4.3 Explicit or implicit (1)? Hawkins and Hastie (1990) The outcome knowledge’s influence - ‘creeping determination’ → The immediate and automatic (implicit) integration of the outcome information to a person’s knowledge about an event. → If hindsight bias is stronger for Koreans, we infer that they integrated the outcome information (revise their causal models) more implicitly.

15. 4.3 Explicit or implicit (2) ? Dual process theories (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999) Holistic cognition - system 1 – implicit - evolutionarily older Analytic cognition - system 2 – explicit - evolutionarily newer Can be applied to the cultural differences in cognition? Yama, Nishioka, Horishita, Kawasaki, and Taniguchi (2007) Westerner – multicultural – need analytic and explicit thought (Needs to understand other culture’s customs) Easterner –monocultural –implicit comprehension of traditional rules Buchtel and Norenzayan (in press) ‘Easterners – implicit’ is an open question

16. 5. The general paradigm of experiments 1) Information that make people expects an outcome is given to participants, and the participants are asked to estimate the probability of the outcome. (Control: No outcome information; Outcome: Outcome information) (Implicit accessibility by outcome information) 2) Information that the expected outcome did not actually occur is given, and the participants are asked to point out possible reasons for this. (Explicit accessibility) 3) Participants are asked to judge the probability that the expected outcome occurred returning to the time when they were not yet informed of the outcome.

17. 6.1 Method of Experiment 1 Design 4 (nationality: French, British, Japanese, Korean) by 2 (outcome: control, outcome) by 2 (trial: initial, final) Participants 86 French university students. (C:44; O:42) 98 British university students. (C:49; O:49) 100 Japanese university students. (C:51; O:49) 95 Korean university students. (C:46; O:49)

18. (Page1) Please imagine that students are going to take an exam at a university. The lecturer said, “if a student studies hard, then (s)he will pass the exam.” Mary is a student at the university. She studied hard. But it turned out that Mary did not pass the exam later. Now if you had been asked the following question before you knew that Mary did not pass the exam, what might have been your answer? What is the probability that Mary will pass the exam in this situation? (Page 2) Although Mary studied hard, it turned out that she did not pass the exam. Please point out possible factors that might have influenced why she did not pass the exam one by one in the following space (in 4 minutes). (Page3) Finally, now please think back to the time when you knew only that Mary has studied hard. Please estimate the probability that she will pass the exam again. You can indicate a different number from your first one.

19. Fig.2 Prediction on estimated probability based on the hypotheses Rule-based without explicit revision Rule-based with explicit revision Rule-based with implicit revisionImplicit revision (Dialectics) Westerners Easterners Rule - dialectics Explicit - implicit

20. Figure 3. Initial and final mean estimated probabilities of Experiment 1(%). FrenchBritish Japanese Korean Rule - dialectics Explicit - implicit Rule-based with explicit revision Rule-based with implicit revision Implicit revision (Dialectics)

21. 6.2.1 Results and Discussion of Experiment 1 (1) French Rule-based with explicit revision French did not show hindsight bias. The outcome information did not make their causal models revised. They revised their causal models after pointing out the reasons. British and Japanese Rule-based with implicit revision The outcome information in effect revised the causal models? British and Japanese did not show hindsight bias British and Japanese might become cautious not to be affected by the outcome information, and thus they tried to be ‘hypothetical’, keeping the rule as it is. Korean Implicit revision (dialectical) Koreans showed hindsight bias. When the outcome information was given, an implicit access is made to revised causal models.

22. 6.2.2 Results and Discussion of Experiment 1 (2) Hindsight bias in the initial estimation was seen only in Korean. Japanese did not show hindsight bias. Hindsight bias is a product of implicit revision of causal models, but it disappears if people try to be ‘hypothetical’, following the rule. The ‘Rule – dialectics’ hypothesis Exceptions : Japanese The ‘Explicit – implicit’ hypothesis Exceptions : British Is implicit revision culturally universal to some extent?

23. 6.2.3 Results and Discussion of Experiment 1 (3) The difference between Choi and Nisbett’s (2000) study and our study Choi and Nisbett (2000) : A story on a seminary student who was very likely to help others with a no-help outcome Our study: Conditionals →encourage to think ‘hypothetically’? Experiment 2, The original scenario (a good Samaritan) of Choi and Nisbett (2000).

24. 7.1 Method of Experiment 2 The original scenario (a good Samaritan) of Choi and Nisbett (2000). Design 4 (nationality: French, British, Japanese, Korean) by 2 (outcome: control, outcome) by 2 (trial: initial, final) Participants 94 French university students. (C:46; O:48) 69 British university students. (C:33; O:36) 114 Japanese university students. (C:57; O:57) 102 Korean university students. (C:52; O:50)

25. (Page 1) Please imagine a seminary student whose name is John. He is religious, generous, and helpful. He was taking a sermon course. He was supposed to give a practice sermon as a course requirement. But, unfortunately, he was 10 minutes late for the sermon. The professor was known for being harsh on students for being late. While he was proceeding to the place where he was supposed to give a sermon, he came across a victim who was left lying down by an alley. But it turned out that John did not help the victim. Now if you had been asked the following question before you knew that John had not helped the victim, what might have been your answer? What is the probability that John will help the victim in this situation? (Page 2) Now, it turned out that he did not help the victim. Please point out possible factors that might have influenced why he did not help the victim one by one in the following space. (Page 3) Finally, please now think back to the time when you did not know the outcome that John had not helped the victim. Please estimate again the probability that he will help the victim and circle the number corresponding to your estimation. You can indicate a different number from your first one.

26. Figure 4. Initial and final mean estimated probabilities of Experiment 1(%). French British Japanese Korean Rule - dialectics Implicit revision (Dialectics) Rule-based with implicit revision

27. 7.2 Results and Discussion of Experiment 2 Easterners showed hindsight bias Westerners did not show hindsight bias, ‘BUT’ did implicit revision of causal models just by outcome information. The reason why Westerners did not show hindsight bias is because they tried to be ’hypothetical’ and readjusted their causal models to follow the rule they had spontaneously drawn from the scenario. e.g. If X is kind, generous, and religious, X is very likely to help a victim. The ‘Rule – dialectics’ hypothesis Better fit the data of Experiment 2

28. 8.1 General Discussion (1) Experiment 1 Experiment 2 (Conditionals) (Good Samaritan) French Rule-based with Rule-based with explicit revision implicit revision British Rule-based with Rule-based with implicit revision implicit revision Japanese Rule-based with Implicit revision implicit revision (Hindsight bias) Korean Implicit revision Implicit revision (Hindsight bias) (Hindsight bias) Westerners are more likely to make a rule-based reasoning and explicit cognition. The pressure to make a rule-based reasoning and explicit cognition are stronger in conditional reasoning.

29. 8.2 General Discussion (2) The ‘rule – dialectics’ hypothesis was more strongly supported than the ‘explicit - implicit’ hypothesis, but neither of them was complete to explain the cultural differences in hindsight bias →’Implicit revision’ is universal to some extent? →Even Easterners (Japanese) show tendency of reasoning hypothetically. Hindsight bias is caused by the implicit revision of the causal models, which may be universal to some extent, BUT, can be suppressed by rule-based reasoning, which may be more used for Westerners.

30. 9.1 Future research (framework for cultural differences) Culture Cultural Specific Behavior Mental Function and Structure Culture Mental Function and Structure Mental Function and Structure Adaptive Problems Culturally universal Shaping of mind Shaping of culture Fig.5b A interactive view of culture-mind relationship (the cultural psychology view) Fig.5a A traditional view of cultural differences (the universality view) Fig.5c A interactive view with adaptive problems (Yama et al., 2007) Letter Religion Computer

31. 9.2 Future research (framework for cultural differences) Cultural psychology framework Culture – self-construal – cognitive style Individualist culture – independent self-construal – analytic cognition detachment rule-based Collectivist culture – interdependent self-construal – holistic cognition contextualized dialectic cf. Kuhnen & Schubert (2001) Cultural priming Differences between yourself and others – analytic cognition Similarities between yourself and others – holistic cognition

32. 9.3 Future research (framework for cultural differences) Ecological framework Multi-culture (high relational mobility) - Explicit social contract - rule-based Low-context culture – communication with explicit assumption Adaptive problems : Being accepted by out-group members and detecting violation of social contract Mono-culture (low relational mobility) – Keep in-group harmony - dialectics High-context culture – communication with implicit assumptions Adaptive problem : Keeping in-group harmony and detecting free-riding from out-group members

33. THANK YOU This research is supported by the grant from France-Japan Research Cooperative Program (CHORUS), and by a grant-in-aid from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (No. 16530483). The co-authors of this research are, Ken I. MANKTELOW (University of Wolverhampton, UK), Hugo MERCIER (Institute Jean Nicod, France), Jean-Baptiste VAN DER HENST (Institute des Sciences Cognitives, France), Kyung Soo DO (Sung Kyun Kwan University, Korea), Yayoi KAWASAKI (Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan), Kuniko ADACHI (National Institute of Longevity Sciences, Japan). I also thank Minoru KARASAWA, Incheol CHOI, Wai Ling LAI, Junichi TANIGUCHI, Masasi HATTORI, Masaki YUKI, David E. OVER, Yukinori TAKUBO, Liden BALL, Hartmut Blanc, Shira ELQAYAM, Jonathan EVANS, and Mike OAKSFORD