1. 국제정치론 2015 가을학기 제 10 주 (2) 최현진 정경대학 정치외교학과 choihj@khu.ac.kr

2. 제 10 주 (2) 핵무기와 군비통제

3. 군축과 군비통제 : 주요 개념 군축 ( Disarmament ) – 현존하는 무력의 수단을 절대적으로 축소하거나 궁극적으로 철폐하는 것 1991 미 ∙ 소 전략무시감축협정 (START), 1987 중단거리 핵미사일 폐기협정 (INF) 군비통제 ( Arms Control ) – 군사력의 보유를 인정하되 무모한 군비경쟁을 방지하고 적절한 힘의 균형을 이루어 평화를 확보하는 것 1959 남극조약, 1972 미 ∙ 소 전략무기제한협정

4. 군축과 군비통제 : 주요 개념 수직적 확산 ( Vertical proliferation ) – 이미 핵무기를 보유한 국가들이 핵 보유고를 늘리는 행위 수평적 확산 ( Horizontal proliferation ) – 핵무기를 보유한 국가의 수가 증가하는 현상

5. 군축과 군비통제 군축의 조건 – 정치적 관계 개선과 긴장완화 – 군사적 균형 – 국방비 절감의 필요성 – 상호간의 신뢰 군축을 어렵게 만드는 제약 요소 – 국가간 군비경쟁 – 병영국가 또는 군국주의적 성격을 가진 국가 – 군산복합체의 영향력 – 사찰 / 검증의 기술적 어려움 – 무기기술의 발전

6. 세계 핵탄두 보유 현황 (출처: www.psriowa.org)

7. 핵 비확산을 위한 노력 : NPT 1970 년 핵 비확산조약 (NPT) 발효 – 현재 189 개국 참여 NPT 조약의 네 가지 의무 – 핵 미 보유국은 핵무기를 개발하지 않는다. – 핵 보유국은 핵 미 보유국에 핵 기술과 핵무기를 제공하지 않는다. – 핵 보유국은 핵의 평화적 사용을 위한 발전 기술과 정보를 제공한다. – 핵 보유국은 핵 군비경쟁을 중단하고 군축을 위해 노력한다.

8. 핵 비확산을 위한 노력 : IAEA 1957 년 국제원자력기구 ( International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA ) 창설 IAEA 의 세가지 기능 – 핵의 평화적 이용을 장려하고 이에 필요한 물자, 서비스 설비를 제공 – 핵 발전 시설에 대한 감독과 사찰 – 핵 안전사고 예방을 위한 안전장치 마련

9. 핵 군비경쟁 냉전시기 미 ∙ 소 양국의 군비경쟁 – 미국은 1988 년 1 만 3,000 개의 핵탄두를 보유 – 소련은 1989 년 1 만 1,000 개의 핵탄두를 보유 더 많은 핵무기는 평화를 가져오는가 ? – 가공할 파괴력으로 인한 전쟁 억제효과 ? – 선제공격 가능성 – 우발적 핵전쟁의 가능성

10. 미국과 러시아의 핵탄두 보유량

11. 핵 군비경쟁 핵 군비경쟁은 왜 일어나는가 ? – 안보딜레마 (1 차 공격능력 강화 ) – 기술의 발전 미사일 방어체제 Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) 복수개별유도탄두

12. 복수개별유도탄두 (MIRV)

13. 쿠바미사일위기 1962. 10

14. The Cuban Missile Crisis In October 1962, the U.S. and the Soviet Union came to the brink of war. In early 1962, the Soviet Union was transporting large amount of arms and some troops to Cuba. Never before had Moscow stationed nuclear weapons outside its own territorial borders.

15. The Cuban Missile Crisis On September 11, the Soviet government made the following announcement: –“There is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”

16. The Cuban Missile Crisis In response, President Kennedy promised that he would not invade Cuba unless Cuba threatened other nations in Latin America or became an offensive base for the Soviet Union. If, however, Cuba became an offensive base for the Soviet Union, then the U.S. will do whatever to protect its own security.

17. The Cuban Missile Crisis On October 15-16, the United States had discovered Soviet ballistic missiles (with nuclear warheads) in Cuba. Why did the Soviet Union undertake such a reckless move?

19. The Cuban Missile Crisis Nuclear imbalance? In 1962, the United States had at least 180 ICBMs, 12 submarines (each carrying 12 nuclear warheads), and 630 strategic bombers stationed in the U.S., Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union had only 20 ICBMs and 6 submarines without foreign nuclear bases.

20. The Cuban Missile Crisis Berlin? In 1945, Berlin had been divided into zones of occupation among the Americans, British, French, and Soviets. West Berlin was located in the heart of the communist East German state. In 1958, Khrushchev had decided to make West Berlin the key battlefield in the Cold War, demanding that the West withdraw from Berlin.

21. West and East Berlin

22. The Cuban Missile Crisis If the U.S. did nothing, Khrushchev would force the West out of Berlin, confident that the missiles in Cuba would deter the Americans from starting a war. If the Americans tried to negotiate, Khrushchev could trade Cuba with Berlin. If the Americans blockaded or attacked Cuba, he could use this as the excuse for an equivalent blockade or attack on Berlin.

23. Kennedy and Khrushchev

24. The Cuban Missile Crisis How did the United States respond to the missile deployment in Cuba? President Kennedy assembled his most trusted advisers in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) Let’s look at all the possible alternatives.

26. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 1: Do Nothing

27. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 1: Do Nothing Benefits: –The U.S. should not overreact to the Soviet move and prompt an explosive countermove against Berlin. Costs: –Failing to respond would divide allies –Weakens the U.S. position in the West –Domestic consequences of inaction would be intolerable. (Kennedy said, “Well, I think I would have been impeached.”)

28. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 2: Diplomacy –Negotiating the removal of the missiles with bargaining on both sides (suggested by Adlai Stevenson).

29. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 2: Diplomacy –Negotiating the removal of the missiles with bargaining on both sides (suggested by Adlai Stevenson). Benefits: –No military conflict? Costs: –While the diplomats argued, the missiles in Cuba would become operational –Breaking up the alliance by confirming European suspicions that the U.S. would sacrifice their security to protect its own interests.

30. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 3: A Secret Approach to Castro

31. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 3: A Secret Approach to Castro Benefits: –Castro might break with Moscow if he knew that he was in deadly danger. Costs: –Missiles were firmly under Soviet control!

32. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 4: Invasion –General Taylor said, “I am a pessimist, Mr. President. We have a war plan over there for you. It calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers to take an island.”

33. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 4: Invasion –General Taylor said, “I am a pessimist, Mr. President. We have a war plan over there for you. It calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers to take an island.” Benefits: –The U.S. could remove not only the missiles but also Castro regime. Costs: –Possible nuclear disaster. –An equivalent Soviet move against West Berlin.

34. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 5: Air Strike –The removal of the missile sites by a swift conventional air attack.

35. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 5: Air Strike –The removal of the missile sites by a swift conventional air attack. Benefits: –A strike would remove the missiles before they became operational. Costs: –Even if the missile sites could be destroyed, the Soviet bombers might attack the southeastern U.S. –A surprise air attack would kill Russians at the missile sites. –A surprise attack was like Pearl Harbor.

36. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 6: Blockade with “ultimatum” –An embargo on military shipments to Cuba enforced by a naval blockade. –Demanding removal of the missiles –No negotiations –The threat of further military action –Supported by Robert Kennedy.

37. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 6: Blockade with “ultimatum” Benefits: –Convey a sense of imminent confrontation without direct military action. Costs: –Soviet might blockade Berlin (joint blockade). –If Soviet ships did not stop, the U.S. would be forced to fire the first shot, inviting Soviet retaliation. –Blockade itself was not related to those missiles already in Cuba. A blockade might allow the Soviets to buy time to complete the missile installations.

38. The Cuban Missile Crisis Alternative 7: Blockade with “negotiations” –A naval blockade. –Do not demand removal of the missiles already there. –Offer a summit meeting. –Striking a deal that might trade withdrawal of missiles in Cuba for American concessions on its missiles in Turkey and Italy. –Supported by McNamara and Stevenson

39. The Cuban Missile Crisis On October 20-21, President Kennedy chose Alternative 6: Blockade with Ultimatum. The blockade was coupled with a demand for withdrawal of the missiles. No summit meeting or other channels of negotiation was offered. Direct military action (air strike and invasion) against Cuba was threatened. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W50RNAbmy3M

40. The Cuban Missile Crisis How did the Soviet Union respond? On October 24, Khrushchev sent a letter saying that he would tell Soviet captains to ignore the American blockade. He also called for a summit meeting with Kennedy. On October 25, Khrushchev said that he wanted to resolve the crisis. He suggested the terms, “Give us a pledge not to invade Cuba, and we will remove the missiles… to make Cuba into a zone of peace.”

41. The Cuban Missile Crisis The blockade showed U.S. willingness to escalate this crisis to the point of risking a military confrontation. It was the first step in a series of moves that threatened air strike or invasion. Without such threat, the blockade alone would not have forced the removal of the missiles already present. Khrushchev faced a clear, urgent threat that America was about to move up the ladder of escalation.