1. Class 8 – Emerging Powers in Comparative Perspective Dr. Vinícius Rodrigues Vieira (Lecturer in International Relations) IRI-USP, São Paulo, 11 April 2016

2.  In the previous week, we saw that at the regional level China and India have been forced to flex their muscles beyond economic power;  Structural and military empowerment!!!  Global impact!  By contrast, Brazil does not face the same level of competition within South America...  It is considered to be far from achieving great power status...  So does the regional level impact a country’s rise?

3.  Brazil’s case suggests the hypothesis is valid  Sluggish economic growth;  Slowing-down state capitalism;  Declining aspirations at the global level;  Problems of leadership within South America.

4.  Mercosur  Cooperation with Argentina (1985)  Paraguay and Uruguay (1991)  Official launch (1995)  EU as a model  Never fulfilled…  Argentinean debacle (2001)  Pink-tied left (2000s)  China’s Rise (2000s)  Financial Crisis (2008-)  Venezuela’s entrance (2012)  So the bloc became tasteless and with holes…

5.  Mercosur

8.  Venezuela’s entrance (2012)  Paraguayan suspension  The only who had not ratified  Brazilian entrepreneurs: SPLIT!!!  Agriculture and Industry: opportunities, but fears of threatening US and EU regarding future partnerships;  Services: construction conglomerates sought opportunities.  Pursuit of bilateral agreements  Argentina and China partnership (2015)  trade + investment  “Brazil left a void space”, says a diplomat;  Uruguay considered signing a PTA with the US.  In the meantime…

9. Source: Oliveira (2012)  Commodity boom (irrelevant PTAs???)

13.  Commodity boom  All cards in WTO’s Doha Round;  Target: reduction of agricultural subsidies;  Reality: pursuit of leadership in the Global South amid decline in the proportion of high-added value exports;  Diplomacy as a means of development;  But satisfies domestic demands too…  Growing influence of agribusiness;  Macroeconomic stability matters for social policy.

16.  Reduction of inequality  Rising commodity prices: Chinese demand;  Winners: primary sector entrepreneurs;  Losers: manufacturers.  Expansion of internal market: declining inequality due to reasons that still need further clarification:  Increase in labour earnings account for about 66%;  About 1.5 million new formal jobs per year under Lula!!!  Cash transfers (which were initiated under Cardoso and expanded by Lula) account for only 17% of this process.

18.  The Party is Over!!!

24.  Brazil’s seem to lack economic power (in relative terms...) ...without economic power  NO possibility of having other types of power  Structural power;  Military power:  Brazil joined the NPT in 1998 and therefore resigned to the right to have nuclear weapons...  Therefore...

25.  Not a would-be great power. So, is it a middle power??? “It is autonomously powerless to bring major change and able to act effectively only with acquiescence from great powers and the active cooperation of other middle powers. Preservation of relative peace and stability in the international system is the name of the game... Middle powers are particularly effective as defensive forerunners for the great powers’ systemic desires because they are not perceived as harboring ambitions for domination…” (Burges, 2013: 288-289).

26.  Classical cases: Canada and Australia, which share common characteristics...  Industrialized, but relevant commodity exporters;  No major military power  reliance on structural power;  Anglo-Saxon Heritage  Members of the Commonwealth;  They have been benefiting from US hegemonic stability.  Could Brazil be a middle power?  South America: low inter-state violence (war), notwithstanding the rise of non-state security threats, such as narcotraffic (Burges, 2013: 288).

27.  Some unique characteristics  Out of all BRICS, it is the only one that has not been directly involved in the major disputes of power at the world stage in the 20th Century;  NOT a “monster country” (Lafer, 2000);  NOT colonized or an expansionist empire during most of the 1800s-1900s;  Dubious identity: both Western and Non- Western traits (or sees itself as Western, yet has not received full recognition from West for this).

28.  “To the frustration of the existing middle powers bent on incorporating a new voice into their fold, Brazil does not seem to realize that it should happily (and quietly) join the liberal ‘West’ club constructed by the United States and used to set up the current framework of global governance rules and institutions… For a country like Brazil, which has largely existed outside the closely integrated U.S. alliance, this implies a need to rethink global order and to push for approaches that challenge, change or block the ambitions of the existing hegemonic decision makers” (Burges, 2013: 286).

30.  “A central precept of Brazilian foreign policy beyond being a major power or major power-to-be is that the country is not part of the dominant North-Atlantic bloc set up and managed by the United States. The Brazilian view of how international society should be structured and operate deviates from the United States-led bloc’s turn towards strengthened international regimes and institutions, remaining instead fixated on the preservation of sovereignty and maintenance of the principle of non-intervention” (Burges, 2013: 287).

31.  US perception: Brazil is unreliable;  2010 nuclear deal with Iran (brokerage with Turkey) (Burges, 2013, 297)  although the story is more complicated...  Reality: belief in multilateralism (yet not US-centered)  Soft balancing of the established powers through changes in the distribution of structural power;  Democratization of current organizations;  IMF and World Bank (as discussed two weeks ago!!!);  BRICS!!!

33.  So what???  Mistake in trying to re-shape structural power without much economic power  inverted equation;  Brazil can be considered a middle power if in the long run it does not side much with either US or China;  Middle power  favors the status quo...  Next would-be status quo...  Is it the case of South Africa?